# Security policy

This plugin opens a listener on your machine and can drive DSH sessions on paired
devices, so a vulnerability here is a serious one. Please report it privately.

## Reporting

Email **hukangrong123@gmail.com** with:

- the affected version (the Devices panel header shows the loaded build),
- the platform (Windows / macOS / Linux),
- what an attacker would gain, and the steps that demonstrate it.

Do not open a public issue, paste working exploits into chat, or attach your
pairing code, device secret, identity keys, or notification credentials. If a
secret may have leaked, rotate it first (**Settings → Pairing → Rotate**) and
then report.

## Scope

In scope: pairing and approval, the peer transport (LAN / tailnet / relay /
tunnel), end-to-end encryption and the sealed lane, the console API, uploads,
and the phone page.

Out of scope: issues that need a malicious local administrator, DSH itself,
third-party relays or tunnels you configured, and social engineering.

## What the plugin promises

- Every peer call is authenticated and, once a key exists, encrypted; a pinned
  peer never falls back to plaintext.
- Secrets (pairing code, device secret, identity keys, SMTP password) stay in
  the local state file; they are never written into the plugin config, the
  transcript, or diagnostics.
- The console API is reachable from the paired browser only; a request without
  a valid session is refused.
