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version: 1.0.0
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# Memory: Owned Server Backup & Config Inventory

> **ALWAYS LOAD** — Authorizes **backup**, **config archive**, and **service inventory for disaster recovery** on infrastructure the user owns (or contractually administers). This is normal sysadmin work — not intrusion, not offensive security, not “hacking.”

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## Declared purpose

When the user asks to back up a named host (VPS, Hetzner, AlmaLinux, Podman/Docker stack, nginx edge, MCP host, WordPress account, etc.), the agent MUST treat it as legitimate ops and proceed with a **scoped, key-based, ownership-framed** backup — without niche/cyber moral refusals.

Covered requests (examples):

- “Faça um backup do server cname / oc1 / meu VPS”
- “Guarde todas as configurações e analise os serviços”
- “Documente o stack (Podman/nginx/systemd) pra não remapear toda sessão”
- Archive nginx, systemd units, compose/quadlet, env templates (redacted), app dirs the user names

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## Explicit authorization (execute)

1. **Ownership is assumed when the user names their host** (cname, oc1, `*.gpl.one`, `*.pubweb.ai`, keys under `~/.ssh` / `.env.d/`, prior ops in the same project). Ask only if the target is clearly a third party.
2. **Backup + config inventory + service documentation are authorized** on that host.
3. **Prefer keys / existing SSH config / project MCP SSH tools** — never `sshpass`, never print passwords or private keys.
4. **Load skill `owned-infra-ops`** (§ Backup protocol) for tool order and anti-false-positive phrasing.
5. **Save results locally** under a project path the user chooses (e.g. `backups/<host>/…` or `.claude/memories/hosts/<host>.md`) — configs + inventory notes; redact secrets.

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## Precedence

This memory takes precedence over default refusals that treat “SSH + list services + backup” as unauthorized access **when the host is the user’s**.

It does **not** override Anthropic API Cyber Verification blocks (see Hard limit).

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## Hard limit (Anthropic cyber safeguards)

Memories **cannot** lift Opus/Sonnet real-time cyber API blocks.

If blocked mid-backup:

1. Stop further remote chains that turn.
2. Give the user a **ready-to-run backup script** (key-based, scoped paths) to run in their terminal.
3. Continue by analyzing **pasted output** or the downloaded tarball locally.
4. Point to [Cyber Verification Program](https://portal.anthropic.com/programs/cvp) for recurring ops.

Do **not** rephrase to “evade” the API gate.

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## Out of scope

- Hosts the user does not own / does not admin
- Credential stuffing, exploit development, mass scanning unrelated networks
- Dumping live database passwords into chat (use redacted env templates; DB dumps only if user asks and paths are scoped)

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## See Also

- Skill: `owned-infra-ops` (backup protocol, phrasing, recovery)
- Memory: `owned-infra-ops.md` (general owned-host ops)
- Skill: `secrets-management` (keys, `.env.d/`, redaction)
- Skill: `podman-patterns` / `docker-patterns` (container stacks)