export interface BotGuardConfig {
    apiKey?: string;
    organizationId?: string;
    apiUrl?: string;
    shieldId?: string;
    shieldKey?: string;
    /** Windows DPAPI-protected shield key. Preferred over plaintext shieldKey. */
    shieldKeyDpapi?: string;
    scan?: {
        endpoint?: string;
        description?: string;
        systemPrompt?: string;
        categories?: string[];
        attackCount?: number;
        failThreshold?: number;
        format?: 'json' | 'table' | 'summary';
        mode?: 'sync' | 'async';
        webhookFormat?: string;
    };
}
/**
 * Outcome of the most recent DPAPI PowerShell attempt in THIS process —
 * the fleet's "is PowerShell blocked on this machine?" health bit, derived
 * from work we had to do anyway (never a dedicated PowerShell spawn).
 * spawnOk=false means powershell.exe/pwsh.exe could not even start (EDR/
 * AppLocker block, missing shells); spawnOk=true + decryptOk=false means the
 * shell ran but the blob would not decrypt (wrong user profile / corrupt).
 */
export interface PowershellHealth {
    spawnOk: boolean;
    decryptOk: boolean;
    checkedAt: string;
    /** FullLanguage / ConstrainedLanguage / RestrictedLanguage — captured only when a decrypt fails (extra spawn is failure-path-only). */
    languageMode?: string;
}
export declare function getPowershellHealth(): PowershellHealth | undefined;
/**
 * PowerShell language mode — the "is this a hardened WDAC/AppLocker fleet
 * machine?" bit that explained the lptx1110 incident. Spawned only on the
 * DPAPI failure path (and from the deep self-test), never on healthy runs.
 */
export declare function capturePowershellLanguageMode(): string | undefined;
/**
 * PSCredential.GetNetworkCredential() instead of Marshal::SecureStringToBSTR:
 * hardened fleets run PowerShell in Constrained Language Mode, where the
 * [Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal] calls are forbidden (script fails ->
 * exit 1 -> "Shield key not available" -> every hook 401s fail-closed). The
 * PSCredential technique is on CLM's approved-type list and decrypts the same
 * DPAPI-protected SecureString in every language mode. Exported so the CLM
 * regression test runs this EXACT text inside a ConstrainedLanguage session.
 */
export declare const DPAPI_DECRYPT_SNIPPET = "$secure=ConvertTo-SecureString -String $env:FCD_DPAPI_VALUE; (New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('fcd', $secure)).GetNetworkCredential().Password";
/**
 * Deep self-test probe: encrypt AND decrypt a throwaway value with the exact
 * DPAPI snippets used for the shield key. Encryption alone can succeed on a
 * machine that can never decrypt (the pre-v1.21.32 bricking bug) — only the
 * full roundtrip proves the credential store works.
 */
export declare function dpapiRoundtripProbe(): {
    ok: boolean;
    detail: string;
};
export declare function getHomeConfigPath(): string;
export declare function loadConfig(configPath?: string): BotGuardConfig;
export declare function getDefaultConfigPath(): string;
export declare function saveShieldConfig(input: {
    shieldId: string;
    shieldKey?: string;
    apiUrl?: string;
}): string;
export interface SetupConfigInput {
    apiKey?: string;
    organizationId?: string;
    apiUrl?: string;
    shieldId?: string;
    shieldKey?: string;
}
export interface ResolvedCliCredentials {
    apiKey?: string;
    organizationId?: string;
    apiUrl: string;
    shieldId?: string;
    shieldKey?: string;
}
/**
 * Daemon→child credential handoff: the daemon injects its already-decrypted
 * in-memory creds as FCD_SHIELD_ID + FCD_SHIELD_KEY when spawning sweep
 * children (see discoverSweepCredentialEnv in daemon.ts). When BOTH are
 * present the child must use them as-is and skip the DPAPI decrypt — that
 * decrypt spawns powershell.exe, which EDR on hardened fleet machines can
 * block (and flags as suspicious even when it merely fails). Requiring the
 * pair keeps a stray single env var (e.g. AGENTGUARD_SHIELD_KEY from a
 * Cursor-plugin setup) from overriding the machine's enrolled key.
 * Pure — unit-tested.
 */
export declare function daemonHandoffShieldKey(env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): string | undefined;
/**
 * Which source supplied the shield key on the most recent resolution — the
 * codes-only trace shipped in the collect_diagnostics bundle (never the key
 * itself). `none_dpapi_broken` is the credential-broken state: a DPAPI blob
 * exists but would not decrypt and no fallback source was available.
 */
export type ShieldKeySource = 'override' | 'daemon_handoff' | 'native_store' | 'machine_file' | 'dpapi' | 'plaintext_config' | 'env' | 'none' | 'none_dpapi_broken';
export interface CredentialResolutionTrace {
    shieldKeySource: ShieldKeySource;
    dpapiAttempted: boolean;
    at: string;
}
export declare function getCredentialResolutionTrace(): CredentialResolutionTrace | undefined;
/** Merge saved ~/.fullcourtdefense.yml + env + optional CLI flag overrides. */
export declare function resolveCliCredentials(config: BotGuardConfig, overrides?: Partial<ResolvedCliCredentials>, options?: {
    skipDpapi?: boolean;
}): ResolvedCliCredentials;
/**
 * Credential resolution that is guaranteed to spawn NO child process — for
 * frequent low-privilege callers (watchdog beacon every 5 min). Skips the
 * DPAPI/PowerShell decrypt entirely; on a DPAPI-enrolled machine this may
 * yield no shieldKey, in which case the caller sends a constrained
 * (unauthenticated) beacon instead.
 */
export declare function resolveCliCredentialsShellFree(config: BotGuardConfig, overrides?: Partial<ResolvedCliCredentials>): ResolvedCliCredentials;
export declare function isCliSetupComplete(config: BotGuardConfig): boolean;
/** Fail fast with a clear message when setup was not run. */
export declare function requireCliSetup(config: BotGuardConfig, overrides?: Partial<ResolvedCliCredentials>, options?: {
    requireApiKey?: boolean;
    requireOrganizationId?: boolean;
    requireShield?: boolean;
}): ResolvedCliCredentials;
export declare function saveSetupConfig(input: SetupConfigInput, targetPath?: string): string;
export declare function resolveSystemPrompt(value: string): string;