/**
 * Secret detection for memory content (v39 memory scope isolation, S4;
 * docs/plans/2026-07-01-memory-scope-isolation.md).
 *
 * Conservative, provider-bounded patterns only - a bare `sk-` in prose must
 * NOT flag. Detection gates two surfaces:
 *  - producer: shareMemory/autoShare never promote flagged rows to the
 *    global store;
 *  - consumer: ambient context (getContext) never injects a flagged row
 *    outside its owning project, and never anywhere when the row has no
 *    project origin. Explicit recall is unaffected - recalling a secret is
 *    a deliberate act.
 *
 * This is deliberately a thin slice of the A4 lifecycle-compliance item
 * (no write-time scrubbing, no PII detection).
 *
 * Leaf module: keep free of imports from store/api/shared so all of them
 * can import it without cycles.
 */
/** Result of scanning one memory. `reason` names the tag or pattern that fired. */
export interface SecretDetection {
    flagged: boolean;
    reason: string | null;
}
/**
 * Scan a memory's tags + content for secret material.
 * Pure and deterministic; no filesystem or store access.
 */
export declare function detectSecret(entry: {
    content: string;
    tags: string[];
}): SecretDetection;
/**
 * Replace secret-shaped substrings in free text with a redaction marker.
 * Reuses the same `SECRET_PATTERNS` / co-occurrence guard as `detectSecret`
 * (which only flags whole-entry content) so callers that must persist raw
 * text that never passes through the normal capture content gate — e.g. the
 * CS1 pre-compact snapshot fields — can scrub it in place instead.
 */
export declare function redactSecrets(text: string): string;
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