/**
 * sigil config at ~/.sigil/config.toml. Carries the OOB confirm transport
 * block and the optional local JSON-RPC signing proxy block.
 *
 *   [confirm.ntfy]
 *   topic  = "an-unguessable-string"
 *   server = "https://ntfy.sh"   # optional, default https://ntfy.sh
 *
 *   [rpc]
 *   portal   = "evm:bot"
 *   upstream = "https://sepolia.example/v3/KEY"
 *   token    = "an-unguessable-string-16+chars"
 *   port     = 8547              # optional
 *
 * Missing file → SigilConfig with no transport configured. That's fine on
 * its own; we only fail closed at startup if some policy actually depends
 * on a transport (see `enforceConfirmTransportPresence`).
 */
export interface SigilConfig {
    confirm?: ConfirmConfig;
    rpc?: RpcConfigToml;
}
/**
 * Local JSON-RPC signing proxy (`[rpc]` block). All of portal/upstream/token
 * are required — the proxy never starts without an auth token, and a token
 * under 16 chars is rejected at parse time rather than silently weakening
 * the only thing standing between "any local process" and "signs with the
 * portal key".
 */
export interface RpcConfigToml {
    /** Portal handle whose key answers eth_accounts / signs eth_sendTransaction. */
    portal: string;
    /** Upstream JSON-RPC node everything else is proxied to. http(s) only. */
    upstream: string;
    /** Shared secret every request must present (Bearer or Basic password). */
    token: string;
    /** Listen port on 127.0.0.1. Default 8547 (clear of anvil's 8545). */
    port?: number;
}
export interface ConfirmConfig {
    /** Default timeout for any OOB confirm round-trip, in milliseconds.
     *  Defaults to 60_000. Per-portal overrides come later. */
    timeoutMs?: number;
    ntfy?: NtfyConfigToml;
}
export interface NtfyConfigToml {
    topic: string;
    server?: string;
}
export declare class SigilConfigError extends Error {
    constructor(message: string);
}
/**
 * Parse the file contents (an empty string is treated as "no file").
 * Exported for tests; production loaders should use `loadConfig` so the
 * file-not-found case is handled uniformly.
 */
export declare function parseConfig(source: string): SigilConfig;
/** Minimum length for the [rpc] auth token. Below this, brute force from a
 *  rebound browser page or a local process stops being fanciful. */
export declare const RPC_TOKEN_MIN_LENGTH = 16;
/**
 * Load + parse the file at ~/.sigil/config.toml. Returns an empty config if
 * the file is absent. Throws SigilConfigError on parse/schema errors.
 */
export declare function loadConfig(path: string): SigilConfig;
/**
 * Walk every *.toml under the policy dir, parse each, and return true if
 * any of them can route a sign to the confirm gate: require_confirm_above_wei,
 * or strict-mode allow_contract_creation (deploys always confirm). A
 * malformed policy file is skipped (it'll surface its own error at sign
 * time); we only need to know whether some portal is *trying* to gate on
 * confirm.
 */
export declare function anyPolicyRequiresConfirm(policyDir: string): boolean;
/**
 * Fail-closed check called at sigil-mcp boot: if any policy on disk uses
 * require_confirm_above_wei but the config has no transport, the process
 * cannot honour that policy — bail with a clear message instead of running
 * with a half-built safety net.
 */
export declare function enforceConfirmTransportPresence(config: SigilConfig, policyDir: string): void;
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