/**
 * Context Handoff — A-CTX-2 contracts.
 *
 * Chain verification circuit breaker for upstream-to-downstream context handoff.
 *
 * Rule: a downstream agent MUST NOT execute before verifyContextHandoff returns ok=true.
 * Healthy handoffs are silent. Broken handoffs stop execution and return one reason code
 * plus one recovery instruction. Never silently discard excluded or unverifiable context.
 */
/**
 * Overall integrity state of the upstream chain.
 * "verified"          — all upstream receipts and artifacts check out
 * "evidence_boundary" — upstream integrity could not be established (no receipt)
 * "tamper_detected"   — receipt hash or artifact hash does not match
 * "incomplete"        — required fields or artifacts are absent
 * "unsupported_schema"— handoff schemaVersion is not recognised
 */
export type ChainIntegrityState = "verified" | "evidence_boundary" | "tamper_detected" | "incomplete" | "unsupported_schema";
export type HandoffClaimState = "verified" | "unverified" | "rejected" | "unknown";
/** A single verifiable statement carried across the handoff boundary. */
export interface ContextHandoffClaim {
    claimId: string;
    statement: string;
    evidenceRefs: string[];
    verificationState: HandoffClaimState;
}
/** A content-addressed artifact that must be present and hash-stable across the boundary. */
export interface ContextHandoffArtifact {
    path?: string;
    sha256: string;
    required: boolean;
    label?: string;
}
export declare const HANDOFF_SCHEMA_VERSION: "martin.handoff.v1";
/**
 * Immutable record produced by the upstream agent and verified before the
 * downstream agent executes.
 *
 * upstreamIntegrity propagates from the parent handoff — it can never be
 * upgraded by downstream success. A "tamper_detected" upstream remains
 * "tamper_detected" regardless of what the current agent does.
 */
export interface ContextHandoffReceipt {
    schemaVersion: typeof HANDOFF_SCHEMA_VERSION;
    handoffId: string;
    chainId: string;
    missionId?: string;
    producerRunId: string;
    /** SHA-256 of the upstream run's canonical receipt file. */
    producerReceiptHash: string;
    /** Parent handoff IDs for multi-hop chain lineage. */
    parentHandoffIds?: string[];
    claims: ContextHandoffClaim[];
    artifacts: ContextHandoffArtifact[];
    /** Free-text assumptions that have not yet been verified at handoff time. */
    unresolvedAssumptions: string[];
    upstreamIntegrity: "verified" | "evidence_boundary" | "tamper_detected" | "incomplete";
    createdAt: string;
}
/**
 * Safe ledger record for a context object that was denied before reaching
 * executable context.
 *
 * MUST NOT contain the secret value or raw denied content — only safe
 * identity, hashes, and reason codes.
 */
export interface ContextExclusionDecision {
    decision: "excluded";
    objectId: string;
    reasonCode: "secret_detected" | "policy_denied" | "authority_boundary" | "integrity_unverified";
    reason: string;
    /** SHA-256 of the denied content — never the content itself. */
    sourceHash?: string;
    excludedAt: string;
}
export interface ContextHandoffVerification {
    ok: boolean;
    integrity: ChainIntegrityState;
    reasons: Array<{
        code: string;
        message: string;
        claimId?: string;
        artifactSha256?: string;
    }>;
}
/**
 * Decision produced by decideContextCircuitBreak.
 *
 * Healthy:  { shouldStop: false, silent: true }
 * Broken:   { shouldStop: true, silent: false, reasonCode, message, nextAction }
 */
export interface ContextCircuitBreakResult {
    shouldStop: boolean;
    /** true = healthy, no human-visible output; false = must surface to caller */
    silent: boolean;
    verification: ContextHandoffVerification;
    reasonCode?: string;
    message?: string;
    nextAction?: string;
}