#!/usr/bin/env node
import { C as CliNameLiteral, a6 as VoteThreshold, B as VotingStrategy, F as ErrorPolicy, a7 as NoQuorumPolicy } from './consensus-vote-types-DkRs8FbB.js';
import { z } from 'zod';

/**
 * nexus-agents/audit - Authentic Vote Record (#3897, model revised #3927)
 *
 * A committed, append-only, tamper-EVIDENT record of a completed
 * `consensus_vote`, persisted at vote time so the authority-ladder promotion
 * gate (`scripts/check-authority-tier-drift.ts`, #3895) can rest authenticity
 * on a tamper-evident record set instead of on hand-transcribed YAML.
 *
 * MODEL: TAMPER-EVIDENT RECORD SET + MONOTONIC SEQUENCE (NOT a linear hash
 * chain). #3927 (design vote 7-0, Option B). The original #3897 design was a
 * LINEAR HASH CHAIN: each record's `hash` folded in the prior record's hash, so
 * the order of file lines was load-bearing. That model cannot survive a
 * concurrent-branch git merge — two branches that each append a record from the
 * same tip produce two records claiming the same `previousHash`, and any
 * merge-concatenation breaks the back-link check. The revised model treats the
 * ledger as an UNORDERED SET of self-hashed records plus a monotonic `sequence`
 * number: each record's hash is POSITION-INDEPENDENT (covers `sequence` but NOT
 * `previousHash`), so it is stable across merges and reorders. `previousHash`
 * is retained ADVISORILY for audit texture but does NOT participate in
 * verification. Omission is detected via SEQUENCE GAPS; concurrent forks (two
 * records sharing a sequence) are a BENIGN signal, not a failure.
 *
 * KNOWN GAP IN OMISSION DETECTION (#4011): sequence-gap detection only catches an
 * omission that leaves a HOLE in the `0..maxSeq` run. It does NOT catch the
 * deletion of a FORK PARTNER — when a sequence is shared by ≥2 records and one is
 * removed, the surviving partner still occupies that sequence, so no gap appears
 * and verification still returns `ok`. So a concurrent fork that resolved
 * `approved` + `rejected` can have its `rejected` partner silently dropped. This
 * is consistent with the residual-trust boundary (records are author-typed;
 * a signature is OPTIONAL until the #3927 item 4 phase-3 cutover): a commit-access
 * actor could equally have just never written the rejecting record, so this grants
 * no new capability. Closing it (cross-checking `forks`/`recordCount`, or
 * requiring fork partners to be co-present) is only meaningful once signing raises
 * the overall bar, and folds into #3927 item 4. See the audit-hash-chain threat
 * model for the disclosed boundary.
 *
 * SIGNATURE (#3927 item 4, phases 1-2). A record MAY carry `signature`: a
 * detached `ssh-keygen -Y sign` signature, namespace
 * {@link VOTE_RECORD_SIGNATURE_NAMESPACE}, over the record's committed `hash`
 * string. It is OUTSIDE the self-hash (it is made over the hash) and is
 * verified separately by `vote-record-signature.ts` against the committed
 * `governance/allowed_signers`. `verifyVoteRecordSet` does NOT check it: the
 * set verifier answers "was any record edited", the signature verifier answers
 * "did a listed key sign this hash", and the gate reports the two side by side.
 * What a signature proves is key ACCESS from the signing environment, not a
 * human's presence — see the threat model and #6257.
 *
 * WHY A DEDICATED PAYLOAD-COVERING HASH (and not the audit-event head hash).
 * The audit-event chain (`computeEventHash` in audit-logger.ts) hashes only the
 * stable HEAD fields (id/timestamp/category/action/outcome/actor/previousHash)
 * and intentionally NOT `metadata` — so riding a tier-transition-style metadata
 * payload would leave the vote `decision`/`approvalPercentage` OUTSIDE the
 * hash: an attacker could flip `rejected`→`approved` in the metadata without
 * breaking any hash. That defeats the whole point of #3897. This record instead
 * folds EVERY authenticity-bearing field — the proposal content hash, the
 * decision, the approval percentage, the vote counts, the per-voter summary,
 * and the `sequence` — into the self-hash, so editing any of them is detected
 * as a `hash_mismatch`. This is the tamper-evidence MVP; cryptographic
 * signing/provenance (binding the record to a key) is DEFERRED (#3897 follow-up).
 *
 * NOTE: the separate audit-event/tier-transition chain (`audit-logger.ts`) IS
 * still a real linear hash chain — it has a single-writer runtime and never
 * merges concurrent branches, so the chain model holds there. Only THIS ledger
 * (a multi-branch committable artifact) was converted to a record set.
 *
 * @module audit/vote-record
 */

/**
 * The `{pr, headSha}` binding of a PR-ratification vote (#5130 step 1, schema
 * 1.10). `pr` is the PR number the panel ratified; `headSha` is the full head
 * commit the panel saw. Exported for the `consensus_vote` input schema and the
 * caller-commits append script, so producer, record and script validate the
 * same shape.
 */
declare const VoteRecordPrBindingSchema: z.ZodObject<{
    pr: z.ZodNumber;
    headSha: z.ZodString;
}, z.core.$strict>;
type VoteRecordPrBinding = z.infer<typeof VoteRecordPrBindingSchema>;

/**
 * nexus-agents/cli - Mode Detector
 *
 * Automatic detection of nexus-agents invocation mode based on
 * environment variables, TTY state, and explicit flags.
 *
 * (Source: Node.js 22.x TTY documentation)
 * (Source: MCP Protocol 2025-11-25 - client detection patterns)
 */
/**
 * Server mode for nexus-agents.
 * - server: MCP server only (responds to MCP client calls)
 * - orchestrator: CLI orchestrator (calls external CLIs like Gemini, Codex)
 * - mesh: Not yet implemented — reserved for future bidirectional mode
 */
type ServerMode = 'server' | 'orchestrator' | 'mesh';

/**
 * nexus-agents CLI Types
 *
 * Type definitions and constants for the CLI.
 *
 * @module cli-types
 */

/**
 * Exit codes for the CLI.
 */
declare const EXIT_CODES: {
    readonly SUCCESS: 0;
    readonly SERVER_START_FAILED: 1;
    readonly SHUTDOWN_ERROR: 2;
    readonly INVALID_ARGS: 3;
    /** Subcommand is stubbed / advertised but not implemented (#2727). */
    readonly NOT_IMPLEMENTED: 4;
};
/**
 * CLI command types that can be executed.
 */
type CliCommand = 'server' | 'help' | 'version' | 'hello' | 'config' | 'expert' | 'workflow' | 'doctor' | 'verify' | 'review' | 'routing-audit' | 'orchestrate' | 'system-review' | 'vote' | 'index' | 'research' | 'validation' | 'learning-metrics' | 'swe-bench' | 'atbench' | 'setup' | 'hooks' | 'demo' | 'sprint' | 'session' | 'evaluate' | 'issue' | 'fitness-audit' | 'release-notes' | 'release-validate' | 'release-announce' | 'scaffold' | 'visualize' | 'capabilities' | 'status' | 'memory-benchmark' | 'auth' | 'scenario' | 'warm-up' | 'e2e-eval' | 'routing-ab' | 'memory-eval' | 'health' | 'init' | 'validate' | 'registry' | 'login' | 'usage' | 'migrate' | 'tour' | 'improvement-review' | 'auto-remediate' | 'remediation-review' | 'mode' | 'jobs';
/**
 * Parsed CLI arguments and command.
 */
interface ParsedCliArgs {
    command: CliCommand;
    subcommand?: string;
    options: {
        help: boolean;
        version: boolean;
        verbose: boolean;
        interactive: boolean;
        all: boolean;
        mode: ServerMode;
        output?: string;
        force: boolean;
        format: string;
        input?: string;
        dryRun: boolean;
        banditStats: boolean;
        setup: boolean;
        skipChecks: boolean;
        task?: string;
        model?: CliNameLiteral;
        maxTokens?: number;
        maxCostUsd?: number;
        engine?: 'router' | 'puppeteer';
        learn?: boolean;
        policyPath?: string;
        maxSteps?: number;
        createIssue: boolean;
        fix: boolean;
        proposal?: string;
        /** Legacy spelling of the bar; `strategy` wins when both are given (#6227). */
        threshold?: VoteThreshold;
        /** #6227 — `--strategy`, the tool's own enum, passed to the engine as the MCP tool passes it. */
        strategy?: VotingStrategy;
        /** #6227 — `--ratifies-pr <n>@<sha>`, already parsed into the record's binding shape. */
        ratifiesPr?: VoteRecordPrBinding;
        quick: boolean;
        timeoutMs?: number;
        /** #2630 — see `applyErrorPolicy`. */
        errorPolicy?: ErrorPolicy;
        /** #4135 — how the vote command maps a `no_quorum` decision. Default `fail`. */
        onNoQuorum?: NoQuorumPolicy;
        /** #4472 / #4941 — repeatable `--option`, the named alternatives to tally. */
        options?: string[];
        /** #6110 — `--project`, the project the panel judges (replaces `nexus-agents` in the prompts). */
        project?: string;
        variant?: 'lite' | 'verified' | 'full';
        limit?: number;
        instance?: string[];
        resume: boolean;
        concurrency?: number;
        mcp?: boolean;
        predictions?: string;
        cacheLevel?: string;
        maxWorkers?: string;
        runId?: string;
        outputDir?: string;
        fixture?: string;
        llmScoring?: boolean;
        period?: number;
        export?: string;
        noTrends?: boolean;
        nonInteractive: boolean;
        skipMcp: boolean;
        skipRules: boolean;
        skipHooks: boolean;
        skipConfig: boolean;
        skipOpencode: boolean;
        skipGemini: boolean;
        skipCodex: boolean;
        scope?: 'user' | 'project';
        customApi?: string;
        customApiKey?: string;
        customModel?: string;
        mock: boolean;
        deep: boolean;
        /**
         * Run the `serves` readiness level: a real completion per adapter (#4376).
         *
         * Opt-in because it spends generation quota. The default run proves
         * `installed` and `authenticated` only, and reports `serves` as
         * not-attempted rather than assuming it.
         */
        live: boolean;
        json?: boolean;
        source?: string;
        portable?: boolean;
        gitignore?: boolean;
        mcpConfig?: boolean;
        install?: boolean;
        uninstall?: boolean;
        opencode?: string;
        validate?: boolean;
        evaluator?: string;
        owner?: string;
        note?: string;
        sound?: boolean;
        unsound?: boolean;
    };
    positionals: string[];
}

/**
 * nexus-agents CLI Commands
 *
 * Command dispatch and routing for the CLI.
 *
 * @module cli-commands
 *
 * File structure:
 * - Validators in cli-commands-validators.ts (Issue #272)
 * - Usage text in cli-commands-usage.ts
 * - Command handlers in cli-commands-handlers.ts (Issue #285)
 */

/**
 * Prints help text to stdout.
 *
 * Default output hides maintainer commands (benchmarks, release tooling, deep
 * diagnostics). Pass `--all` to include them. See `cli-command-catalog.ts` for
 * the audience classification.
 */
declare function printHelp(args?: ParsedCliArgs): void;
/**
 * Prints version information to stdout.
 */
declare function printVersion(): void;

/**
 * nexus-agents CLI
 *
 * CLI entry point for Nexus Agents MCP server.
 * Supports commands for server operation, configuration, and expert management.
 *
 * (Source: MCP Protocol 2025-11-25)
 * (Source: Node.js 22.x parseArgs documentation)
 */

/**
 * Parses CLI arguments and determines the command to run.
 *
 * @param args - Command line arguments (defaults to process.argv.slice(2))
 * @returns Parsed CLI arguments with command and options
 */
declare function parseCliArgs(args?: string[]): ParsedCliArgs;

export { type CliCommand, EXIT_CODES, type ParsedCliArgs, type ServerMode, parseCliArgs, printHelp, printVersion };