export interface SandboxOptions {
    timeoutMs?: number;
    memoryLimitMb?: number;
}
/**
 * Operator opt-in env var that allows {@link runInWorker} to execute on Node.js
 * despite the lack of permission isolation. Read via {@link getHostEnv} so that
 * a per-request project env overlay cannot enable unsafe execution from inside
 * a tenant context.
 *
 * @internal Exported for testing.
 */
export declare const NODE_SANDBOX_ALLOW_UNSAFE_ENV = "VERYFRONT_NODE_SANDBOX_ALLOW_UNSAFE";
/**
 * Pure decision helper for the Node.js sandbox guard. Given the raw env-var
 * value, decide whether to block execution on Node.
 *
 * Returns `true` only when the value is the literal string `"1"`. Any other
 * value (including `"true"`, `"yes"`, whitespace, or empty string) keeps the
 * guard active. Strict equality is intentional for a security opt-in.
 *
 * @internal Exported for testing only.
 */
export declare function isNodeSandboxAllowedUnsafe(envValue: string | undefined): boolean;
/**
 * Operator opt-in env var that allows {@link runInWorker} to execute on Bun
 * despite the lack of permission isolation. Read via {@link getHostEnv} so that
 * a per-request project env overlay cannot enable unsafe execution from inside
 * a tenant context.
 *
 * @internal Exported for testing.
 */
export declare const BUN_SANDBOX_ALLOW_UNSAFE_ENV = "VERYFRONT_BUN_SANDBOX_ALLOW_UNSAFE";
/**
 * Pure decision helper for the Bun sandbox guard. Given the raw env-var
 * value, decide whether to block execution on Bun.
 *
 * Returns `true` only when the value is the literal string `"1"`. Any other
 * value (including `"true"`, `"yes"`, whitespace, or empty string) keeps the
 * guard active. Strict equality is intentional for a security opt-in.
 *
 * @internal Exported for testing only.
 */
export declare function isBunSandboxAllowedUnsafe(envValue: string | undefined): boolean;
/**
 * Run untrusted JavaScript in an isolated Worker.
 *
 * ## Isolation model
 *
 * - **Deno (recommended):** the worker is spawned with `permissions: "none"`,
 *   denying filesystem, network, env, and subprocess access. This is the
 *   primary safe execution path.
 * - **Node.js:** Node Workers do not support permission isolation. They
 *   inherit full access to the filesystem, network, env vars, and built-in
 *   modules. Only memory limits can be enforced. Because of this, the Node
 *   path is **disabled by default** and throws {@link NOT_SUPPORTED}.
 *   Operators who deliberately trust their input may set the env var
 *   `VERYFRONT_NODE_SANDBOX_ALLOW_UNSAFE=1` to bypass the guard.
 * - **Bun:** Bun Workers have the same lack of permission isolation as Node.js.
 *   The Bun path is **disabled by default** and throws {@link NOT_SUPPORTED}.
 *   Operators who deliberately trust their input may set the env var
 *   `VERYFRONT_BUN_SANDBOX_ALLOW_UNSAFE=1` to bypass the guard.
 *
 * Callers SHOULD NOT pass untrusted code to this function on Node.js or Bun
 * unless they have audited every caller and operator and accept the risk.
 *
 * @throws NOT_SUPPORTED on Node.js without the explicit opt-in env var.
 * @throws NOT_SUPPORTED on Bun without the explicit opt-in env var.
 */
export declare function runInWorker<T = unknown>(code: string, options?: SandboxOptions): Promise<T>;
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