/**
 * Structured errors for the direct Google Sheets API outbound provider.
 *
 * The transport converts gaxios/network failures into
 * `GoogleSheetsApiTransportError` with explicit HTTP-status and stable-code
 * presence so the shared `classifyTransportOutcome` boundary can decide
 * between a proven pre-mutation rejection and an ambiguous delivery without
 * reading raw SDK error objects.
 */
import { type SyncInvalidProviderClassification } from "../../../contracts/sheets/errors.js";
export { GoogleSheetsApiTransportError, GOOGLE_SHEETS_API_TRANSPORT_ERROR_CODES, } from "../../../contracts/sheets/transportError.js";
export type { GoogleSheetsApiTransportErrorCode } from "../../../contracts/sheets/transportError.js";
/**
 * Classification shared by every `spreadsheets.get` validation guard: a raw
 * get reply whose shape, cell value, or cell format fails closed is a
 * `get_reply` / `malformed_reply` invalid provider state. All model parsers
 * that promote `spreadsheets.get` payloads (`preflightParsing`,
 * `valueNormalization`, `preflightRows`, `observation`, and the `readRows`
 * read operations) route their raw GET guards through this constant so the
 * emitted redacted event always carries the stable pair instead of
 * collapsing to `unclassified`. The message (which may echo a payload
 * fragment, id, or URL) is never logged.
 */
export declare const GET_REPLY_MALFORMED: SyncInvalidProviderClassification;
/**
 * Throws the shared contract error for an invalid direct-provider request.
 *
 * Mirrors the Apps Script operation request boundary: invalid routes, effect
 * shapes, and provider options fail closed before any remote mutation.
 */
export declare function invalidProviderRequest(label: string, message: string): never;
/**
 * Throws the shared contract error for an invalid remote Sheet/API state.
 *
 * Malformed SDK payloads, header drift, duplicate anchors/identities, and
 * receipt-schema drift are remote-state problems, not transport problems.
 * They surface to the worker as delivery-uncertain (the same way a throwing
 * Apps Script operation does) so the effect is probed rather than failed on
 * unverified evidence.
 *
 * `classification` carries the allowlisted provider operation/reason so the
 * redacted `hikoutei.transport.response_invalid` event (and the thrown error)
 * expose a stable safe category. Call sites that detect a proven fixture
 * branch pass a specific classification; everything else keeps the default
 * `unclassified` category. The message is never logged and never reaches
 * telemetry (it can echo remote payload fragments, ids, or URLs).
 */
export declare function invalidProviderState(message: string, classification?: SyncInvalidProviderClassification): never;
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