import { type NoFollowPathIdentity } from "./no-follow-file.js";
export declare const WORKFLOW_LIFECYCLE_STATE_FILES: readonly ["workflow-loop-state.json", "ralph-loop-state.json"];
export type WorkflowLifecycleStateFileName = typeof WORKFLOW_LIFECYCLE_STATE_FILES[number];
export type WorkflowLifecycleStateToken = NoFollowPathIdentity | null;
export type WorkflowLifecycleStateRead = {
    readonly kind: "absent";
} | {
    readonly kind: "blocked";
} | {
    readonly kind: "ready";
    readonly value: {
        readonly bytes: Buffer;
        readonly token: NoFollowPathIdentity;
    };
};
export declare class WorkflowLifecycleStateError extends Error {
    constructor();
}
export declare class WorkflowLifecycleStateConflictError extends Error {
    constructor();
}
export declare function readWorkflowLifecycleStateFile(projectDir: string, name: WorkflowLifecycleStateFileName, maxBytes: number): WorkflowLifecycleStateRead;
export declare function writeWorkflowLifecycleStateFile(projectDir: string, name: WorkflowLifecycleStateFileName, expectedToken: WorkflowLifecycleStateToken, text: string): WorkflowLifecycleStateToken;
export type WorkflowLifecycleGuardMode = "no-follow-open" | "lstat-verified";
/**
 * Reports how the workflow directory is guarded on this platform.
 *
 * `no-follow-open` is the POSIX path: `O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW` makes the open
 * itself refuse a symlink or a non-directory, atomically.
 *
 * `lstat-verified` is the Windows path. Neither flag exists there, so the open
 * cannot carry the guarantee. The caller has already rejected symlinks and
 * non-directories with `lstat` before opening, and re-verifies the descriptor's
 * identity against that `lstat` afterwards, so a swapped directory is still
 * caught. What is lost is the atomicity of the open — a same-UID race, which
 * this program's threat model already declines to claim resistance against.
 */
export declare function workflowLifecycleGuardMode(): WorkflowLifecycleGuardMode;