/**
 * Merge the peaks-managed Skill denylist into the existing settings object.
 * Preserves every other `permissions.deny` entry the user (or another tool)
 * has written so the install is additive, not destructive. The output is
 * always deterministic: the same input always yields the same output,
 * regardless of insertion order in the source array.
 *
 * Defensive behavior:
 * - `settings.permissions` is missing or non-object → install creates a
 *   fresh `permissions: { deny: [...our entries] }` object.
 * - `settings.permissions.deny` is missing or non-array → install replaces
 *   the field with a fresh array containing only our entries.
 * - Duplicate entries (any source) are collapsed to one via `new Set`.
 *
 * The function is pure: it does not mutate the input. Atomic write happens
 * at the call site (`applyHookInstall`).
 */
export declare function withSuperpowersSkillDenylist(settings: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown>;
/**
 * Inverse of `withSuperpowersSkillDenylist`. Removes every peaks-managed
 * `UseSkill(...)` entry from the deny list. If the resulting deny list is
 * empty, the `deny` field itself is deleted; if the `permissions` object
 * becomes empty, the `permissions` field itself is deleted. This is the
 * uninstall path: every field we wrote must be removed exactly, and no
 * other field may be touched.
 *
 * Pure (no mutation).
 */
export declare function withoutSuperpowersSkillDenylist(settings: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown>;
/**
 * Read-only introspection. Returns the deny entries that `peaks hooks
 * install` would write today. Useful for `peaks hooks status` and the
 * dry-run envelope.
 */
export declare function listSuperpowersDenyEntries(): ReadonlyArray<string>;
/**
 *
 * In addition to the static SUPERPOWERS_DENIED_SKILLS list, peaks
 * scans the existing settings file for "trigger phrases" that
 * indicate the user has configured the superpowers chain (or
 * any other auto-run worktree-creating tool) and appends a
 * defensive deny to prevent the chain from running raw
 * `git worktree add` (or `podman run`) directly.
 *
 * Triggers detected (substring match on the existing
 * permissions.deny / permissions.allow list):
 *
 *  - `superpowers:using-git-worktrees` — the chain's ground zero
 *  - `superpowers:brainstorming` etc. — the upstream skill
 *  - `Bash(git worktree add` — the user has explicitly
 *    allowed raw git worktree, which our L2 lease-aware gate
 *    would also intercept (defense in depth)
 *
 * Append-only — never replaces, never re-orders, never removes
 * existing entries. Idempotent: re-running the install with
 * the same input yields the same output.
 */
export declare const TRIGGER_PHRASES: ReadonlyArray<string>;
export declare function withTriggeredDenyList(settings: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown>;
/** Inverse of withTriggeredDenyList: strip every deny-trigger entry. */
export declare function withoutTriggeredDenyList(settings: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown>;