/**
 * Shared log redaction — single source for the MCP server (api/mcp.ts) (mirror of the
 * #63 single-source discipline for tool defs). GDPR-first: guest PII (name / email /
 * phone / address) and secrets (Stripe keys, JWTs, tokens) must NEVER reach logs in
 * clear text — not in params, not in error messages.
 *
 * Three layers, because key-name matching alone bit us:
 *  1. Key-based, NORMALIZED — lowercase + strip non-alphanumerics so camelCase
 *     (`guestName`) AND snake_case (`guest_name`) both match. The original bug:
 *     `"guestname".includes("guest_name") === false` → guest names logged in clear text.
 *  2. Value-based — redact secret/PII patterns in string values regardless of key name
 *     (a secret in an unexpectedly-named field, or inside an error message).
 *  3. Deep — recurse into nested objects/arrays (the original sanitizer was top-level only).
 */
/** Redact a params object before logging: key-based + value-based + deep. */
export declare function sanitizeParams(params: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown>;
/** Redact an error message before logging (value-based patterns: secrets, JWTs, emails). */
export declare function redactMessage(msg: string | undefined | null): string | undefined;