import type { RiskLevel } from "../registry/types.js";
/**
 * How the user confirmation was resolved.
 *
 * - `auto_approved`: risk was at or below `HARNESS_AUTO_APPROVE_RISK`
 * - `elicited`: client completed an MCP elicitation handshake and the user
 *   explicitly accepted with `confirm: true` (the proceed case), or
 *   explicitly declined / cancelled / unchecked the confirm box (the block
 *   cases — paired with `outcome: "blocked"`)
 * - `caller_confirmed`: caller passed `confirm: true` and the client could
 *   not surface a usable elicitation prompt (no capability advertised,
 *   `elicitInput` failed, or the client returned a degenerate accept). Used
 *   by non-interactive automation. Distinct from `elicited` so audits can
 *   tell automation overrides apart from genuine human consents
 * - `not_required`: low-risk operation (`read` / `low_write`) that did not
 *   need confirmation
 * - `blocked`: client could not surface a usable confirmation prompt
 *   (lacking elicitation capability + no `confirm: true`, transport error,
 *   or degenerate accept). Paired with `outcome: "blocked"` on the
 *   pre-dispatch audit row
 */
export type ConfirmationMethod = "auto_approved" | "elicited" | "caller_confirmed" | "blocked" | "not_required";
/**
 * The outcome of an audited operation.
 *
 * - `success`: the dispatched API call returned successfully
 * - `error`: the dispatched API call failed (network/HTTP/etc.)
 * - `blocked`: a pre-dispatch audit row emitted by
 *   `Registry.auditBlockedAttempt()` when an operation was gated by
 *   elicitation. The operation itself was NOT dispatched; the row exists
 *   for record-keeping so operators can see blocked attempts. Distinct
 *   from `error` so audit/OTel consumers can filter pre-dispatch blocks
 *   from real API failures
 */
export type AuditOutcome = "success" | "error" | "blocked";
/**
 * Enriched audit event emitted for every registry-mediated API call.
 * Sinks receive this and decide how to persist / forward it.
 */
export interface AuditEvent {
    event_id: string;
    timestamp: string;
    tool: string;
    operation: string;
    resource_type: string;
    resource_id?: string;
    action?: string;
    org_id?: string;
    project_id?: string;
    account_id: string;
    risk: RiskLevel;
    confirmation?: ConfirmationMethod;
    outcome: AuditOutcome;
    error?: string;
    duration_ms: number;
    http_status?: number;
    http_method?: string;
    http_path?: string;
}
/**
 * Context passed from tool handlers into registry dispatch so the
 * audit layer can capture tool-level metadata it cannot derive itself.
 */
export interface AuditContext {
    tool: string;
    confirmation?: ConfirmationMethod;
    resource_id?: string;
    action?: string;
}
/**
 * A destination for audit events. Implementations must be failure-isolated:
 * errors during emit/flush/close are logged but never propagate.
 */
export interface AuditSink {
    readonly name: string;
    emit(event: AuditEvent): void | Promise<void>;
    flush?(): Promise<void>;
    close?(): Promise<void>;
}
//# sourceMappingURL=types.d.ts.map