{
"version": 3,
"sources": ["../src/modules/privacy.js"],
"sourcesContent": ["// zelvior-runtime/privacy -- client-side privacy and anti-annoyance\n// protections. ESM source of truth; bundled by build.mjs. Zero dependency\n// on core zelvior.js.\n//\n// Read this before using it. A JS module running in a page (or, for the\n// extension, a content script) cannot do everything \"privacy protection\"\n// might suggest:\n//\n// - It CANNOT block third-party ad/tracker *network requests* -- that\n// requires intercepting requests before they're sent, which only a\n// browser extension's declarativeNetRequest API (or a network-level\n// proxy/DNS blocker) can do. The zelvior-extension does this\n// separately, with a deliberately compact, documented filter list --\n// not this npm package, which has no access to the network layer at\n// all. If you're using this module directly on a page (not through the\n// extension), you are not getting network-level ad/tracker blocking.\n// - It CANNOT reliably stop a page from navigating itself away via\n// `window.location = url` -- modern browsers do not allow scripts to\n// intercept or veto that assignment, by design (this module does not\n// pretend otherwise). What it CAN do: remove ``\n// redirect tags before they fire (a real, common technique that\n// auto-redirect pages actually rely on), and block `window.open()`\n// popups that aren't tied to a genuine user gesture.\n// - \"Stealth mode\" reduces specific, well-known fingerprinting vectors\n// (canvas reads, WebRTC local IP leakage) -- it does not make a browser\n// untraceable, and it has real functional trade-offs, documented at\n// each function below. Anything claiming \"no one can track you\" from a\n// JS snippet is overstating what's possible; this module doesn't.\n\nvar counters = { popupsBlocked: 0, metaRefreshRemoved: 0, fingerprintCallsBlocked: 0 };\n\n// --- Global Privacy Control (GPC) / Do Not Track --------------------------\n// GPC is a real, currently-in-force legal signal: California's CCPA/CPRA\n// regulations (and several other US state privacy laws) require\n// businesses to honor it as a valid \"opt out of sale/sharing\" request\n// when a site reads `navigator.globalPrivacyControl === true`. This is\n// not a hypothetical or symbolic gesture -- it is the actual mechanism\n// the law defines. What this function does NOT do: force a site to\n// comply (compliance is a legal, not technical, guarantee), or add the\n// `Sec-GPC: 1` HTTP header (a page script cannot add headers to the\n// browser's own top-level request for itself; that requires the\n// extension's declarativeNetRequest layer, done separately).\nvar gpcSet = false;\nexport function sendDoNotSellSignal() {\n try {\n Object.defineProperty(window.navigator, 'globalPrivacyControl', { value: true, configurable: true, writable: false });\n gpcSet = true;\n } catch (e) {\n // Some engines make `navigator` properties non-configurable once set\n // by the browser itself (a few browsers now implement GPC natively\n // and expose it as a real, non-overridable property) -- if so, check\n // whether it's already true rather than treating this as a failure.\n try { gpcSet = window.navigator.globalPrivacyControl === true; } catch (e2) { gpcSet = false; }\n }\n try {\n // Do Not Track: the older, non-legally-binding precursor to GPC.\n // Largely superseded and ignored by most sites today, but still\n // checked by a handful -- costs nothing to also set.\n Object.defineProperty(window.navigator, 'doNotTrack', { value: '1', configurable: true });\n } catch (e) {}\n return gpcSet;\n}\nexport function isDoNotSellSignalActive() {\n try { return window.navigator.globalPrivacyControl === true; } catch (e) { return gpcSet; }\n}\n\n// --- Popup blocking --------------------------------------------------------\n// Blocks `window.open()` calls that are not tied to a genuine, current\n// user gesture (`navigator.userActivation.isActive`, the real browser API\n// for this -- not a heuristic guess). This is the same mechanism browsers\n// themselves use internally to decide whether to allow a popup at all;\n// this function makes the check available to page code and lets you\n// react to (and count) blocked attempts, and lets a specific origin be\n// allowlisted.\nvar originalOpen = null;\nvar popupAllowlist = {};\n\nexport function blockPopups(opts) {\n opts = opts || {};\n if (originalOpen) return; // already active\n originalOpen = window.open;\n window.open = function (url, target, features) {\n var hasGesture = typeof window.navigator.userActivation === 'object'\n ? window.navigator.userActivation.isActive\n : true; // engines without the Activation API (rare) fail open rather than breaking every window.open call\n var origin = null;\n try { origin = new URL(url, window.location.href).origin; } catch (e) {}\n var allowed = hasGesture || (origin && popupAllowlist[origin]);\n if (allowed) return originalOpen.call(window, url, target, features);\n counters.popupsBlocked++;\n if (typeof opts.onBlocked === 'function') {\n try { opts.onBlocked({ url: url, origin: origin }); } catch (e) {}\n }\n return null; // matches what a real browser popup blocker returns\n };\n}\nexport function restorePopups() {\n if (originalOpen) { window.open = originalOpen; originalOpen = null; }\n}\nexport function allowPopupsFrom(origin) { popupAllowlist[origin] = true; }\nexport function isBlockingPopups() { return originalOpen !== null; }\n\n// --- Meta-refresh redirect removal -----------------------------------------\n// Removes `` tags (the classic \"you will be\n// redirected in 3 seconds\" mechanism many redirect/ad-gate pages use)\n// before the browser acts on them. This only works if called before the\n// browser's own refresh timer fires -- call it as early as possible\n// (e.g. at `document_start` in an extension content script, which is\n// exactly when the zelvior-extension calls it).\nexport function removeMetaRefresh(root) {\n var doc = root || document;\n var tags = doc.querySelectorAll('meta[http-equiv=\"refresh\" i]');\n var removed = 0;\n for (var i = 0; i < tags.length; i++) {\n if (tags[i].parentNode) { tags[i].parentNode.removeChild(tags[i]); removed++; }\n }\n counters.metaRefreshRemoved += removed;\n return removed;\n}\n\n// --- Stealth mode (opt-in anti-fingerprinting) -----------------------------\n// REAL TRADE-OFFS, same honesty standard as Z.lite -- read every line\n// before enabling. Each piece below breaks a real, legitimate use of the\n// API it touches; this is why it's a function you call, not a default.\nvar stealthActive = false;\nvar originalToDataURL = null, originalGetImageData = null, originalRTCPeerConnection = null;\n\nfunction addCanvasNoise(imageData) {\n // Adds a single-bit, per-pixel-channel perturbation seeded per-canvas-\n // read-call -- enough to change the resulting hash fingerprinting\n // libraries compute from canvas output, without being visible to the\n // human eye. This is the same category of technique browsers'\n // themselves (Brave, Firefox's canvas-poisoning) and privacy extensions\n // use; it is not a novel invention here.\n var d = imageData.data;\n for (var i = 0; i < d.length; i += 4) {\n var n = (Math.random() < 0.5) ? -1 : 1;\n d[i] = Math.max(0, Math.min(255, d[i] + n));\n }\n return imageData;\n}\n\n/**\n * Enables a bundle of anti-fingerprinting measures:\n * - Canvas noise: `HTMLCanvasElement.toDataURL()` and\n * `CanvasRenderingContext2D.getImageData()` return imperceptibly\n * perturbed pixel data. BREAKS: any legitimate use of canvas image\n * export/inspection that needs exact pixel values (image editors,\n * QR/barcode scanners reading a canvas, some canvas-based tests).\n * - WebRTC local-IP leak prevention: blocks `RTCPeerConnection` from\n * gathering \"host\" ICE candidates, which is the specific mechanism\n * that leaks a device's real local (and sometimes public) IP address\n * even behind a VPN. BREAKS: legitimate WebRTC video/audio calls and\n * peer-to-peer connections, which need those candidates to connect at\n * all -- this will make video-calling sites stop working while active.\n */\nexport function enableStealthMode() {\n if (stealthActive) return;\n stealthActive = true;\n if (typeof window.HTMLCanvasElement !== 'undefined') {\n originalToDataURL = window.HTMLCanvasElement.prototype.toDataURL;\n window.HTMLCanvasElement.prototype.toDataURL = function () {\n counters.fingerprintCallsBlocked++;\n var ctx = this.getContext && this.getContext('2d');\n if (ctx) {\n try {\n var data = ctx.getImageData(0, 0, this.width, this.height);\n ctx.putImageData(addCanvasNoise(data), 0, 0);\n } catch (e) {}\n }\n return originalToDataURL.apply(this, arguments);\n };\n }\n if (typeof window.CanvasRenderingContext2D !== 'undefined') {\n originalGetImageData = window.CanvasRenderingContext2D.prototype.getImageData;\n window.CanvasRenderingContext2D.prototype.getImageData = function () {\n counters.fingerprintCallsBlocked++;\n var data = originalGetImageData.apply(this, arguments);\n return addCanvasNoise(data);\n };\n }\n if (typeof window.RTCPeerConnection !== 'undefined') {\n originalRTCPeerConnection = window.RTCPeerConnection;\n window.RTCPeerConnection = function (config) {\n config = config || {};\n // Forces the relay-only ICE transport policy, which prevents host\n // (local network) and most reflexive (public IP-revealing)\n // candidates from ever being gathered -- the real, documented fix\n // for the WebRTC IP-leak fingerprinting/deanonymization vector.\n config.iceTransportPolicy = 'relay';\n counters.fingerprintCallsBlocked++;\n return new originalRTCPeerConnection(config);\n };\n window.RTCPeerConnection.prototype = originalRTCPeerConnection.prototype;\n }\n}\n\nexport function disableStealthMode() {\n if (!stealthActive) return;\n if (originalToDataURL) { window.HTMLCanvasElement.prototype.toDataURL = originalToDataURL; originalToDataURL = null; }\n if (originalGetImageData) { window.CanvasRenderingContext2D.prototype.getImageData = originalGetImageData; originalGetImageData = null; }\n if (originalRTCPeerConnection) { window.RTCPeerConnection = originalRTCPeerConnection; originalRTCPeerConnection = null; }\n stealthActive = false;\n}\nexport function isStealthModeActive() { return stealthActive; }\n\n/** Snapshot of what this module has actually blocked/removed/modified so far, for real display -- not simulated numbers. */\nexport function metrics() {\n return {\n popupsBlocked: counters.popupsBlocked,\n metaRefreshRemoved: counters.metaRefreshRemoved,\n fingerprintCallsBlocked: counters.fingerprintCallsBlocked,\n };\n}\n"],
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"names": ["privacy_exports", "__export", "allowPopupsFrom", "blockPopups", "disableStealthMode", "enableStealthMode", "isBlockingPopups", "isDoNotSellSignalActive", "isStealthModeActive", "metrics", "removeMetaRefresh", "restorePopups", "sendDoNotSellSignal", "__toCommonJS", "counters", "gpcSet", "e2", "originalOpen", "popupAllowlist", "opts", "url", "target", "features", "hasGesture", "origin", "e", "allowed", "root", "doc", "tags", "removed", "i", "stealthActive", "originalToDataURL", "originalGetImageData", "originalRTCPeerConnection", "addCanvasNoise", "imageData", "d", "n", "ctx", "data", "config"]
}