---
name: logicprobe
description: "Use when you want to verify something about code: a design doc, spec, plan, review comment, README or refactor asserting API names, paths, enums, feasibility, state-machine or protocol behaviour, timing guarantees, or 'always/never' properties. Enumerates the claims, verifies each against the code (file:line), and escalates to executable model checks (S1-S8 + A1-A14) when behaviour is at stake. Diagrams: logicprobe-uml; concurrency: logicprobe-concurrency; data: logicprobe-datamodel."
---

# Logic Probe

> **Successor: [`dsh-model-everything`](https://github.com/AmethystLuna/dsh-model-everything).**
> This plugin continues as `dsh-model-everything`: the same domains, a superset of the
> tooling, and a skill for each of them. If both are installed, load the
> `model-everything` skill for new work — it routes to `model-everything-uml`,
> `model-everything-structure`, `model-everything-datamodel` and
> `model-everything-interleaving` — and keep this plugin's skills as the reference for its
> own tool names (`logicprobe_*`). The two do not share a registry: a claim verified through
> one is not verified in the other.

For an unverified design, failure is only a matter of time. Complex code becomes clear once you model it and run it. Check every claim before you act on it.

## When This Skill Applies

**This is the entry point.** If you have any thought of checking whether something about the code is actually true — however small, however informal the claim — load this skill. It owns the doctrine (enumerate the claims, verify each against the code, cite `file:line`, read `verdict` and never `ok`) and the executable verification for behaviour. When the task lands in a neighbouring domain, its routing table below hands it over rather than stretching the doctrine to cover it.

| The task involves… | What it does |
|---|---|
| Any claim about code you want to check — a design doc, spec, plan, review comment, README, commit message, refactor proposal, or a "this is safe / this always holds / this can't deadlock" assertion | Enumerate the verifiable claims (Phase 1), verify each against the codebase with `file:line` evidence (Phase 2), classify the gaps (Phase 3) |
| A state machine or protocol — ≥3 states, guards, ACK/NACK/retry, lock/unlock, start/stop ordering | Build an executable model: S1-S8 structural checks, A1-A14 adversarial probes |
| A quantitative or temporal guarantee — worst-case path cost ≤ budget, "≥90% of runs reach SAFE", "must leave within 2 ticks" | A12 budget, A13 probabilistic reachability, A14 deadlines, each with a counterexample path |
| A handshake or power-up sequencing across two or more components | `logicprobe_compose_verify`: C1 composition deadlock, C2 rendezvous that never fires |
| A refactoring that changes state topology or guard conditions | BEFORE/AFTER models compared for behavioral preservation, invariant continuity and deadlock regression (D1-D4) |
| Explicit request to prove code correct, formally verify a module, or check a migration for breakage | Route by domain — the table under [Routing to the Sibling Skills](#routing-to-the-sibling-skills) — and keep the doctrine |
| An architecture or dependency question about a component/package/class diagram | `logicprobe-structure`: parse the diagram into a dependency graph and judge every edge against the dependency matrix |

**Catalog budget**: DSH renders only the frontmatter `description`, and truncates it at 500 characters (`dsh-tool-skill`, `DEFAULT_CATALOG_DESCRIPTION_MAX_LENGTH`). Every description in this plugin is written to fit that budget, and the triggers that do not fit live in this table. `tests/skills/run.mjs` fails when any skill's catalog line would be cut, or would lose one of its use-case triggers.

<HARD-GATE>

## Verification Depth (Plan-Mode Gate)

When loaded as a plan-mode verification gate, this skill's execution is **mandatory**. The model has no discretion to bypass it. Depth classification is gated on objective plan features extracted in Phase 0.

### Phase 0: Feature Extraction (Mandatory)

Before any verification, output the plan's feature summary to context:

```text
Plan features:
  Files: [N]
  Functions added/modified: [list or "none"]
  Behavioral claims: [none / "invariants listed" / "always/never/guaranteed assertions"]
  State machine changes: [none / describe topology delta]
→ Depth: LIGHTWEIGHT | STANDARD | ESCALATED
```

This step is NOT skippable — it creates an explicit, auditable record of what the plan claims before verification begins.

### Depth Classification

| Plan Feature | Depth |
|-------------|-------|
| Single file, zero function signatures added/modified, no behavioral claims of any kind | LIGHTWEIGHT |
| Multi-file, OR new/modified function signatures, OR implicit behavioral claims (invariants, equivalence assertions, "behavior is unchanged") | STANDARD |
| "Always"/"never"/"guaranteed" language, OR state machine topology changes (≥1 state or ≥2 transitions modified) | ESCALATED |

**"No behavioral claims" is narrow**: if the plan asserts anything about behavior preservation — including listing invariants, claiming equivalence, or saying "refactoring only, no behavior change" — that IS a behavioral claim. The absence of the literal words "always"/"never" does NOT mean there are no behavioral claims.

### Output Requirements

| Depth | Required |
|-------|----------|
| LIGHTWEIGHT | All 5 checklist items (file paths, API/type names, line numbers, behavioral claims, mechanism feasibility) answered in context with explicit results per item |
| STANDARD | Phase 1-2: enumerate every verifiable claim → verify each against codebase with evidence |
| ESCALATED | Full pipeline: Phase 1-5 including Logic Primitive Verification (Phase 2a structural, Phase 2b adversarial) |

### Plan Verification Block

After verification, append a summary to the plan file:

```markdown
## Plan Verification

- **Depth**: [LIGHTWEIGHT / STANDARD / ESCALATED]
- **Scope**: [N] file paths, [M] API/type names, [K] line citations confirmed
- **Escalation**: [skipped — no behavioral claims detected] or [see transcript for N-check results]
```

This block is the audit trail. A future reviewer must be able to see what was verified and when.
</HARD-GATE>

## Methodology

### Phase 1: Enumerate Claims

Read the document fully. Extract every claim that is verifiable:

- Numeric claims (counts, sizes, frequencies)
- API/type/enum names
- File paths and line numbers
- Mechanism descriptions ("compile-time resolution", "static dispatch")

### Phase 2: Verify Against Codebase

For each claim, run the relevant verification:

- **Numeric claims**: `grep -c` or `grep -rn` to get the real count
- **API/type names**: extract actual signatures from headers
- **Enum/constant values**: list actual values from BSP/config headers
- **Mechanism feasibility**: check language standard and compiler support

### Phase 2 Trigger: Escalate to Logic Primitive?

If the document under review contains ANY of the following, escalate to [Logic Primitive Verification](#logic-primitive-verification) IMMEDIATELY:

- State machine or statechart with ≥3 states OR with guard conditions on transitions
- Protocol handshake, ACK/NACK, retry, or timeout sequence logic
- Claims using absolute language: "always", "never", "guaranteed", "all paths", "cannot", "impossible"
- Lock/unlock, alloc/free, start/stop paired operations where ordering matters
- Any logic where correctness depends on transition completeness or event ordering
- **Refactoring that modifies state topology**: splitting/merging states, adding/removing transitions, changing guard conditions, extracting sub-machines

**Heuristic**: If the transition-to-state ratio > 1.5 or any transition has a guard condition, the machine is complex enough to warrant verification — regardless of state count. For refactoring, trigger if the refactoring changes ≥1 state or ≥2 transitions from the original model.

### Phase 3: Gap Analysis

Classify findings by severity:

1. **Architecture-level**: claims that make the design unimplementable (fake APIs, missing modules)
2. **Mechanism-level**: claims the language/compiler cannot fulfill
3. **Consistency-level**: internal contradictions across documents

### Phase 4: Root Cause

For each error, identify why it happened:

- Wrong mental model (C++ constexpr thinking in C99)?
- Incomplete search scope?
- Copy-paste from other projects without verification?
- Misunderstanding of compiler/linker behavior?

### Phase 5: Structured Output

Each finding includes:

- Exact location (file:line or section)
- What the document claims
- What the codebase actually contains (with evidence — grep output, line numbers)
- Correction direction

---

## Logic Primitive Verification

When Phase 2 triggers escalation, do NOT proceed to Phase 3 until the verification pipeline below is complete. Trust models, not intuition.

### Pipeline Overview

```text
Document claims → Extract model → Runtime check:
  ├── DSH + `logicprobe_verify` tool available → build Model schema v1 (references/dsh-model-schema.md) → call the tool → structured report
  └── No engine available → Manual Verification Mode (see references/logic-verification-guide.md#manual-verification-mode)

Refactoring variant:
  Old code + Refactoring plan → Extract BEFORE model + AFTER model
    → Run the pipeline on the AFTER model (the same checks)
    → Compare BEFORE vs AFTER: behavioral preservation, regression, complexity delta
    → Flag any invariant that held in BEFORE but fails in AFTER

UML modelling variant (the task is to draw a flow, not to check a claim):
  Code flow → model with a citation per element → logicprobe_uml action=render → diagram
    → logicprobe_uml action=review → modelling findings + render/parse round-trip fidelity
    → logicprobe_verify → the behavioural checks (S1-S8 / A1-A14)
```

### Budgeting the Model Before You Run It

Search cost is the declared domain times the number of states — and a declared range is
not a bound on the search.

- **`inc`/`dec` are never clamped to `min`/`max`.** The declaration is a property the
  checks verify, not a limit the engine enforces. A counter whose guard does not pin it
  ranges past its own declaration, so the reachable set is unbounded however small the
  declared range looks; S8 reports that as `S8_DOMAIN_NOT_ENFORCED`.
- **Bound a counter with a guard, not a narrower declaration.** `max: 4` with a guard
  `retry < 4` closes the loop. `max: 4` alone does not.
- **Say the budget before running**: values per variable x states. A product in the
  10^5-and-up range will hit the cap and come back undecided.
- **Model the check where the code performs it.** A cap check that lives inside the tick
  handler is a guarded branch of the tick event, not a separate event: as a separate event
  the environment can starve it, and the leads-to failure you then read is an artefact of
  the model rather than a property of the code.

### Native dsh Tools

| Tool | Covers |
|------|--------|
| `logicprobe_verify` | S1-S8 structural + A1-A14 adversarial, including A12 budget / worst-case path cost, A13 probabilistic reachability over a DTMC, and A14 discrete-tick deadlines. `beforeModel` + `stateMapping` add the D1-D4 before/after regression. |
| `logicprobe_datamodel_verify` | Data models and schema migrations: DS/DA checks plus the DD1-DD4 data regression. See the `logicprobe-datamodel` skill. |
| `logicprobe_compose_verify` | Two or more machines checked together (rendezvous handshake semantics): C1 composition deadlock, C2 rendezvous never fires. |
| `logicprobe_concurrency_scan` | Mines concurrency claims (thread-safe, lock-free, race condition, mutex, ISR-safe) and routes them to dedicated verification. It does not prove concurrency safety. |
| `logicprobe_export` | Emits external-checker input from a verified model: UPPAAL, TLA+, PRISM, SPIN. |
| `logicprobe_uml` | render / parse / review / explain-labels for UML modelling — the diagram domain belongs to the `logicprobe-uml` skill. |
| `logicprobe_structure_verify` | Reviews a structure diagram as a dependency graph. It reports isolated nodes, dangling endpoints, cycles, disallowed edges, layer violations and missing required edges, and it checks refinement across declared levels. The diagram domain belongs to the `logicprobe-structure` skill. |
| `logicprobe_report_diff` | Compares two reports of the same family. A finding's identity is its check, its code and its machine-readable locator, so reworded prose reads as changed rather than new. This is slice acceptance computed instead of eyeballed. Without the tool, `verify --baseline REPORT` prints the same diff. |

The repository engine mirrors the same checks for hosts without the native tools, and its `--help` lists the subcommands. Two capabilities have no mirror. Data-model verification takes the data harness or the manual mode there. The concurrency claim scan is the same story: `logicprobe-concurrency` routes the claims instead. That engine prints the report JSON, not the body — the body is the dsh tools' rendering.

### Reading a Report: `ok` Is Not a Verdict

Every tool report carries the same outcome contract. **`ok` says a report was produced; `verdict` says how the review went.** A report may be `ok: true` and still be a failed review — gating on `ok` is how a failing verification gets read as a passing one.

| Field | Meaning |
|-------|---------|
| `schema` | The versioned report contract (`logicprobe/verify/v1`, `logicprobe/uml/review/v1`, …). Branch on this instead of sniffing fields. |
| `ran` | The tool executed and produced this report. `false` only when the tool refused the request before running (see `errorCode`/`error`). |
| `verdict` | `pass` \| `pass_with_findings` \| `fail`. **This is the outcome you act on.** |
| `verdictReason` | Why, e.g. `2 error finding(s) (first: S2_NO_TRANSITIONS)` or `no error findings; 3 warning finding(s)`. |
| `findings[]` | `{code, severity, message, detail?, evidence?, path?}`. Any `severity: "error"` forces `verdict: "fail"`. |
| `hashSpec` | Which published model-hash specification `modelHash` follows — see `references/hash-spec.md`. |
| `hashes` | Every hash the report carries, in one place (a model hash, a diagram hash, before/after hashes). |
| `nextSteps[]` | What to do next, derived from the findings; never empty, and identical for two runs over the same input. |
| `metadataKeys[]` | Paths of the `_`-prefixed annotation keys the schema ignored, e.g. `["_source", "_verified", "states[0]._note"]` (present only when the input carried any). |
| `narrativeCoverage` | `{states: "5/5", events: "3/9", scenarios: "0/12"}` when the model carries a narrative — a partial narrative is valid, and this is how much is still undocumented. The gap is also a `NARRATIVE_PARTIAL` (info) finding, so a gate can read it without parsing `nextSteps` text. |

A tool prints a body, not JSON. Passing checks stay in the `CHECKS` inventory line, and a fact that several checks report is listed once. Only error findings inline their evidence. Pass `reportView: "full"` when you need the structured report itself, for example to hand it to `logicprobe_report_diff`.

Turn the verdict into an answer, never into a summary of `ok`:

- `verdict: "pass"` — no error and no warning finding. Safe to report as verified, still with the scope the model covered.
- `verdict: "pass_with_findings"` — verification ran clean, but warnings exist (e.g. `S5` implicit-ignore events, `UML012_NO_TERMINAL`). Report the pass **and** the warnings; do not silently upgrade it to "no issues".
- `verdict: "fail"` — an error-severity finding exists, or the input was rejected (`MODEL_INVALID`). Say plainly that the claim is **not** verified, quote the counterexample path the finding carries, and only then propose a correction. Never describe a `fail` as "the tool ran successfully".

Exit codes: `0` for `pass` / `pass_with_findings`, `2` for `fail`, a refusal, or an unreadable input. In DSH the native tools return the report as data — read `verdict`, and treat `errorCode`/`error` as the refusal path.

`summary.truncated: true`, or a finding whose code ends in `_UNDECIDED`
(`S7_UNDECIDED`, `A7_UNDECIDED`, `A9_LEADS_TO_UNDECIDED`, `D2_UNDECIDED`), means the search
stopped before deciding. That is **not** a pass: name the invariant that went undecided,
and say the property is undecided rather than reading the silence as success.

### Writing the Answer: Name the Finding, Not Its Code

`S2_NO_TRANSITIONS`, `UML019`, `DA2` are values of `findings[].code`, not names. A reader
who has not memorized the schema learns nothing from one, and cannot tell whether their
machine is sound or stuck.

- **Say what it means**, in the user's language and in the terms of their own code:
  「启动超时后 ERROR 没有任何出口迁移，机器会停在那里」, not 「S2 命中」. The finding's
  `message` is written for the report; the sentence for the user is written from it.
- **Keep the identifier where the identifier is the subject**: a report field quoted
  verbatim, a baseline diff, a test name, or a question about the check itself.
- **Name the property, not the checking.** "This path locks without unlocking" beats
  "A4 failed". A check's name earns its place when the reader asked about the checking.
- **Carry the verdict in words.** "Not verified" or "verified, within the scope of this
  model" — never a bare pass, and never a warning presented without its label.

A reader who cannot tell what failed will either trust a report they cannot read, or
ignore one they should act on.

### Slice Acceptance: Baseline Diffs

The acceptance criterion for a refactoring slice is usually "no **new** findings", not
"zero findings". Do not compare two JSON reports by eye — run the comparison:

- DSH: `logicprobe_report_diff { baseline: <earlier report>, current: <new report> }`
- Any host without the tools: run the repository engine against the same JSON.
  (also available on `compose`, `structure` and `uml-review`)

A finding's identity is its **check id + code + canonical locator** (built from
`evidence`/`path`; the message only when a finding carries neither), so a reworded
message reads as `changed`, never as a new finding. The diff's `verdict` describes the
**delta** — a newly added error finding fails it — while `currentVerdict` keeps the
absolute result visible, and a clean delta over a still-failing report says so in
`nextSteps` rather than passing quietly. Two runs over the same input add zero findings:
run that self-check before trusting any baseline.

### Archiving a Model: `_`-Prefixed Metadata

Keep provenance with the model instead of in a sidecar that drifts:

- Any key starting with `_` at any level (`_source`, `_verified`, `_uml`, `_extraction_caveats`, `states[0]._note`) is **annotation metadata**: the schema ignores it, `modelHash` excludes it, and the report echoes it as `metadataKeys`.
- Everything else stays closed — a mistyped `sttes` is still a validation error, and that is deliberate.
- Because the hash ignores `_` keys, "the model as archived" and "the model with metadata stripped" hash identically; record the reported `hashSpec` next to the hash so a later reader can reproduce it (`verify model.json --hash-check <hex>` answers whether a recorded hash belongs to a published spec at all).

### Refactoring Verification Mode

When the document under review is a refactoring plan (modifying existing state machine logic, not designing from scratch), adapt the pipeline:

1. **Extract the BEFORE model** from the existing codebase (not the plan — verify what the code actually does, not what the plan claims it does)
2. **Extract the AFTER model** from the refactoring plan
3. **Show both tables AND their model narratives** to the user side by side and confirm the delta is intentional
4. **Run Phase 2a + 2b on the AFTER model** — the same checks a new design gets
5. **Compare BEFORE vs AFTER**:

   | Check | Method | Severity if Violated |
   |-------|--------|:---:|
   | Behavioral preservation | Every event sequence accepted by BEFORE must also be accepted by AFTER (or explicitly removed per plan) | Error — regression |
   | Invariant continuity | Any invariant that held in BEFORE must hold in AFTER (unless the refactoring explicitly changes it) | Error — undocumented behavior change |
   | Deadlock regression | New states or transitions must not introduce deadlocks not present in BEFORE | Error |
   | Complexity claim | If plan claims "simpler": count states + transitions + guards. Is AFTER objectively simpler? | Warning — unsubstantiated claim |
   | Unreachable code | New states added in AFTER must be reachable (otherwise they're dead code from the start) | Warning |

   In DSH, pass `beforeModel` and optional `stateMapping` to `logicprobe_verify`; the engine runs D1 Behavioral Preservation, D2 Invariant Continuity, D3 Regression Delta, and D4 Deadlock/Liveness Regression automatically.

6. **Flag any behavioral delta not documented in the plan** — the most common refactoring bug is an unintended side effect that the plan doesn't acknowledge

Run the checks with the native `logicprobe_verify` tool (model JSON, structured guard DSL, path-aware invariants) — see `references/dsh-model-schema.md`. A host without the tools can run the repository engine against the same JSON. For probe patterns, extraction methodology and manual procedures, load `references/logic-verification-guide.md`.

### Phase 2a: Structural Primitives

Run these FIRST. They establish basic well-formedness before adversarial probing.

| # | Primitive | Method | Severity if Violated |
|:--:|-----------|--------|:---:|
| S1 | **Reachability** | BFS from init state; flag all states not in visited set | Warning — dead code |
| S2 | **Deadlock** | Any non-terminal state with zero outgoing transitions? | Error — machine can get stuck |
| S3 | **Liveness** | Does the transition graph contain an absorbing cycle that excludes expected terminal/recovery states? (e.g. ERROR→RECOVERING→ERROR→... with no exit) | Error — infinite loop |
| S4 | **Determinism** | Same state + same event → multiple different targets? | Error — ambiguous behavior |
| S5 | **Event completeness** | For each state, are there plausible events with no defined transition? | Warning — implicit ignore |
| S6 | **Guard completeness** | For each transition with a guard condition, are ALL branch outcomes defined? `if (cnt<3) RETRY else FATAL` → both paths must exist in model | Error — undefined behavior path |
| S7 | **Invariant validity** | Does every reachable state satisfy the plan's stated "always/never/guaranteed" assertions? | Error — plan claim is false |
| S8 | **Monotonic variables** | If a variable is declared `monotonic: inc/dec`, do all updates respect that direction? | Error — counter can move backwards |

### Phase 2b: Adversarial Probes

Run these SECOND. Each probe actively tries to BREAK the model. If any probe succeeds (finds a violation), the plan has a behavior gap.

| # | Attack | Method | Target Claim |
|:--:|--------|--------|-------------|
| A1 | **Unexpected event** | For each state S, inject every event E where no transition is defined for (S, E). Log whether the model silently ignores or crashes. | "All events are handled in all states" |
| A2 | **Race interleaving** | For every pair of concurrent events (E1, E2), simulate arrival in both orders: E1-then-E2 vs E2-then-E1. Flag if terminal state differs. | "Behavior is independent of event ordering" |
| A3 | **Order permutation** | For N independent events, permute arrival order. Flag if different permutations produce different final states or violate invariants. | "Outcome is order-independent" |
| A4 | **Pair symmetry** | Match every `start/stop`, `lock/unlock`, `alloc/free` pair. Flag if any state allows a path where a pair is unbalanced (start without stop, lock without unlock). State `onEntry`/`onExit` actions are treated as implicit acquire/release. | "Resources are always released" |
| A5 | **Boundary blast** | Probe counters at 0, 1, max-1, max, max+1. Probe timestamps at 0, tick_wraparound. Flag overflow, underflow, or undefined behavior. | "Handles all counter/timer values" |
| A6 | **Resource injection** | Simulate `malloc→NULL`, `queue→full`, `semaphore→timeout` at each state that calls them. Flag if any state has no recovery path. | "Graceful degradation under resource pressure" |
| A7 | **Counter-example witness** | For any invariant that fails, find the event sequence that violates it and output the exact path. Breadth-first searches (state predicates, sequence, atomicity, budget) yield the shortest witness; the leads-to walk and the probability bound report the witness they found without claiming minimality. | "This invariant holds" → refuted by a concrete path |
| A8 | **Idempotent replay** | For each event declared in `idempotentEvents`, apply it twice from every reachable state. Flag if the second application changes state or is not replayable. | "This event is safe to retry/replay" |
| A9 | **Leads-to** | From a declared source state, every path must eventually reach the target state, or reach one member of a declared target set. | "This state always progresses to completion" |
| A10 | **Sequence order** | Events declared in a sequence must occur in the specified order. | "backup before modify before commit" |
| A11 | **Atomicity** | Once an atomic event starts, the machine must commit or roll back before leaving the scope or terminating. | "all-or-nothing transaction" |
| A12 | **Budget (worst-case path cost)** | With `cost` on transitions (absent = 1) and a `budget` invariant, every reachable path must stay within budget; reports the shortest over-budget counterexample and flags reachable positive-cost cycles as unbounded. | "Worst-case path cost ≤ budget" |
| A13 | **Probability reachability (DTMC)** | With `weight` on transitions (absent = 1) and a `probability` invariant, P(ever hitting the target) must satisfy the bound; solved by value iteration over the absorbing chain. | "≥ 90% of runs reach SAFE" |
| A14 | **Deadline (discrete tick clock)** | State `maxTicks` plus top-level `tickEvents`: a tick step may not keep a state resident past its deadline; reports the over-residency path. | "must leave within 2 ticks" |

### Integration Back to Phase 3

For every probe failure:

1. **Quote** the plan claim verbatim
2. **Show** the counter-example event sequence
3. **Classify** severity (Architecture / Mechanism / Consistency)
4. **Propose** correction direction — never fix inline

### Extraction Rule

Before writing any verification code, output the model in one of the rendering
forms below. Default is Form A; switch forms when the machine is large or the
display area is narrow — never let a table row wrap.

**Form A — integrated transition table (default)**: formal symbols with their
natural-language meaning inlined; the scenario each (state, event) combination
represents is the last column:

```text
状态（含义）             | 事件（含义）          | 下一状态（含义）      | Guard?  | 场景（状态+事件）
------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|---------|--------------------
INIT（上电待就绪）       | power_ready（电源就绪）| IDLE（空闲待命）     | -       | 就绪后进入待命
IDLE（空闲待命）         | start_cmd（启动命令） | STARTING（启动中）   | -       | 收到命令开始启动
STARTING（启动中）       | ack_received（收到ACK）| ACTIVE（运行中）    | -       | 启动成功进入运行
STARTING（启动中）       | timeout（等待超时）   | ERROR（出错待恢复）  | retry==0 | 首次超时进入重试
STARTING（启动中）       | timeout（等待超时）   | FATAL（不可恢复）    | retry>=1 | 重试耗尽转致命
ERROR（出错待恢复）      | cooldown_elapsed（冷却结束）| RECOVERING（重初始化）| -     | 冷却结束开始恢复
```

Width discipline (Form A): keep parenthetical meanings short (state/event ≤ 6
characters, scenario ≤ 10) and estimate every row's display width (CJK counts as
2) to fit the available area. If any row would wrap, shorten the meanings; if it
still will not fit, switch to Form C. A wrapped table row loses column alignment
and is harder to read than no table at all.

**Form B — sentence blocks (reading-accessible)**: one transition per block,
scenario sentence first, fixed three-line frame. Use for detailed confirmation,
users with reading difficulties, or machines with ≤ 10 transitions:

```text
第 1 步：就绪后进入待命
    状态 INIT（上电待就绪）
    发生 power_ready（电源就绪）
    进入 IDLE（空闲待命）
```

**Form C — grouped by source state (large machines / narrow panes)**: one
section per state, each rendered as its own small 3-column table
（事件（含义）| 下一状态（含义）| 场景）; no cross-group column alignment to track:

```text
DEGRADED_LOADING（降级加载）
  事件（含义）          | 下一状态（含义）      | 场景
  first_data（首帧数据）| OK_READY（正常就绪）  | 收到首帧转就绪
  fault（故障）         | FAULT（故障锁存）     | 故障锁存
  power_off（下电）     | POWER_OFF（下电）     | 下电
```

Each group table is narrow (3 columns, roughly ≤ 60 display columns with short
meanings). If one group's table would still wrap, fall back to a one-line-per-event
bullet list for that group only.

Reading rule: every row/block is one sentence — "在【状态（含义）】下发生【事件（含义）】
→ 进入【下一状态（含义）】，即【实际场景】"。Meanings repeat on purpose: each entry is
self-contained. The machine-readable model keeps the same information in its
`narrative` block (`narrative.states`, `narrative.events`, `narrative.scenarios`).

**CRITICAL**: Show the chosen form to the user and ask for confirmation before
generating the harness. Because the natural language is inlined, any entry that
reads wrong to the user — a state/event meaning that is off, or a scenario that
does not match reality — means the model is wrong even if the symbols are
consistent. The #1 failure mode of verification is extracting the wrong model. If
the plan is ambiguous, flag it as a finding first — don't guess.

**Exception**: If the runtime reports `logicprobe interaction=auto`, do NOT call
`ask_user_question`. Instead: (a) cite evidence for every cell/entry — each
state/event meaning and each scenario must trace to a source sentence, (b)
round-trip the filled model (including its `narrative` block) back into the SAME
rendering form and compare it with the extraction, and (c) mark the report
`UNCONFIRMED`.

### Code-Level Behavioral Suggestion

When the task is NOT document/plan review but involves code-level behavioral questions — e.g., the user is editing source files and asks:

- "check this timing sequence for bugs"
- "could this state machine deadlock here"
- "is this retry limit safe"
- "what happens if event X arrives during state Y"

→ **Proactively suggest** logicprobe as an optional verification pass. Do NOT escalate automatically — plan-level verification was likely already done. The suggestion is: "I can run a logic-primitive verification on this state machine to check for deadlocks, unreachable states, and boundary issues. Want me to?"

If the user says yes, extract the model from the existing code (not a plan document), and run the standard pipeline. Output the findings as suggestions, not requirements.

This covers the gap where behavioral verification is useful even when no design document is being reviewed.

### When NOT to Escalate

Skip logic-primitive verification when:

- The document makes no behavioral/logic claims (pure API listings, config tables, data schemas)
- The state machine has ≤2 states, no guards, and trivial transitions (IDLE↔ACTIVE)
- The claim is purely structural (file paths, type names, numeric constants) — Phase 2 grep verification is sufficient

### Routing to the Sibling Skills

This skill owns behavioural claims. Three neighbouring domains have their own skill, and loading the wrong one wastes the verification:

| Domain | Skill |
|---|---|
| Drawing a code flow as UML, or auditing a diagram somebody drew (render / parse / review / explain-labels, round-trip fidelity, component and class diagrams refused) | `logicprobe-uml` |
| Reviewing architecture, module structure or a dependency diagram (isolated nodes, dangling endpoints, cycles, allowed-dependency and layer violations, missing required edges) | `logicprobe-structure` |
| Concurrency claims — "thread-safe", "lock-free", "no data race", "ISR-safe" — mined and routed to TSan/Helgrind/CBMC/TLA+, never proven here | `logicprobe-concurrency` |
| Entities, fields, relationships, data invariants, schema migrations (DS1-DS4, DA1-DA12, DD1-DD4) | `logicprobe-datamodel` |

### The Same Domains in the Successor

[dsh-model-everything](https://github.com/AmethystLuna/dsh-model-everything) covers each domain above with one skill, and adds two this plugin does not have. Use the mapping when both plugins are installed — the successor's skill is the one to load for new work, because its tools are the ones its own guidance names:

| This plugin | `dsh-model-everything` | What the successor adds |
|---|---|---|
| `logicprobe` | `model-everything` | the same doctrine over `model_verify`, `model_compose_verify` and `model_export` |
| `logicprobe-uml` | `model-everything-uml` | more diagram families (timing, profile, composite, communication, interaction overview) |
| `logicprobe-structure` | `model-everything-structure` | multi-level refinement between drawings |
| `logicprobe-datamodel` | `model-everything-datamodel` | the same DS/DA/DD families over `model_datamodel_verify` |
| `logicprobe-concurrency` | `model-everything-interleaving` | async vocabulary, a family per claim, and a lost update decided rather than routed |
| — | `model-everything-design` | layering, substitutability, interface width (no counterpart here) |
| — | `model-everything-report-reading` | how to read a report (no counterpart here) |

---

## Red Flags

If you catch yourself thinking any of these, stop:

| You think | Reality |
|-----------|---------|
| "Too simple to check" | The check is cheap. The silent skip is not. |
| "I read the code, so I know" | Knowing is not evidence. Cite `file:line`, or run the model, or call the claim unverified. |
| "The spec or the diagram says so" | Both are claims about the code. Reconcile them with a source-side scan. |
| "I'll check while implementing" | Check before the decision, not after. |
| "Reasoning is enough" | Reasoning is not a run. One counter-example kills a universal claim. |
| "The report passed, so the code is fine" | The report covers the model you gave it. Reconcile it, and say what you did not check. |
| "The declared range limits the search" | The declaration is a property to verify. `inc`/`dec` are never clamped to it; only a guard bounds the value. |
| "The check found nothing" | Read the verdict: `truncated` and `_UNDECIDED` mean the search stopped, not that the property holds. |

## Rules

1. Never trust a document's claim without codebase verification.
2. Be honest about mechanism boundaries — if the language standard can't do it, say so.
3. Cite evidence with specific file:line references.
4. Don't fix during review — point the way, let implementation happen after approval.
5. **For behavioral claims: verify with code, not reasoning.** If a plan says "always", "never", or "guaranteed", generate and run a model. One counter-example is enough to refute a universal claim.
6. **Confirm the model before running it** — unless the runtime reports `logicprobe interaction=auto`. Extraction errors are the dominant failure mode of formal verification. In auto mode, substitute evidence-cited extraction + round-trip validation and mark the report `UNCONFIRMED`.
7. **Don't verify what the code already checks.** If the existing codebase has compile-time assertions, static analysis, or runtime checks for a property, cite those — don't re-verify in a model.
8. **Hand a neighbouring domain to its own skill.** A diagram is a model, not evidence: modelling or auditing one belongs to `logicprobe-uml`. A concurrency claim is mined and routed, never proven here: that is `logicprobe-concurrency`. Schema, data invariants and migrations are `logicprobe-datamodel`. This skill keeps the doctrine and the behavioural checks.
9. **Say what this does not prove.** For dimensions logicprobe does not verify — hard real time (deadlines, periods), preemptive concurrency, hybrid-control stability, probabilistic reliability, execution-cost budgets — route to the dedicated tool named in `references/gap-routing-guide.md`. `logicprobe_verify` reports carry the same routing as informational `coverageNotes` on matching models.
10. **A declared range is a property, not a bound, and a capped search is not a pass.** `inc`/`dec` are never clamped to `min`/`max`; only a guard that pins the value bounds it. When a report is `truncated` or a check is `_UNDECIDED`, say the property is undecided and narrow the model — never report it as verified.
11. **Write-site analysis is out of scope, and stays there.** "Only the ISR writes this flag", "one owner per register" — logicprobe verifies models and diagrams, not *who writes what in the source*. That claim needs a source-side AST/rule check or a static analyzer; this plugin's contribution is to flag the claim as unverified and route it (`logicprobe_concurrency_scan` does exactly that). Do not imply the diagram or the model settled it.