export interface IntegrityResult {
    /** Critical helper names whose on-disk hash doesn't match the signed manifest
     *  (or that are missing from disk despite being part of the signed set). */
    tampered: string[];
    /** Set only when the package's OWN signed manifest can't be verified at all —
     *  there's no ground truth to check the installed files against, distinct
     *  from a clean `tampered: []` result. */
    blocked?: string;
}
/**
 * Re-verify each of `criticalHelpers` present on disk in `helpersDir` against
 * `sourceDir`'s signed manifest. Read-only — safe to call without holding any
 * refresh lock; callers only need to acquire one if `tampered` comes back
 * non-empty and they intend to repair it.
 *
 * `sourceDir: null` (package source unresolvable) returns `{ tampered: [] }`
 * — fails open rather than flagging every install as tampered when there is
 * no ground truth at all to compare against.
 */
export declare function verifyInstalledCriticalHelpers(helpersDir: string, sourceDir: string | null, criticalHelpers: readonly string[], pubkeyPemOverride?: string): IntegrityResult;
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