/**
 * Honeypot decoy credentials.
 *
 * When the org enables honeypots (fleet settings → delivered via the runtime
 * bundle), the daemon plants a small set of decoy credential files in
 * locations a credential-hunting agent would search. No legitimate tool ever
 * reads these files, so ANY tool call touching one is a near-zero-false-
 * positive compromise signal: the deterministic guard blocks it on-device and
 * the resulting event (categoryId "honeypot") lets the backend auto-contain
 * the machine.
 *
 * Safety rules:
 *   - A decoy is only created where NO file exists. If a real file is already
 *     at a decoy path we skip it and never track it — we must never overwrite
 *     or later delete a user's real file.
 *   - Only files recorded in the state file (i.e. files WE created) are ever
 *     removed when the feature is disabled.
 */
export interface HoneypotDecoyState {
    path: string;
    itemId: string;
}
export interface HoneypotState {
    version: 1;
    enabled: boolean;
    plantedAt: string;
    decoys: HoneypotDecoyState[];
}
export interface PlantResult {
    planted: string[];
    existing: string[];
    skipped: string[];
}
/**
 * Plant (or re-plant) decoys. Idempotent — safe to call on every bundle poll.
 * Never overwrites a file we did not create.
 */
export declare function plantHoneypots(): PlantResult;
/** Remove decoys WE planted (state-tracked only) and clear the state file. */
export declare function removeHoneypots(): string[];
/**
 * Absolute paths of active decoys, for the deterministic guard. Fast (one
 * small JSON read), never throws — enforcement surfaces call this per scan.
 */
export declare function getHoneypotPaths(): string[];