/**
 * Deep research workflow.
 * Built-in workflow for comprehensive research across multiple sources.
 */
import { type ToolDefinition } from "@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent";
export interface DeepResearchConfig {
    /** Number of distinct search angles/queries to explore. */
    angles: number;
    /** Minimum distinct sources required for a claim to survive cross-checking. */
    minSupport: number;
}
/**
 * Modest, documented bounds for `/deep-research` (issue #122). They keep
 * unusually large model output from overflowing / clipping the agent-result
 * channel while staying generous enough for ordinary research.
 */
export declare const DEEP_RESEARCH_BOUNDS: Readonly<{
    /** Max research-question length in characters. */
    readonly maxQuestionChars: 2000;
    /** Min/max number of search angles (fan-out width). */
    readonly minAngles: 1;
    readonly maxAngles: 8;
    /** Cap on gathered sources fed into cross-checking (fan-in). */
    readonly maxSources: 32;
    /** Per-source claim cap. */
    readonly maxClaimsPerSource: 12;
    /** Char cap on a single source URL. */
    readonly maxUrlChars: 400;
    /** Char cap on a single extracted claim. */
    readonly maxClaimChars: 800;
    /** Char cap on the JSON payload handed to the verify/report agents. */
    readonly maxSourcesJsonChars: 60000;
    /** Char cap on the final report text. */
    readonly maxReportChars: 8000;
}>;
/**
 * Tool pool for `/deep-research` subagents: read-only repository tools plus the
 * real `web_search` / `web_fetch` tools. Research agents cannot mutate the
 * workspace because `createReadOnlyTools` returns only `read`, `grep`, `find`,
 * `ls` (no `bash`, `edit`, `write`). The handler additionally sets the run-level
 * `readOnly` fence (see `deepResearchSafetyOptions`) so an `agentType`
 * allowlist / harness config can never re-grant a write tool.
 */
export declare function createDeepResearchTools(cwd: string): ToolDefinition[];
/**
 * The safety-relevant subset of `/deep-research`'s `runWorkflow` options —
 * extracted as a pure, testable seam. Spreading this into the handler's run
 * options guarantees the run is read-only and web-enabled without relying on
 * prompt text alone.
 */
export declare function deepResearchSafetyOptions(cwd: string): {
    tools: ToolDefinition[];
    readOnly: true;
};
/**
 * Generate a deep-research workflow that uses the real web_search/web_fetch tools.
 *
 * The script is static and reads its inputs from `args` (question/angles/minSupport),
 * so the question is never string-interpolated into source — no escaping hazards.
 * Inject the web tools at run time via the agent's `tools` option.
 *
 * Bounds (issue #122): question/angles/minSupport are validated up front and
 * fail with a clear `Error` message; gathered sources and the final report are
 * capped with explicit truncation notes so unusually large output never silently
 * overflows the agent-result channel.
 */
export declare function generateDeepResearchWorkflow(): string;
/**
 * Generate a codebase audit workflow.
 */
export declare function generateCodebaseAuditWorkflow(scope: string, checks: string[]): string;