import { type DOMPurify } from "dompurify";
export type SanitizerLike = Pick<DOMPurify, "sanitize">;
/***********************************************
 * ALLOWED_TAGS
 *
 * Base allowlist of HTML tag names for DOMPurify.
 *
 * Intent:
 *   - Represent a broad but finite subset of “safe-ish”
 *     HTML5 elements that are expected in typical UI
 *     markup (text, lists, tables, basic form controls).
 *   - Anything not in this list must be explicitly added
 *     via `ADD_TAGS` in `sanitize_external`, or it will
 *     be stripped by DOMPurify.
 *
 * Notes:
 *   - All entries are lowercase to match DOMPurify’s
 *     internal normalization.
 *   - High-risk or complex tags (e.g. <svg>, media,
 *     scripting, embedding) are excluded and handled
 *     separately via `FORBID_TAGS_HARD`.
 ***********************************************/
export declare const ALLOWED_TAGS: string[];
/***********************************************
 * ALLOWED_ATTR
 *
 * Base allowlist of HTML attributes for DOMPurify.
 *
 * Coverage:
 *   - Core identity / semantics:
 *       id, class, title, role, data-*
 *   - Accessibility:
 *       aria-label, aria-hidden, aria-expanded,
 *       aria-controls
 *   - Links and images:
 *       href, src, srcset, sizes, alt, target, rel
 *   - Performance hints:
 *       loading, decoding
 *
 * Behavior:
 *   - Attributes not in this list are removed unless
 *     DOMPurify is configured to allow them via
 *     additional options.
 *   - `data-*` is handled via `ALLOW_DATA_ATTR: true`
 *     in the sanitizer options, not by literal listing
 *     of every possible data-foo.
 ***********************************************/
export declare const ALLOWED_ATTR: string[];
/***********************************************
 * FORBID_TAGS_HARD
 *
 * Set of tag names that are *always* rejected by the
 * sanitizer, even if:
 *   - they appear in the HTML,
 *   - they are added to `ADD_TAGS`, or
 *   - they slip into default DOMPurify allowlists.
 *
 * Includes:
 *   - Active / executable content:
 *       script, style
 *   - Embedding / navigation primitives:
 *       iframe, object, embed, link, meta, base, form
 *   - Complex rendering surfaces:
 *       svg, math, video, audio
 *
 * Rationale:
 *   - These tags either:
 *       - can execute code,
 *       - change document-level behavior (base/meta),
 *       - or open a large security / complexity surface
 *         (SVG, MathML, media).
 *   - If you ever need a *safe subset* of these (e.g.
 *     SVG icons), introduce a dedicated, tightly
 *     constrained pipeline instead of weakening this set.
 ***********************************************/
export declare const FORBID_TAGS_HARD: Set<string>;
/***********************************************
 * ALLOWED_URI_REGEX
 *
 * URI scheme allowlist used for URL-bearing attributes
 * (href, src, srcset, etc.).
 *
 * Allowed schemes:
 *   - http:
 *   - https:
 *   - mailto:
 *   - tel:
 *   - data:image/ (images only, not arbitrary data:)
 *
 * Security:
 *   - Rejects javascript:, vbscript:, and other
 *     scriptable / dangerous schemes by default.
 *   - Used both:
 *       - directly in `set_attrs_safe`, and
 *       - indirectly via DOMPurify’s ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP.
 ***********************************************/
export declare const ALLOWED_URI_REGEX: RegExp;
/***********************************************
 * sanitize_external
 *
 * One-shot sanitization for *external / untrusted* HTML
 * using DOMPurify, augmented with:
 *   - discovery-driven tag allowlists,
 *   - hard tag forbids,
 *   - strict attribute and URL enforcement,
 *   - and minimal attribute hygiene for links.
 *
 * Tag policy:
 *   - Base allowlist: `ALLOWED_TAGS`.
 *   - Per-call additions: `ADD_TAGS = buildAddTags(html)`,
 *     derived from the actual tag usage in the HTML.
 *   - Hard blocklist: `FORBID_TAGS_HARD`, which overrides
 *     any other allow lists and is always enforced.
 *
 * Attribute policy:
 *   - `ALLOWED_ATTR` defines the base attribute allowlist.
 *   - Syntactic `hson:*` candidates found in the source are added only so the
 *     canonical metadata registry can validate them after sanitization.
 *   - `FORBID_ATTR: ["style", "srcdoc"]` forbids inline
 *     styles and srcdoc frames outright.
 *   - `ALLOW_DATA_ATTR: true` allows all `data-*` attributes.
 *   - A DOMPurify `uponSanitizeAttribute` hook:
 *       - Drops `style` and `srcdoc` even if seen.
 *       - Validates URL-bearing attributes (`href`, `src`,
 *         `xlink:href`, `poster`) against `ALLOWED_URI_REGEX`.
 *       - For `srcset`, rejects the whole attribute if *any*
 *         candidate URL is unsafe.
 *       - Enforces `rel="noopener noreferrer"` on links with
 *         `target="_blank"` for tab-hijack protection.
 *
 * Behavior:
 *   - Returns a new HTML string that has been:
 *       - parsed by DOMPurify,
 *       - stripped of disallowed tags/attributes/URLs,
 *       - normalized according to the above policies.
 *
 * Notes:
 *   - Hard-forbidden elements (e.g. `<script>`) and their content are removed.
 *     Ordinary text under admitted elements remains intact.
 *   - `WHOLE_DOCUMENT: false` treats the input as a fragment
 *     rather than a full HTML document.
 *
 * @param html  Raw, potentially untrusted HTML input.
 * @returns     A sanitized HTML string suitable for safe
 *              insertion via `mount_html_safe` or similar
 *              inert-parse pipelines.
 ***********************************************/
/** Resolve one sanitizer whose DOM implementation is bound to exactly one window. */
export declare function make_sanitizer(targetWindow: Window): SanitizerLike;
export declare function sanitize_external(html: string, options?: Readonly<{
    xmlShaped?: boolean;
}>): string;
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