/**
 * Built-in Semgrep taint rules.
 *
 * Semgrep's free community rulesets (p/owasp-top-ten, p/javascript, …)
 * do NOT include the taint-tracking rules for SQL injection, command
 * injection, and SSRF — those require `semgrep login` (a registry
 * account). That left a major detection gap: the product could not catch
 * three of the most important vulnerability classes offline.
 *
 * These embedded taint rules close that gap with zero login/network —
 * they ship with the package as a string and are written to a temp file
 * at scan time, then passed to semgrep with `--config`. Verified against
 * the eval fixtures.
 *
 * @module scanners/builtin-rules
 */
/** Embedded Semgrep taint rules (YAML). */
export declare const BUILTIN_SEMGREP_RULES = "rules:\n  - id: vaspera-sql-injection\n    mode: taint\n    severity: ERROR\n    languages: [javascript, typescript]\n    message: >-\n      Untrusted request input flows into a SQL query without\n      parameterization (SQL injection).\n    metadata:\n      category: security\n      cwe: \"CWE-89\"\n      owasp: \"A03:2021\"\n      vaspera: builtin\n    pattern-sources:\n      - pattern: req.query\n      - pattern: req.params\n      - pattern: req.body\n      - pattern: req.headers\n    pattern-sinks:\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: $X.query($SQL, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $SQL\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: $X.execute($SQL, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $SQL\n      - pattern: $X.raw(...)\n    pattern-sanitizers:\n      # Drizzle ORM / postgres.js / slonik sql`` tagged template: interpolated\n      # values become bound parameters, not raw SQL fragments. sql.raw(...) is\n      # intentionally NOT listed here \u2014 it bypasses parameterization and IS unsafe.\n      - pattern: sql`...`\n  - id: vaspera-command-injection\n    mode: taint\n    severity: ERROR\n    languages: [javascript, typescript]\n    message: >-\n      Untrusted request input flows into a shell command\n      (command injection).\n    metadata:\n      category: security\n      cwe: \"CWE-78\"\n      owasp: \"A03:2021\"\n      vaspera: builtin\n    pattern-sources:\n      - pattern: req.query\n      - pattern: req.params\n      - pattern: req.body\n    # exec/execSync run a shell string (dangerous with interpolation).\n    # Array-form spawn(cmd, [args]) is the SAFE alternative, so it is\n    # intentionally NOT a sink \u2014 flagging it would be a false positive.\n    pattern-sinks:\n      - pattern: exec(...)\n      - pattern: execSync(...)\n      - pattern: $CP.exec(...)\n      - pattern: $CP.execSync(...)\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: spawn($CMD, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $CMD\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: $CP.spawn($CMD, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $CMD\n  - id: vaspera-ssrf\n    mode: taint\n    severity: ERROR\n    languages: [javascript, typescript]\n    message: >-\n      Untrusted request input flows into an outbound request URL\n      (server-side request forgery).\n    metadata:\n      category: security\n      cwe: \"CWE-918\"\n      owasp: \"A10:2021\"\n      vaspera: builtin\n    pattern-sources:\n      - pattern: req.query\n      - pattern: req.params\n      - pattern: req.body\n    # Focus on the URL argument \u2014 taint in a request body/payload\n    # argument is not SSRF, so flagging it would be a false positive.\n    pattern-sinks:\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: fetch($URL, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $URL\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: axios.get($URL, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $URL\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: axios.post($URL, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $URL\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: axios($URL, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $URL\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: http.get($URL, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $URL\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: https.get($URL, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $URL\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: got($URL, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $URL\n  - id: vaspera-path-traversal\n    mode: taint\n    severity: ERROR\n    languages: [javascript, typescript]\n    message: >-\n      Untrusted request input flows into a filesystem path\n      (path traversal / CWE-22). An attacker can read or write arbitrary\n      files on the server by supplying a path like ../../etc/passwd.\n      Sanitize with path.basename() and resolve against a fixed root, or\n      use an explicit allowlist of permitted paths.\n    metadata:\n      category: security\n      cwe: \"CWE-22\"\n      owasp: \"A01:2021\"\n      vaspera: builtin\n    pattern-sources:\n      - pattern: req.query\n      - pattern: req.params\n      - pattern: req.body\n      - pattern: req.headers\n    # Sinks cover both the fs.-prefixed module form AND the bare/destructured\n    # form (import { readFile } from \"fs/promises\"; readFile(path)).\n    # Semgrep taint mode follows dataflow through intermediate variables, so\n    # readFile(join(\"/data\", req.query.file)) is caught because the tainted\n    # value reaches the first argument of readFile regardless of join().\n    # focus-metavariable: $PATH ensures we flag taint in the path argument\n    # only, not in the options/encoding/callback arguments (precision).\n    pattern-sinks:\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: readFile($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: readFileSync($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: writeFile($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: writeFileSync($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: appendFile($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: appendFileSync($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: createReadStream($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: createWriteStream($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: unlink($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: unlinkSync($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: rm($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: rmSync($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: readdir($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: readdirSync($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: fs.readFile($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: fs.readFileSync($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: fs.writeFile($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: fs.writeFileSync($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: fs.appendFile($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: fs.createReadStream($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: fs.createWriteStream($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: fs.unlink($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: fs.rm($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: fs.readdir($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: fs.promises.readFile($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: fs.promises.writeFile($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: res.sendFile($PATH, ...)\n          - focus-metavariable: $PATH\n    # path.basename / basename strips directory components \u2014 a basenamed value\n    # cannot traverse outside the current directory. path.resolve used as a\n    # sanitizer only when anchored to a constant root; basename is the key one.\n    pattern-sanitizers:\n      - pattern: path.basename(...)\n      - pattern: basename(...)\n  - id: vaspera-insecure-deserialization\n    severity: ERROR\n    languages: [javascript, typescript]\n    message: >-\n      Insecure deserialization (CWE-502): untrusted input is executed as code\n      via eval, the Function constructor, or an unsafe yaml.load. Use JSON.parse\n      or a safe schema (yaml.load(x, { schema: JSON_SCHEMA })).\n    metadata:\n      category: security\n      cwe: \"CWE-502\"\n      owasp: \"A08:2021\"\n      vaspera: builtin\n    # Not taint-tracked: these sinks execute their argument as code regardless\n    # of provenance, so the construct itself is the vulnerability.\n    pattern-either:\n      - pattern: eval(...)\n      - pattern: new Function(...)\n      # Single-arg yaml.load (no safe schema). A 1-arg pattern (no \"...\")\n      # naturally excludes the safe 2-arg form yaml.load(x, { schema }).\n      # Constrain the receiver to yaml-ish names so it doesn't match every\n      # unrelated .load() call.\n      - patterns:\n          - pattern: $YAML.load($X)\n          - metavariable-regex:\n              metavariable: $YAML\n              regex: (?i)(yaml|jsyaml)\n  - id: vaspera-xxe\n    severity: ERROR\n    languages: [javascript, typescript]\n    message: >-\n      XML external entity injection (XXE, CWE-611): an XML parser is constructed\n      without disabling external entity resolution. Disable DTD/entity expansion\n      or use a parser that is safe by default.\n    metadata:\n      category: security\n      cwe: \"CWE-611\"\n      owasp: \"A05:2021\"\n      vaspera: builtin\n    # xmldom's DOMParser resolves external entities by default; fast-xml-parser's\n    # XMLParser is safe by default and is intentionally NOT flagged.\n    pattern-either:\n      - pattern: new DOMParser()\n      - pattern: new DOMParser(...).parseFromString(...)\n  - id: vaspera-mass-assignment\n    # Not taint-tracked: structural patterns are used instead of taint mode.\n    # Taint mode propagates req.body taint to req.body.email (member access),\n    # which would flag the safe allowlist form values({ email: req.body.email }).\n    # Structural patterns match only when the whole-body object or a spread of\n    # it reaches a write sink \u2014 the critical precision line.\n    #\n    # Safe case \u2014 NOT flagged by any pattern below:\n    #   db.insert(users).values({ email: req.body.email, name: req.body.name })\n    # The arg is neither req.body (different expression) nor { ...req.body }\n    # (no object-spread of the whole body), so no pattern fires.\n    severity: ERROR\n    languages: [javascript, typescript]\n    message: >-\n      Mass assignment / over-posting (CWE-915): the entire request body (or a\n      spread of it) flows directly into an ORM write. An attacker can set\n      arbitrary fields such as isAdmin or role. Fix: pick only the scalar fields\n      you intend to write (e.g. email and name from req.body), or use a\n      validated DTO / pick() / allowlist.\n    metadata:\n      category: security\n      cwe: \"CWE-915\"\n      owasp: \"A08:2021 A04:2021\"\n      vaspera: builtin\n    pattern-either:\n      # ---- Drizzle / generic: .values(req.body) --------------------------------\n      - pattern: $DB.values(req.body)\n      # ---- Drizzle / generic: .values({ ...req.body }) -------------------------\n      - pattern: \"$DB.values({ ...req.body })\"\n      # ---- Drizzle / generic: .set(req.body) -----------------------------------\n      - pattern: $DB.set(req.body)\n      # ---- Drizzle / generic: .set({ ...req.body }) ----------------------------\n      - pattern: \"$DB.set({ ...req.body })\"\n      # ---- Prisma: .create({ data: req.body }) ---------------------------------\n      - pattern: \"$PRISMA.create({ data: req.body })\"\n      # ---- Prisma: .create({ data: { ...req.body } }) --------------------------\n      - pattern: \"$PRISMA.create({ data: { ...req.body } })\"\n      # ---- Prisma: .update/.upsert with data: req.body -------------------------\n      - pattern: \"$PRISMA.$METHOD({ ..., data: req.body })\"\n      # ---- Mongoose / generic: Model.create(req.body) --------------------------\n      - pattern: $MODEL.create(req.body)\n      # ---- Mongoose: .updateOne(filter, req.body) / .findByIdAndUpdate ----------\n      - pattern: $DOC.updateOne($FILTER, req.body)\n      - pattern: $DOC.findByIdAndUpdate($ID, req.body)\n      # ---- Generic: .insert(req.body) ------------------------------------------\n      - pattern: $DB.insert(req.body)\n  - id: vaspera-prototype-pollution\n    # Structural patterns (not taint-tracked) targeting the two highest-precision\n    # prototype pollution forms: bracket-assignment with a request-derived key,\n    # and Object.assign() with the entire request body/query as a source.\n    # Recursive-merge loops are not included \u2014 they cannot be expressed at the\n    # required precision level without an unacceptable FP rate.\n    #\n    # Safe cases \u2014 NOT flagged:\n    #   Object.assign({}, defaults)        \u2014 no req.* as second arg\n    #   profile.name = req.body.name       \u2014 static key, not bracket-assignment\n    severity: ERROR\n    languages: [javascript, typescript]\n    message: >-\n      Prototype pollution (CWE-1321): user-controlled input used as an object\n      key or merged via Object.assign can pollute Object.prototype. Fix: use\n      Object.create(null) for lookup maps, validate / allowlist keys before\n      assignment, and replace Object.assign(target, body) with a validated DTO.\n    metadata:\n      category: security\n      cwe: \"CWE-1321\"\n      owasp: \"A08:2021\"\n      vaspera: builtin\n    pattern-either:\n      # ---- Dynamic bracket-assignment with a request-derived key ---------------\n      # obj[req.body.key] = val or obj[req.body.$PROP] = val\n      # Static-key writes (obj.knownField = val) use dot notation so they do\n      # NOT match the bracket form \u2014 zero false positives on that pattern.\n      - pattern: $OBJ[req.body.$PROP] = $VAL\n      - pattern: $OBJ[req.query.$PROP] = $VAL\n      - pattern: $OBJ[req.params.$PROP] = $VAL\n      # ---- Object.assign with the entire request body/query as second arg ------\n      # Object.assign({}, defaults) is safe and will NOT match because\n      # 'defaults' is not req.body / req.query / req.params.\n      - pattern: Object.assign($TARGET, req.body)\n      - pattern: Object.assign($TARGET, req.query)\n      - pattern: Object.assign($TARGET, req.params)\n";
/**
 * Write the built-in rules to a temp file (once per process) and return
 * the path, for passing to `semgrep --config`.
 */
export declare function getBuiltinRulesPath(): Promise<string>;
//# sourceMappingURL=builtin-rules.d.ts.map