import type { AttestationInput } from "./vrp-receipt.js";
export declare const VRP_MCP_PROFILE_VERSION = "1.0";
export declare const VRP_MCP_TRANSPORT_LAYER = "transport";
export declare const VRP_MCP_ASSERTION_TYPE = "vrp.mcp.transport.1";
export interface McpTransportAssertionInput {
    /** MCP tool name, e.g. "get_verified_stay_offer". */
    tool: string;
    /** The tool-call arguments object (hashed canonically, never stored raw). */
    arguments: Record<string, unknown>;
    /** ISO-8601 instant the node served the response. */
    served_at: string;
    /** The node identity that served (and will sign) the interaction. */
    issuer: string;
    /** Correlator to the offer attestation this transport wraps (e.g. offer id / JWS thumbprint). */
    offer_ref?: string;
    /** Optional MCP session correlator. */
    session_id?: string;
}
export interface McpTransportAssertion {
    vrp_mcp_profile_version: string;
    type: typeof VRP_MCP_ASSERTION_TYPE;
    tool: string;
    /** Hex SHA-256 of the JCS-style canonical arguments (see `canonicalJson`). */
    arguments_sha256: string;
    served_at: string;
    issuer: string;
    offer_ref?: string;
    session_id?: string;
}
/**
 * JCS-style (RFC 8785) canonical JSON: object keys sorted recursively, array
 * order preserved. Used ONLY to derive `arguments_sha256` (content inside the
 * signed payload) — it is not used to re-derive the JWS signing input, which
 * per ADR 0010 D5 is always the JWS bytes as received. Numbers use JSON's
 * default formatting; tool-call arguments in practice are strings/ints/bools,
 * for which this is stable. A full RFC 8785 number serialization is the v2
 * hardening if float-valued arguments ever appear.
 */
export declare function canonicalJson(value: unknown): string;
/** Hex SHA-256 of the canonical arguments. */
export declare function hashArguments(args: Record<string, unknown>): string;
/**
 * Build the canonical transport assertion (the object the node will sign).
 * Deterministic: optional fields are omitted when absent so the signed bytes
 * are stable for identical interactions.
 */
export declare function buildMcpTransportAssertion(input: McpTransportAssertionInput): McpTransportAssertion;
export interface McpTransportAttestationInput {
    /** Compact JWS the node produced over `buildMcpTransportAssertion(...)`. */
    signature: string;
    /** JWKS source for the node's signing key (same key as VRP offers). */
    source: string;
    valid_from: string;
    valid_until: string;
    ref?: string;
}
/**
 * Wrap a node-signed transport assertion as a VRP receipt `attestations[]`
 * entry (`layer: "transport"`). The result plugs straight into `verifyReceipt`.
 */
export declare function mcpTransportAttestation(input: McpTransportAttestationInput): AttestationInput;
/**
 * Verifier-side check: confirm a (signature-verified) transport assertion
 * actually describes an observed tool call — i.e. the same tool and the same
 * arguments (by canonical hash). Signature validity is the receipt verifier's
 * job; this binds the verified assertion to what the agent claims happened.
 */
export declare function assertionMatchesToolCall(assertion: Pick<McpTransportAssertion, "tool" | "arguments_sha256">, observed: {
    tool: string;
    arguments: Record<string, unknown>;
}): boolean;