/**
 * `loopsy relay` and `loopsy mobile pair` commands.
 *
 *   loopsy relay configure <url>   register this device with the relay,
 *                                  store {url, deviceId, deviceSecret}
 *                                  in ~/.loopsy/config.yaml
 *   loopsy relay show              print current relay config (secret masked)
 *   loopsy relay unset             remove relay config
 *   loopsy mobile pair             fetch a one-time pair token + render QR
 */
import type { RelayConfig } from '@loopsy/protocol';
/**
 * POST /device/register on the chosen relay URL. Returns a fully-formed
 * RelayConfig the caller can drop into ~/.loopsy/config.yaml.
 *
 * The relay echoes back a `relay_url` in the response (today it's literally
 * the request origin per packages/relay/src/index.ts:211, but a self-hosted
 * deployment behind a CF custom-domain rewrite or redirect could legitimately
 * canonicalize it). We trust the relay's response — this is a v1 trust call,
 * not a security boundary; a network MITM would intercept TLS itself, and
 * pinning the user-supplied URL would break legitimate canonicalization.
 */
export declare function registerWithRelay(rawUrl: string): Promise<RelayConfig>;
export declare function relayConfigureCommand(argv: {
    url: string;
}): Promise<void>;
export declare function relayShowCommand(): Promise<void>;
export declare function relayUnsetCommand(): Promise<void>;
export declare function mobilePairCommand(argv: {
    ttl?: number;
    multiUse?: boolean;
    qrPng?: string;
    relayUrl?: string;
    usePublicRelay?: boolean;
}): Promise<void>;
/** CSO #8: list phones currently paired to this device. */
export declare function phoneListCommand(): Promise<void>;
/** CSO #8: revoke a paired phone. */
export declare function phoneRevokeCommand(argv: {
    phoneId: string;
}): Promise<void>;
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