/**
 * Trajectory Collector - message write trajectory recording
 *
 * Fallback trajectory collection when llm_output is blocked by missing
 * allowConversationAccess. before_message_write is NOT in
 * CONVERSATION_HOOK_NAMES so OpenClaw always delivers it.
 *
 * SQLite writes are enqueued to an async queue because before_message_write is
 * a SYNCHRONOUS OpenClaw hook — the handler must return immediately. better-sqlite3
 * is synchronous, so calling it directly would block the message-write main path.
 * Trade-off: in degradation mode the last few queued writes may be lost on
 * process exit; this is acceptable because degradation mode is already caused
 * by a config problem (missing allowConversationAccess), and the primary
 * llm_output path is authoritative when authorized.
 *
 * JSONL writing was removed (no consumers — verified zero readers across the
 * codebase; PRI-347 already removed tool_call/llm_output JSONL writers).
 *
 * ERR-002: fallback errors are logged, never silent.
 * ERR-001/005: content is sanitized before persisting.
 */
import type { PluginHookAgentContext, PluginHookBeforeMessageWriteEvent } from '../openclaw-sdk.js';
/**
 * PRI-346: Message write hook with SQLite fallback trajectory recording.
 *
 * When allowConversationAccess is NOT set (unauthorized), llm_output is silently
 * blocked by OpenClaw and trajectory.db has no data. This hook is NOT in
 * CONVERSATION_HOOK_NAMES, so it always fires — making it the natural fallback.
 *
 * De-duplication: only writes to SQLite when llm_output is blocked (unauthorized).
 * When llm_output is working (authorized), this hook is a no-op.
 *
 * SQLite writes are async-queued (see file header) to avoid blocking the sync hook.
 *
 * ERR-002: structured observability when fallback fires.
 * ERR-001/005: content is sanitized before persisting.
 */
export declare function handleBeforeMessageWrite(event: PluginHookBeforeMessageWriteEvent, ctx: PluginHookAgentContext & {
    workspaceDir?: string;
    pluginConfig?: unknown;
}): void;