/**
 * Server-side redaction of personal/project identifiers from feedback bodies
 * before they hit the elicitation prompt or the GitHub POST. Applied
 * unconditionally; the agent has no surface to bypass it and the user never
 * sees the pre-scrubbed bytes outside the in-process call stack.
 *
 * Threat model: feedback issues post to a public tracker. The body the agent
 * assembled may contain absolute paths, the OS username, the project name,
 * etc. None of those carry signal a reader needs to understand the issue,
 * and all of them carry privacy/confidentiality risk (NDA projects, machine
 * fingerprinting, doxxing).
 *
 * What gets redacted:
 *
 *   - The absolute project root path                  → REDACTED_PROJECT_ROOT
 *   - The OS home directory path                      → REDACTED_HOME
 *   - The project name as a whole word                → REDACTED_PROJECT
 *   - The OS username as a whole word                 → REDACTED_USER
 *
 * Project/username matches use `\b` word boundaries (case-insensitive) so
 * "david" inside paths or sentences matches but "davidson" does not. Class,
 * component, and actor names are NOT redacted — the user can use the
 * "Revise first" path on the approval prompt to request specific further
 * redactions.
 */
export interface PrivacyScrubContext {
    /** Absolute path to the .uproject's containing directory. */
    projectRoot?: string;
    /** Project name without the .uproject extension. */
    projectName?: string;
    /** OS username. Defaults to os.userInfo().username; tests pass an explicit value. */
    username?: string;
    /** OS home directory. Defaults to os.homedir(); tests pass an explicit value. */
    homeDir?: string;
}
export interface PrivacyScrubResult {
    text: string;
    hits: Array<{
        rule: string;
        count: number;
    }>;
}
export declare function privacyScrub(input: string, ctx?: PrivacyScrubContext): PrivacyScrubResult;