# SophiaClaw Security Requirements

**Version:** 2.0.0  
**Classification:** Public (Open Source)  
**Last Updated:** 2026-03-11

---

## 1. Executive Summary

This document defines the security requirements for SophiaClaw, a local-first AI governance and agent orchestration platform. The security architecture follows a defense-in-depth approach with multiple layers of protection, zero-trust principles, and comprehensive audit logging.

### 1.1 Security Principles

SophiaClaw security is built on four core principles:

1. **Local-First**: All data stays on user's machine by default
2. **Zero-Trust**: Every action verified, every request authenticated
3. **Defense in Depth**: Multiple security layers
4. **Minimal Privilege**: Only necessary permissions granted

### 1.2 Security Architecture Overview

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    SECURITY LAYERS                          │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Layer 5: User Controls                                     │
│  - Approval workflows, audit logs, session review           │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Layer 4: Application Security                              │
│  - Input validation, output encoding, secure defaults       │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Layer 3: Network Security                                  │
│  - TLS, certificate pinning, firewall rules                 │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Layer 2: Access Control                                    │
│  - Authentication, authorization, sandboxing                │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Layer 1: Data Protection                                   │
│  - Encryption at rest, in transit, credential isolation     │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

---

## 2. Threat Model

### 2.1 Assets to Protect

| Asset                                    | Sensitivity | Impact if Compromised                   |
| ---------------------------------------- | ----------- | --------------------------------------- |
| LLM API credentials                      | Critical    | Financial loss, unauthorized API access |
| Channel tokens (Telegram, Discord, etc.) | Critical    | Account takeover, message interception  |
| Session logs                             | High        | Privacy breach, conversation exposure   |
| Workspace files                          | High        | Data loss, intellectual property theft  |
| Governance policies                      | Medium      | Policy bypass, unauthorized actions     |
| Audit logs                               | Medium      | Compliance failure, evidence tampering  |
| Configuration                            | Low-Medium  | Misconfiguration, service disruption    |

### 2.2 Threat Actors

| Actor             | Capability | Motivation                   | Attack Vectors                    |
| ----------------- | ---------- | ---------------------------- | --------------------------------- |
| External attacker | High       | Financial gain, data theft   | Network attacks, credential theft |
| Malicious insider | Medium     | Sabotage, data exfiltration  | Direct access, policy bypass      |
| Compromised AI    | Medium     | Prompt injection, tool abuse | Manipulated outputs               |
| Accidental user   | Low        | Mistakes, misconfiguration   | Unintentional data exposure       |
| Automated bot     | Medium     | Spam, abuse                  | API abuse, rate limit evasion     |

### 2.3 Attack Vectors and Mitigations

| Threat                   | Attack Vector                       | Mitigation                                          | Status         |
| ------------------------ | ----------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- | -------------- |
| **Credential theft**     | File system access, memory scraping | Encryption at rest, keychain integration            | ✅ Implemented |
| **Session hijacking**    | Token interception, replay attacks  | TLS, token rotation, short-lived sessions           | ✅ Implemented |
| **Prompt injection**     | Malicious input, jailbreak attempts | Input validation, output encoding, governance gates | ✅ Implemented |
| **Tool abuse**           | Arbitrary command execution         | Sandboxing, allowlists, approval workflows          | ✅ Implemented |
| **Data exfiltration**    | Network access, file copy           | Network policies, egress filtering, audit logging   | ✅ Implemented |
| **Privilege escalation** | Root access, system modification    | No root execution, path validation, sandboxing      | ✅ Implemented |
| **Supply chain attack**  | Compromised dependencies            | Locked dependencies, SRI, code signing              | ⚠️ Partial     |
| **Denial of service**    | Resource exhaustion                 | Rate limiting, resource quotas                      | ✅ Implemented |
| **Man-in-the-middle**    | Network interception                | TLS 1.3, certificate validation                     | ✅ Implemented |
| **Replay attack**        | Message replay                      | Nonce, timestamp validation, HMAC                   | ✅ Implemented |

### 2.4 Trust Boundaries

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  EXTERNAL (Untrusted)                   │
│  - Telegram servers                     │
│  - Discord servers                      │
│  - LLM provider APIs                    │
│  - Public internet                      │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  GATEWAY (Semi-trusted)                 │
│  - WebSocket connections                │
│  - Channel handlers                     │
│  - Request routing                      │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  AGENT (Trusted with limits)            │
│  - AI reasoning                         │
│  - Tool selection                       │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  SANDBOX (Controlled)                   │
│  - Tool execution                       │
│  - File system access                   │
│  - Process spawning                     │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  SECRETS (Most sensitive)               │
│  - Credentials storage                  │
│  - API keys                             │
│  - Encryption keys                      │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

---

## 3. Security Controls

### 3.1 Authentication Controls

#### 3.1.1 Gateway Authentication

| ID      | Requirement                                                           | Priority | Implementation         |
| ------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ---------------------- |
| SEC-101 | The system SHALL require authentication for all WebSocket connections | P0       | Token-based auth       |
| SEC-102 | The system SHALL use 256-bit random tokens for gateway auth           | P0       | Cryptographic RNG      |
| SEC-103 | The system SHALL implement HMAC-SHA256 request signing                | P0       | Integrity              |
| SEC-104 | The system SHALL include timestamp and nonce in auth handshake        | P0       | Replay prevention      |
| SEC-105 | The system SHALL store tokens encrypted in credentials store          | P0       | Protection             |
| SEC-106 | The system SHALL support token rotation via CLI                       | P1       | Key management         |
| SEC-107 | The system SHALL limit failed auth attempts to 5 per minute           | P1       | Brute force prevention |
| SEC-108 | The system SHALL temporarily lock out after 10 failed attempts        | P1       | Account protection     |

#### 3.1.2 Authentication Protocol

```typescript
interface AuthHandshake {
  type: "auth";
  token: string; // 256-bit random token
  timestamp: number; // Unix timestamp (ms)
  nonce: string; // UUID v4
  signature: string; // HMAC-SHA256(token + timestamp + nonce)
}

// Signature calculation
const message = `${token}${timestamp}${nonce}`;
const signature = crypto.createHmac("sha256", masterKey).update(message).digest("hex");
```

#### 3.1.3 Channel Authentication

| ID      | Requirement                                                       | Priority | Notes          |
| ------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | -------------- |
| SEC-111 | The system SHALL verify Telegram webhook signatures (HMAC-SHA256) | P0       | Telegram       |
| SEC-112 | The system SHALL authenticate Discord bot via token               | P0       | Discord        |
| SEC-113 | The system SHALL use OAuth 2.0 for Slack integration              | P0       | Slack          |
| SEC-114 | The system SHALL verify Slack request signing                     | P0       | Slack          |
| SEC-115 | The system SHALL support QR code authentication for WhatsApp      | P1       | WhatsApp       |
| SEC-116 | The system SHALL implement channel allowlisting (optional)        | P2       | Access control |

### 3.2 Authorization Controls

#### 3.2.1 Permission Model

| ID      | Requirement                                                    | Priority | Notes            |
| ------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ---------------- |
| SEC-201 | The system SHALL implement role-based access control (RBAC)    | P0       | Authorization    |
| SEC-202 | The system SHALL define roles: user, trusted, admin            | P0       | Role hierarchy   |
| SEC-203 | The system SHALL associate permissions with roles              | P0       | Permission model |
| SEC-204 | The system SHALL check permissions before every tool execution | P0       | Enforcement      |
| SEC-205 | The system SHALL support resource-scoped permissions           | P1       | Granularity      |
| SEC-206 | The system SHALL log all authorization decisions               | P0       | Audit            |

#### 3.2.2 Role Definitions

```typescript
type Role = "user" | "trusted" | "admin";

type Permission = {
  resource: "tool" | "file" | "command" | "channel";
  action: "read" | "write" | "execute" | "admin";
  scope: string; // Resource identifier or wildcard
};

const rolePermissions: Record<Role, Permission[]> = {
  user: [
    { resource: "tool", action: "read", scope: "*" },
    { resource: "file", action: "read", scope: "workspace/*" },
    { resource: "tool", action: "execute", scope: "safe/*" },
  ],
  trusted: [
    ...rolePermissions.user,
    { resource: "tool", action: "execute", scope: "*" },
    { resource: "file", action: "write", scope: "workspace/*" },
    { resource: "command", action: "execute", scope: "user/*" },
  ],
  admin: [{ resource: "*", action: "*", scope: "*" }],
};
```

#### 3.2.3 Tool Permission Levels

| Level          | Description     | Allowed Operations         |
| -------------- | --------------- | -------------------------- |
| `none`         | No tools        | Read-only responses        |
| `safe`         | Safe tools only | File read, search, info    |
| `standard`     | Standard tools  | File write, bash (limited) |
| `elevated`     | All tools       | System commands, network   |
| `unrestricted` | No limits       | Full system access         |

### 3.3 Sandboxing Controls

#### 3.3.1 File System Sandbox

| ID      | Requirement                                                              | Priority | Implementation                 |
| ------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------ | -------- | ------------------------------ |
| SEC-301 | The system SHALL jail all file operations to workspace directory         | P0       | Path validation                |
| SEC-302 | The system SHALL normalize all paths before validation                   | P0       | Directory traversal prevention |
| SEC-303 | The system SHALL reject paths that escape workspace                      | P0       | Security boundary              |
| SEC-304 | The system SHALL resolve symlinks and validate target                    | P0       | Symlink attack prevention      |
| SEC-305 | The system SHALL check paths against denied patterns                     | P0       | Pattern matching               |
| SEC-306 | The system SHALL NOT allow absolute paths (unless explicitly configured) | P0       | Security                       |
| SEC-307 | The system SHALL limit file operations to 50MB per file                  | P1       | Resource protection            |

#### 3.3.2 Path Validation Algorithm

```typescript
class FileSandbox {
  private basePath: string = "~/.sophiaclaw/workspace";

  resolvePath(userPath: string): string {
    // Normalize and resolve
    const resolved = path.resolve(this.basePath, userPath);

    // Normalize both paths for comparison
    const normalizedBase = path.normalize(this.basePath);
    const normalizedResolved = path.normalize(resolved);

    // Prevent directory traversal
    if (!normalizedResolved.startsWith(normalizedBase)) {
      throw new SecurityError("Path escapes workspace");
    }

    // Check denied patterns
    const deniedPatterns = [/\.env$/, /\.key$/, /\.pem$/, /\/\.git\//, /\/node_modules\//];

    for (const pattern of deniedPatterns) {
      if (pattern.test(normalizedResolved)) {
        throw new SecurityError(`Path matches denied pattern: ${pattern}`);
      }
    }

    return resolved;
  }
}
```

#### 3.3.3 Process Sandboxing

| ID      | Requirement                                                   | Priority | Implementation      |
| ------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------------------- |
| SEC-311 | The system SHALL maintain shell command allowlist             | P0       | Whitelist           |
| SEC-312 | The system SHALL deny commands matching dangerous patterns    | P0       | Blacklist           |
| SEC-313 | The system SHALL enforce command execution timeouts           | P0       | Resource protection |
| SEC-314 | The system SHALL limit memory for spawned processes           | P1       | Resource protection |
| SEC-315 | The system SHALL spawn processes as current user (never root) | P0       | Privilege           |
| SEC-316 | The system SHALL sanitize environment variables               | P1       | Info leakage        |
| SEC-317 | The system SHALL deny network access for processes by default | P1       | Isolation           |

#### 3.3.4 Command Policy

```typescript
interface CommandPolicy {
  allowed: string[]; // Whitelist
  denied: RegExp[]; // Blacklist patterns
  timeout: number; // Max execution time (ms)
  max_memory: string; // Memory limit
  network: boolean; // Network access allowed?
}

const defaultPolicy: CommandPolicy = {
  allowed: ["git", "npm", "pnpm", "node", "python3"],
  denied: [
    /rm\s+-rf\s+\//, // rm -rf /
    /sudo/, // sudo commands
    />\s*\/etc/, // Writing to /etc
    /curl.*\|\s*bash/, // Pipe to bash
    /wget.*\|\s*bash/, // Pipe to bash
    /^\.\//, // Execute from current dir
  ],
  timeout: 60000, // 60 seconds
  max_memory: "512m",
  network: false,
};
```

---

## 4. Encryption Requirements

### 4.1 Encryption at Rest

#### 4.1.1 Credential Encryption

| ID      | Requirement                                                | Priority | Implementation       |
| ------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | -------------------- |
| SEC-401 | The system SHALL encrypt all credentials with AES-256-GCM  | P0       | Encryption algorithm |
| SEC-402 | The system SHALL derive master key from OS keychain        | P0       | Key management       |
| SEC-403 | The system SHALL fallback to PBKDF2 with user password     | P1       | Fallback             |
| SEC-404 | The system SHALL use 600,000 PBKDF2 iterations minimum     | P0       | Key strength         |
| SEC-405 | The system SHALL generate random 16-byte IV per encryption | P0       | IV management        |
| SEC-406 | The system SHALL include authentication tag (GCM)          | P0       | Integrity            |
| SEC-407 | The system SHALL clear keys from memory after use          | P1       | Memory protection    |

#### 4.1.2 Credential Encryption Format

```typescript
interface EncryptedCredential {
  cipher: "aes-256-gcm";
  encrypted_data: string; // Base64 encoded
  iv: string; // Base64 (16 bytes)
  tag: string; // Base64 (16 bytes)
  salt: string; // Base64 (32 bytes)
  kdf: {
    algorithm: "pbkdf2" | "keychain";
    iterations: number; // 600000 minimum for PBKDF2
  };
}

// Encryption process:
// 1. Generate random 32-byte salt
// 2. Derive 32-byte key using PBKDF2(password, salt, 600000, sha256)
// 3. Generate random 16-byte IV
// 4. Encrypt with AES-256-GCM
// 5. Store cipher, encrypted_data, iv, tag, salt
```

#### 4.1.3 Session Log Encryption (Optional)

| ID      | Requirement                                                  | Priority | Notes        |
| ------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ | -------- | ------------ |
| SEC-411 | The system SHALL support optional session log encryption     | P2       | Privacy      |
| SEC-412 | The system SHALL rotate session encryption keys every 7 days | P2       | Key rotation |
| SEC-413 | The system SHALL store encrypted sessions separately         | P2       | Organization |
| SEC-414 | The system SHALL decrypt sessions on-demand for viewing      | P2       | Usability    |

### 4.2 Encryption in Transit

#### 4.2.1 WebSocket Security

| ID      | Requirement                                                         | Priority | Implementation      |
| ------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------------------- |
| SEC-421 | The system SHALL use WSS (WebSocket Secure) in production           | P0       | TLS                 |
| SEC-422 | The system SHALL require TLS 1.3, allow TLS 1.2 minimum             | P0       | Protocol version    |
| SEC-423 | The system SHALL validate server certificates                       | P0       | MITM prevention     |
| SEC-424 | The system SHALL support certificate pinning for critical endpoints | P1       | Additional security |
| SEC-425 | The system SHALL disable weak cipher suites                         | P0       | Crypto strength     |
| SEC-426 | The system SHALL implement perfect forward secrecy                  | P0       | Key exchange        |

#### 4.2.2 External API Communication

| ID      | Requirement                                                            | Priority | Notes             |
| ------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ----------------- |
| SEC-431 | The system SHALL use HTTPS for all external API calls                  | P0       | Encryption        |
| SEC-432 | The system SHALL validate SSL certificates                             | P0       | MITM prevention   |
| SEC-433 | The system SHALL NOT disable certificate validation (no insecure flag) | P0       | Security          |
| SEC-434 | The system SHALL support custom CA bundles (enterprise)                | P2       | Self-signed certs |

### 4.3 Key Management

| ID      | Requirement                                                  | Priority | Implementation                        |
| ------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ | -------- | ------------------------------------- |
| SEC-441 | The system SHALL use OS keychain for master key storage      | P0       | macOS Keychain, Secret Service, DPAPI |
| SEC-442 | The system SHALL NEVER store encryption keys in config files | P0       | Protection                            |
| SEC-443 | The system SHALL NEVER log encryption keys                   | P0       | Protection                            |
| SEC-444 | The system SHALL support key rotation for credentials        | P1       | Key lifecycle                         |
| SEC-445 | The system SHALL re-encrypt data on key rotation             | P1       | Continuity                            |

---

## 5. Authentication/Authorization Requirements

### 5.1 User Authentication

| ID      | Requirement                                                             | Priority | Notes             |
| ------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ----------------- |
| SEC-501 | The system SHALL support token-based authentication                     | P0       | Primary method    |
| SEC-502 | The system SHALL support optional multi-factor authentication           | P2       | Enhanced security |
| SEC-503 | The system SHALL implement secure password handling (if passwords used) | P1       | Hashing           |
| SEC-504 | The system SHALL enforce password complexity (if passwords used)        | P2       | Strength          |
| SEC-505 | The system SHALL support session-based authentication                   | P1       | Convenience       |
| SEC-506 | The system SHALL implement logout functionality                         | P1       | User control      |

### 5.2 Session Management

| ID      | Requirement                                                         | Priority | Notes                 |
| ------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | --------------------- |
| SEC-511 | The system SHALL generate unique session IDs (UUID v4)              | P0       | Uniqueness            |
| SEC-512 | The system SHALL expire sessions after 30 minutes idle              | P0       | Timeout               |
| SEC-513 | The system SHALL support maximum session lifetime of 24 hours       | P1       | Long-lived protection |
| SEC-514 | The system SHALL invalidate sessions on logout                      | P0       | Security              |
| SEC-515 | The system SHALL support session enumeration (list active sessions) | P1       | Management            |
| SEC-516 | The system SHALL support session termination (kill session)         | P1       | Management            |
| SEC-517 | The system SHALL support kill-all-sessions (emergency)              | P1       | Emergency             |

### 5.3 API Authorization

| ID      | Requirement                                                           | Priority | Notes            |
| ------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ---------------- |
| SEC-521 | The system SHALL validate authentication before API access            | P0       | Gatekeeping      |
| SEC-522 | The system SHALL check authorization for each API endpoint            | P0       | Access control   |
| SEC-523 | The system SHALL support API key authentication                       | P1       | Machine auth     |
| SEC-524 | The system SHALL implement rate limiting per user/API key             | P1       | Abuse prevention |
| SEC-525 | The system SHALL return 401 for auth failures, 403 for authz failures | P1       | Correct errors   |

### 5.4 Channel Authorization

| ID      | Requirement                                                   | Priority | Notes          |
| ------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | -------------- |
| SEC-531 | The system SHALL verify channel message signatures            | P0       | Authenticity   |
| SEC-532 | The system SHALL support chat/user allowlisting per channel   | P1       | Access control |
| SEC-533 | The system SHALL reject messages from non-allowlisted sources | P1       | Security       |
| SEC-534 | The system SHALL support channel-level access control         | P1       | Granularity    |

---

## 6. Audit Logging Requirements

### 6.1 Security Events

| ID      | Requirement                                               | Priority | Event Types                      |
| ------- | --------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | -------------------------------- |
| SEC-601 | The system SHALL log all authentication successes         | P0       | `auth.success`                   |
| SEC-602 | The system SHALL log all authentication failures          | P0       | `auth.failure`                   |
| SEC-603 | The system SHALL log all authorization denials            | P0       | `authz.denied`                   |
| SEC-604 | The system SHALL log all credential access                | P0       | `credential.accessed`            |
| SEC-605 | The system SHALL log all configuration changes            | P0       | `config.changed`                 |
| SEC-606 | The system SHALL log all policy changes                   | P0       | `policy.changed`                 |
| SEC-607 | The system SHALL log all tool executions                  | P0       | `tool.executed`                  |
| SEC-608 | The system SHALL log all security policy violations       | P0       | `security.violation`             |
| SEC-609 | The system SHALL log all gate blocks and escalations      | P0       | `gate.blocked`, `gate.escalated` |
| SEC-610 | The system SHALL log all encryption/decryption operations | P1       | `crypto.operation`               |

### 6.2 Security Event Schema

```typescript
interface SecurityEvent {
  id: string; // UUID v4
  timestamp: string; // ISO8601
  event_type: SecurityEventType;
  severity: "info" | "warning" | "error" | "critical";
  actor: {
    type: "user" | "system" | "channel" | "ai";
    id: string;
  };
  resource: string; // Affected resource
  action: string; // Action attempted
  result: "success" | "failure" | "blocked";
  metadata: {
    ip_address?: string;
    user_agent?: string;
    session_id?: string;
    error_message?: string;
    violation_details?: string;
  };
}

type SecurityEventType =
  | "auth.success"
  | "auth.failure"
  | "authz.denied"
  | "credential.accessed"
  | "config.changed"
  | "policy.changed"
  | "tool.executed"
  | "security.violation"
  | "gate.blocked"
  | "gate.escalated"
  | "crypto.operation";
```

### 6.3 Log Storage and Protection

| ID      | Requirement                                                           | Priority | Implementation     |
| ------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------------------ |
| SEC-611 | The system SHALL store security logs separately from application logs | P0       | Separation         |
| SEC-612 | The system SHALL protect audit logs from modification                 | P0       | Integrity          |
| SEC-613 | The system SHALL implement append-only log structure                  | P0       | Immutability       |
| SEC-614 | The system SHALL support optional cryptographic hashing (hash chain)  | P2       | Tamper evidence    |
| SEC-615 | The system SHALL compress old logs for storage efficiency             | P1       | Retention          |
| SEC-616 | The system SHALL enforce retention policies                           | P1       | Storage management |

### 6.4 Log Retention

| Log Type            | Default Retention | Configurable | Notes        |
| ------------------- | ----------------- | ------------ | ------------ |
| Security logs       | 1 year            | Yes          | Compliance   |
| Authentication logs | 1 year            | Yes          | Security     |
| Authorization logs  | 1 year            | Yes          | Access audit |
| Audit logs          | 90 days           | Yes          | Operations   |
| Access logs         | 30 days           | Yes          | Debugging    |
| Application logs    | 30 days           | Yes          | Debugging    |

### 6.5 Log Access

| ID      | Requirement                                               | Priority | Notes          |
| ------- | --------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | -------------- |
| SEC-621 | The system SHALL restrict audit log access to admin role  | P0       | Access control |
| SEC-622 | The system SHALL provide CLI for log querying             | P0       | Usability      |
| SEC-623 | The system SHALL support log export for external analysis | P1       | Forensics      |
| SEC-624 | The system SHALL log all audit log access                 | P0       | Meta-audit     |

---

## 7. Input Validation Requirements

### 7.1 Message Validation

| ID      | Requirement                                                      | Priority | Implementation      |
| ------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------------------- |
| SEC-701 | The system SHALL validate all incoming messages with Zod schemas | P0       | Schema validation   |
| SEC-702 | The system SHALL limit message content to 100KB                  | P0       | Resource protection |
| SEC-703 | The system SHALL validate message types (enum)                   | P0       | Type safety         |
| SEC-704 | The system SHALL validate session IDs (UUID format)              | P0       | Format validation   |
| SEC-705 | The system SHALL reject messages with invalid metadata           | P0       | Integrity           |
| SEC-706 | The system SHALL sanitize string inputs (trim, normalize)        | P1       | Cleaning            |

### 7.2 Message Schema

```typescript
import { z } from "zod";

const MessageSchema = z.object({
  type: z.enum(["chat", "tool_response", "command"]),
  content: z.string().max(100000), // 100KB max
  session_id: z.string().uuid().optional(),
  metadata: z.record(z.unknown()).optional(),
});

type Message = z.infer<typeof MessageSchema>;

// Validation
const validate = (data: unknown) => {
  return MessageSchema.safeParse(data);
};
```

### 7.3 Tool Parameter Validation

| ID      | Requirement                                                    | Priority | Implementation      |
| ------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------------------- |
| SEC-711 | The system SHALL define Zod schema for every tool              | P0       | Schema definition   |
| SEC-712 | The system SHALL validate all tool parameters before execution | P0       | Enforcement         |
| SEC-713 | The system SHALL reject invalid parameters with clear error    | P0       | User feedback       |
| SEC-714 | The system SHALL sanitize file paths in parameters             | P0       | Security            |
| SEC-715 | The system SHALL limit content size in parameters              | P1       | Resource protection |

### 7.4 Example Tool Schema

```typescript
const FileWriteSchema = z.object({
  path: z
    .string()
    .min(1)
    .max(4096)
    .regex(/^[\w\-/.]+$/, "Invalid path characters"),
  content: z.string().max(10_000_000), // 10MB max
  encoding: z.enum(["utf8", "base64"]).default("utf8"),
});

// Validation before execution
const validateFileWrite = (params: unknown) => {
  const result = FileWriteSchema.safeParse(params);
  if (!result.success) {
    throw new ValidationError(result.error.message);
  }
  return result.data;
};
```

### 7.5 Output Validation

| ID      | Requirement                                                    | Priority | Notes               |
| ------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------------------- |
| SEC-721 | The system SHALL validate tool outputs before returning to AI  | P1       | Integrity           |
| SEC-722 | The system SHALL truncate oversized outputs                    | P1       | Resource protection |
| SEC-723 | The system SHALL sanitize outputs for known injection patterns | P1       | Security            |
| SEC-724 | The system SHALL encode outputs for safe display               | P1       | XSS prevention      |

---

## 8. Network Security Requirements

### 8.1 Firewall Configuration

| ID      | Requirement                                                | Priority | Notes             |
| ------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ----------------- |
| SEC-801 | The system SHALL bind to loopback (127.0.0.1) by default   | P0       | Network isolation |
| SEC-802 | The system SHALL support configurable bind address         | P1       | Flexibility       |
| SEC-803 | The system SHALL document required firewall rules          | P0       | Operations        |
| SEC-804 | The system SHALL use only outbound HTTPS for external APIs | P0       | Egress control    |
| SEC-805 | The system SHALL support firewall configuration script     | P1       | Automation        |

### 8.2 Rate Limiting

| ID      | Requirement                                                           | Priority | Implementation    |
| ------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ----------------- |
| SEC-811 | The system SHALL implement rate limiting on all APIs                  | P0       | Abuse prevention  |
| SEC-812 | The system SHALL limit to 100 requests per minute per user by default | P0       | Default limits    |
| SEC-813 | The system SHALL support configurable rate limits                     | P1       | Flexibility       |
| SEC-814 | The system SHALL return 429 Too Many Requests on limit exceeded       | P0       | Standard response |
| SEC-815 | The system SHALL implement sliding window rate limiting               | P1       | Fairness          |

### 8.3 Rate Limiter Implementation

```typescript
class RateLimiter {
  private requests = new Map<string, number[]>();

  async checkLimit(
    identifier: string,
    maxRequests: number = 100,
    windowMs: number = 60000, // 1 minute
  ): Promise<boolean> {
    const now = Date.now();
    const requests = this.requests.get(identifier) || [];

    // Remove old requests outside window
    const recentRequests = requests.filter((time) => now - time < windowMs);

    if (recentRequests.length >= maxRequests) {
      return false; // Rate limit exceeded
    }

    // Add current request
    recentRequests.push(now);
    this.requests.set(identifier, recentRequests);

    return true;
  }
}
```

### 8.4 Network Resilience

| ID      | Requirement                                              | Priority | Notes               |
| ------- | -------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------------------- |
| SEC-821 | The system SHALL implement connection timeouts           | P0       | Resource protection |
| SEC-822 | The system SHALL implement request timeouts              | P0       | DoS prevention      |
| SEC-823 | The system SHALL support exponential backoff for retries | P0       | Resilience          |
| SEC-824 | The system SHALL limit concurrent connections per source | P1       | Resource protection |
| SEC-825 | The system SHALL implement circuit breaker pattern       | P2       | Resilience          |

---

## 9. Vulnerability Management

### 9.1 Dependency Security

| ID      | Requirement                                                    | Priority | Implementation          |
| ------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ----------------------- |
| SEC-901 | The system SHALL pin all dependency versions                   | P0       | Reproducibility         |
| SEC-902 | The system SHALL use lockfile for deterministic builds         | P0       | Integrity               |
| SEC-903 | The system SHALL audit dependencies on every build             | P0       | Vulnerability detection |
| SEC-904 | The system SHALL fail build on critical vulnerabilities        | P0       | Security gate           |
| SEC-905 | The system SHALL support Subresource Integrity (SRI)           | P1       | Tamper detection        |
| SEC-906 | The system SHALL minimize dependencies (reduce attack surface) | P1       | Hygiene                 |

### 9.2 Security Patching

| ID      | Requirement                                                     | Priority | Notes          |
| ------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | -------------- |
| SEC-911 | The system SHALL apply critical security patches within 7 days  | P0       | Patch SLA      |
| SEC-912 | The system SHALL apply high severity patches within 14 days     | P1       | Patch SLA      |
| SEC-913 | The system SHALL document known vulnerabilities and mitigations | P1       | Transparency   |
| SEC-914 | The system SHALL support emergency patch deployment             | P1       | Rapid response |

### 9.3 Security Testing

| ID      | Requirement                                                | Priority | Notes               |
| ------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------------------- |
| SEC-921 | The system SHALL include security tests in test suite      | P0       | Verification        |
| SEC-922 | The system SHALL support automated security scanning in CI | P1       | CI/CD               |
| SEC-923 | The system SHALL support penetration testing               | P2       | External validation |
| SEC-924 | The system SHALL support bug bounty program (future)       | P3       | Community           |

---

## 10. Incident Response

### 10.1 Incident Classification

| ID       | Requirement                                           | Priority | Notes          |
| -------- | ----------------------------------------------------- | -------- | -------------- |
| SEC-1001 | The system SHALL define incident severity levels      | P0       | Classification |
| SEC-1002 | The system SHALL provide incident response procedures | P0       | Documentation  |
| SEC-1003 | The system SHALL support emergency lockdown           | P0       | Containment    |
| SEC-1004 | The system SHALL generate incident reports            | P1       | Documentation  |

### 10.2 Incident Severity Levels

| Level        | Description         | Response Time | Actions                                     |
| ------------ | ------------------- | ------------- | ------------------------------------------- |
| 1 - Critical | Active exploitation | Immediate     | Kill gateway, revoke credentials, forensics |
| 2 - High     | Confirmed breach    | <1 hour       | Revoke tokens, isolate, investigate         |
| 3 - Medium   | Attempted breach    | <4 hours      | Block source, notify, review                |
| 4 - Low      | Suspicious activity | <24 hours     | Log review, monitor                         |

### 10.3 Emergency Procedures

| Command                               | Purpose                  | Notes         |
| ------------------------------------- | ------------------------ | ------------- |
| `sophiaclaw credentials revoke-all`   | Revoke all tokens        | Emergency     |
| `sophiaclaw sessions kill-all`        | Terminate all sessions   | Containment   |
| `sophiaclaw gateway lock`             | Lock gateway             | Deny access   |
| `sophiaclaw security incident-report` | Generate incident report | Documentation |

### 10.4 Incident Response Workflow

```
1. Detection → Security event or user report
       │
       ▼
2. Triage → Classify severity, assign responder
       │
       ▼
3. Containment → Isolate affected systems
       │
       ▼
4. Eradication → Remove threat
       │
       ▼
5. Recovery → Restore normal operations
       │
       ▼
6. Lessons Learned → Update procedures
```

---

## 11. Security Configuration

### 11.1 Recommended Security Settings

```yaml
security:
  # Authentication
  auth:
    require_token: true
    token_rotation: "30d"
    max_failed_attempts: 5
    lockout_duration: "15m"

  # Encryption
  encryption:
    algorithm: "aes-256-gcm"
    kdf_iterations: 600000
    key_source: "keychain"

  # Sandboxing
  sandbox:
    enabled: true
    level: "strict"
    network_isolation: true
    resource_limits:
      cpu_percent: 50
      memory_mb: 512
      file_descriptors: 1024

  # Audit
  audit:
    enabled: true
    log_level: "info"
    forward_to: [] # SIEM endpoints

  # Network
  network:
    bind_address: "127.0.0.1"
    tls:
      enabled: true
      min_version: "TLSv1.2"
      prefer_version: "TLSv1.3"
    allowed_origins: ["https://app.sophiaclaw.ai"]

  # Rate Limiting
  rate_limit:
    enabled: true
    requests_per_minute: 100
    burst: 20
```

### 11.2 Security Health Checks

| ID       | Requirement                                            | Priority | Notes               |
| -------- | ------------------------------------------------------ | -------- | ------------------- |
| SEC-1101 | The system SHALL provide security health check command | P0       | `sophiaclaw doctor` |
| SEC-1102 | The system SHALL verify TLS configuration              | P1       | Network             |
| SEC-1103 | The system SHALL verify credential encryption          | P1       | Data protection     |
| SEC-1104 | The system SHALL verify sandbox configuration          | P1       | Isolation           |
| SEC-1105 | The system SHALL verify audit logging is active        | P1       | Compliance          |

---

## 12. Related Documents

- [System Requirements](./SYSTEM_REQUIREMENTS.md)
- [Governance Requirements](./GOVERNANCE_REQUIREMENTS.md)
- [Performance Requirements](./PERFORMANCE_REQUIREMENTS.md)
- [Security Architecture](../security.md)
- [Deployment Guide](../deployment.md)

---

## 13. Security Checklist

### Pre-Deployment Checklist

- [ ] Credentials encrypted and backed up
- [ ] TLS certificates valid and configured
- [ ] Firewall rules configured
- [ ] Rate limiting enabled
- [ ] Audit logging enabled
- [ ] Backup and recovery tested
- [ ] Incident response plan documented
- [ ] Security contacts configured

### Ongoing Security

- [ ] Monthly dependency audits
- [ ] Quarterly security review
- [ ] Annual penetration test (recommended)
- [ ] Continuous vulnerability monitoring
- [ ] Regular security training for operators

---

<p align="center">
  <em>SophiaClaw Security — Defense in Depth</em><br>
  <sub>Zero trust. Maximum transparency.</sub>
</p>
