/**
 * Pass: missing-sanitizer-gate (#107, CWE-79)
 *
 * Detects HTML-attribute / HTML-output methods that pass caller-supplied
 * values to a sink (writer.addAttribute, print, write, etc.) without any
 * sanitizer-shaped call dominating the sink on all control-flow paths.
 *
 * Motivating pattern — CVE-2023-37908 (xwiki-rendering `XHTMLWikiPrinter`):
 *
 *   void cleanAttributes(String elementName, Map<String,String> attributes) {
 *     for (Entry<String,String> e : attributes.entrySet()) {
 *       writer.addAttribute(e.getKey(), e.getValue());   // SINK
 *     }
 *   }
 *
 * The fix wraps the sink in `isAttributeAllowed(elementName, k, v)`. This
 * pass models that shape as a dominator check: for each HTML output sink
 * in a candidate method, at least one sanitizer-named call must dominate
 * the sink block. If none does, we emit a speculative finding.
 *
 * Detection is intentionally permissive (name-only matching on both sinks
 * and sanitizers, no receiver-type resolution). To keep the default CLI
 * surface unchanged, findings are marked `confidence: 'medium'` and are
 * suppressed by `applyConfidenceFilter` unless the caller opts in via
 * `analyze(..., { includeSpeculative: true })`. Downstream verifiers
 * (`circle-ir-ai`, `cognium-ai`) receive the full stream and adjudicate.
 *
 * Language: Java only. Deferred to future work for JS/Python once we have
 * real-world FP/TP telemetry from downstream adjudication.
 *
 * Dedup: at most one finding per method.
 *
 * See: docs/PASSES.md #107, cognium-dev#153.
 */
import type { AnalysisPass, PassContext } from '../../graph/analysis-pass.js';
export interface MissingSanitizerGateResult {
    findings: number;
}
export declare class MissingSanitizerGatePass implements AnalysisPass<MissingSanitizerGateResult> {
    readonly name = "missing-sanitizer-gate";
    readonly category: "security";
    run(ctx: PassContext): MissingSanitizerGateResult;
}
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