# Built-in provider authorized access — 2026-10-14

Status: authenticated route implemented; full clean build, current shared-worktree build, and 685 combined focused tests passed. Bundling, a 604-file tarball audit with zero warnings, and a compiler-free fresh npm install passed. Those implementation checks remain valid. Subsequent genuine-client and wire controls established that public access works and Omnius's obsolete request header caused the checked denials; an account key is not required for the restored anonymous path. See [genuine access repair](WO-genuine-opencode-access-20261014.md) for the live results and current acceptance status.

The operator requires actual built-in model replies before publishing. An old official 1.0.856 protocol projection and current 1.0.858 both receive the same explicit client-restriction HTTP 403 today. This must not be misreported as an output parser failure or fixed by claiming a successful mock response.

## Source and optional credentials

Official provider source at commit `13afea6a1a76360936bbaa7677cff600ad52d452` uses the same pinned HTTPS endpoint and supports `OPENCODE_API_KEY` or an authorized Console credential. Standard local credential/account databases contain zero entries; no provider credential reference is present in the running Omnius process environment. The local Ollama key and local OpenCode server password are not remote inference credentials and must never be reused for this provider. The existence audit did not search arbitrary private files or print secret values.

Evidence: [read-only credential/access audit](evidence/builtin-provider-authorized-access-audit-20261014.json), [official release comparison and actual public denials](evidence/local-admission-provider-regression-20261014.json).

## Required implementation and acceptance

- Bind the official provider environment key only to its exact registered HTTPS origin and API path. Keep the public sentinel where permitted when no key is configured.
- Preserve model-specific catalog, schema, Responses/chat/stream adapters and the free-model eligibility list. Do not bypass these through generic credential profiles or enable paid model IDs.
- Keep credentials in transport headers and privileged host state. Do not persist raw environment keys in model selection/configuration or include them in model messages, tool context, route receipts or error bodies. Preserve manual fallback approval before conversation/tool context can be sent remotely.
- Treat the credentialed route as authenticated when anonymous fallback is disabled; do not enable other anonymous providers. Check credential scope again at dispatch. Revocation or malformed configuration must fail clearly without silently substituting public credentials.
- Verify selected and cascade modes, native schema/tool/stream adapters, origin isolation, no context/receipt leaks, mid-request revocation and CLI selection persistence. Run a combined isolated build/package smoke.
- A positive live model reply through the actual Telegram/runtime path remains the acceptance requirement, using supported public access or an authorized credential. Contract tests do not satisfy that acceptance criterion. Do not claim the operator's publication condition is met until this passes.

The operator has been asked for an authorized environment-variable reference only, never the secret itself. No account creation, provider identity bypass, remote credential guess, or unauthorized retry is part of this repair.


## Verification details

The final combined snapshot passes 685 distinct focused tests across 30 suites: backend 43, orchestrator 401, CLI 179, execution 62. Coverage includes the actual selected/fallback chat, Responses and streaming adapter paths with synthetic HTTP fixtures, credential isolation/redaction/revocation, manual policy, the Step default-selection regression, local cold-load admission, TUI/Telegram producers, cancellation and native computer-use reconciliation. These fixtures are transport regression tests, not evidence of live provider acceptance.

The clean isolated build caught undeclared Node globals in the first helper implementation; the helper now uses structural environment types and optional host-global lookup, preserving browser-compatible imports. Full clean build and the current shared-worktree build pass after correction. User publish staging was not modified.

Final evidence: [combined source/build/package verification](evidence/authenticated-inference-final-verification-20261014.json). Every owned source/test file in the isolated build was compared byte-for-byte with the staged index. The fresh install loaded SQLite and verified CLI, library exports and the pinned companion package. The test package was not published.
