/**
 * child/index.ts — child extension adapter (standalone port of the harness
 * `.pi/extensions/zob-child-safety/index.ts`).
 *
 * Loaded inside child lanes via `-e`. Registers the write-safety guard over
 * the edit/write tools: blocks writes outside allowed/forbidden/zero-access/
 * read-only/sandbox rules via validateRuntimeWritePolicy + blockedFeedback.
 *
 * Uses the LOCAL child/pi-types.ts mirror (zero @earendil-works/* imports,
 * invariant I9); the real Pi API is wired at load time by the child runner.
 */
import type { ExtensionAPI } from "./pi-types.js";
export { pathMatches, parsePathListEnv, validateRuntimeWritePolicy } from "./policy.js";
export { ESCALATION_DIR_ENV, ESCALATION_EXIT_CODE, RUN_ID_ENV, escalationFilePath, escalationMessageHash, isSubagentSession, writeEscalationFile, } from "./escalation.js";
export { AGENTS_DIR_ENV, ALLOWED_SUBAGENTS_ENV, DEPTH_ENV, MAX_DEPTH_ENV, NESTED_ENV, SUBAGENT_TOOL_NAME, agentAllowed, nestedToolEnabled, parseAllowlist, registerNestedSubagentTool, } from "./nested.js";
/** Env var carrying the absolute path of this run's `<runId>.steer` file (B2). */
export declare const STEER_FILE_ENV = "PI_SUBAGENTS_STEER_FILE";
/** Steer payload consumed from the file written by the parent (src/lanes/steer.ts). */
export interface ConsumedSteerPayload {
    runId: string;
    message: string;
    timestamp: number;
}
/**
 * Consume-once read of the steer file (the parent writes it atomically via
 * rename, so a read never observes a partial payload). Deletes the file as
 * soon as it is read so the same steering message can never be injected
 * twice; an unreadable/invalid payload is still consumed (and dropped) so a
 * corrupt file cannot wedge the poll loop.
 *
 * Returns null when there is nothing to inject: no env var, no file, a
 * read race, or an invalid/empty payload.
 */
export declare function consumeSteerFile(steerFile: string | undefined): ConsumedSteerPayload | null;
export default function zobChildSafety(pi: ExtensionAPI): void;