/**
 * Signing fixture for the reporter snippet the CLI prints.
 *
 * The CLI does not sign anything itself — it prints a snippet the customer
 * pastes into their app. This fixture pins the algorithm that snippet
 * documents, so a careless edit to `buildSigningSnippet()` fails here rather
 * than surfacing as an unexplained production `401`.
 *
 * Signing payload: `${timestamp}.${body}` — the request timestamp, a literal
 * `.`, then the raw JSON body. Signing the body alone (dropping the timestamp
 * prefix) removes replay protection and is the exact mistake the snippet and
 * this fixture guard against.
 *
 * The secret is the PROJECT ingest key's signing secret (`his_…`), minted with
 * the key in the dashboard settings page. The per-watcher `hes_…` secret this
 * fixture used to model no longer authenticates anything.
 */
export declare const WATCHER_SIGNATURE_FIXTURE: {
    /** Test signing secret. NEVER a real credential. */
    readonly secret: "his_test_secret_do_not_use_in_production";
    /** Unix seconds, as sent in the `X-Hula-Timestamp` header. */
    readonly timestamp: "1734556800";
    /**
     * The exact raw request body that was signed. Carries all three dedupe
     * identity fields (`key`, `errorName`, `errorCode`) because those — and only
     * those — build the server's fingerprint.
     */
    readonly body: "{\"errorDescription\":\"Payment gateway timed out\",\"key\":\"orders.checkout.timeout\",\"errorName\":\"TimeoutError\",\"errorCode\":\"ETIMEDOUT\",\"environment\":\"production\"}";
    /** HMAC-SHA256(secret, `${timestamp}.${body}`) as lowercase hex. */
    readonly signatureHex: "fe747ddcc36a1405b9ecc417328fbfdb0459d5c7d4d3b0528b47eed0c0b17045";
};
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