import { type JinnMcpTool } from "./toolkit.js";
/**
 * GRS-020a — the company-REFERENCE tool group of the `jinn` MCP server: agents
 * search messages across all sessions, search sessions by structured filters,
 * and expand a search hit into its surrounding context.
 *
 * Contract (012d-0 admission rules, unchanged): every tool is a thin
 * DETERMINISTIC wrapper over ONE gateway read route; no LLM ranking (message
 * search is recency-first, session search is last-activity-first); outputs are
 * decision-shaped with a `hint` naming the next step.
 *
 * Domain rules this module owns:
 *   - INJECTION SAFETY lives in the STORE, not here: the registry's
 *     sanitizeFtsQuery turns every token into a quoted FTS5 phrase, so MATCH
 *     operators (* NEAR - " OR) are literal text and a syntax error is
 *     structurally impossible. The tools pass the raw query through as a URL
 *     parameter — they never build SQL or MATCH strings.
 *   - CONTEXT-BOMB GUARDS: search returns SNIPPETS only (≤ {@link SNIPPET_CHAR_CAP}
 *     chars each, ≤ {@link SEARCH_LIMIT_MAX} hits); session search returns
 *     summaries without message bodies; get-context is radius-bounded and
 *     returns each selected message body in full.
 *   - SELF-EXCLUSION (GRS-020a-fix finding 1): search_messages excludes
 *     the CALLER'S OWN session by default — the act of searching for X is
 *     itself a message containing X, and newest-first ranking would return it
 *     as the top hit. Explicit sessionId scope or includeOwnSession opts back
 *     in. This is a read-tier USE of the identity seam, not an authority gate.
 *   - LENGTH CAPS (finding 3): query/text are capped tool-side (structured
 *     "shorten it" error) BEFORE the HTTP call, so an over-long query can never
 *     surface as a raw HTTP 431. Follow-up if real queries ever need more: move
 *     search to a JSON POST route; the GET+caps shape is the KISS v1.
 *   - READ TIER: these are privileged company reads. Tool-marked or
 *     caller-session-claimed requests must carry a valid bound session
 *     capability; operator/browser reads without those headers remain unchanged.
 *   - TEACHING lives on search_messages (one teaching description per
 *     domain); the other two stay short.
 */
/** Max hits per message search. */
export declare const SEARCH_LIMIT_MAX = 20;
/** Default hits per message search. */
export declare const SEARCH_LIMIT_DEFAULT = 10;
/** Defensive per-snippet char cap (the store's snippet() is ~12 tokens already). */
export declare const SNIPPET_CHAR_CAP = 300;
/** Max session summaries per session search. */
export declare const SESSION_SEARCH_LIMIT_MAX = 50;
/** Default session summaries per session search. */
export declare const SESSION_SEARCH_LIMIT_DEFAULT = 20;
/** Max messages each side of a context anchor. */
export declare const CONTEXT_RADIUS_MAX = 100;
/** Default context radius. */
export declare const CONTEXT_RADIUS_DEFAULT = 3;
/** Tool-side cap on the search query / text filter (GRS-020a-fix finding 3):
 *  an over-long query must become a STRUCTURED "shorten it" error before the
 *  HTTP call — never a raw 431 from the HTTP parser. Half the route-side cap,
 *  so the tool always fails first with the friendlier message. */
export declare const QUERY_CHAR_CAP = 512;
/** Tool-side cap on every other string filter (ids/slugs are far shorter). */
export declare const FILTER_CHAR_CAP = 256;
export declare function buildSearchTools(): JinnMcpTool[];
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