import type { TurnQuiescence } from '../adapters/backend/mojo-process-tree.js';
export interface StrongContainmentHandle {
    kind: 'cgroup';
    sessionId: string;
    /** Worker generation that acquired it; kept for operator-facing logs only. */
    generation: number;
    /** Absolute cgroup v2 directory owning the turn subtree. */
    cgroupPath: string;
    /** Env nonce injected into the tree, so a degraded scan can still corroborate. */
    nonce: string;
    /**
     * Boot id at mint time. A reboot provably kills the whole tree — including the
     * same-UID sibling/parent migrant that cgroup emptiness cannot see — so a
     * changed boot id is the ONE thing that lets a cgroup handle release (it is
     * the same unforgeable fact a weak handle uses). Optional so a handle written
     * by an older daemon (no bootId) still parses; such a legacy handle simply
     * never gets the reboot proof and waits for an operator revoke.
     */
    bootId?: string;
}
export interface WeakContainmentHandle {
    kind: 'tree-identity';
    sessionId: string;
    generation: number;
    rootPid: number;
    /** Boot identity, so a pid from a previous boot is never re-signalled. */
    bootId: string;
    /** `/proc/<pid>/stat` field 22, which makes pid reuse detectable. */
    startTime: number;
    nonce: string;
}
/**
 * A tree we can neither contain nor describe.
 *
 * Reached when the host offers NO usable mechanism: no cgroup v2 delegation, and
 * no readable boot id / starttime (a non-Linux host, or a locked-down /proc). The
 * turn still spawned a credentialed child, so the honest record is not "nothing to
 * track" — it is "something exists here that this host can never prove gone".
 *
 * Why this exists rather than returning null
 * -----------------------------------------
 * `acquireContainmentHandle` used to return null in this case, which meant the
 * caller recorded NOTHING and `hasUnprovenContainment()` answered false — so the
 * device-isolation blocker was not retained on exactly the platform that cannot
 * prove anything. That inverted the intended fail-closed direction, and it did so
 * silently, because "no handle" is indistinguishable from "no turn ever ran".
 *
 * An unprovable handle is deliberately a DEAD END: `proveContainmentQuiescent`
 * can never return `proven: true` for it, so the type-level guard on
 * `releaseContainmentHandle` makes it impossible to release. The session's blocker
 * therefore stays for the lifetime of the record, which is the correct answer when
 * a credentialed subtree existed and the host cannot ever demonstrate its death.
 *
 * The platform is recorded so an operator can tell "macOS, no cgroups" apart from
 * "Linux with /proc unreadable" without re-deriving it.
 */
export interface UnprovableContainmentHandle {
    kind: 'unprovable';
    sessionId: string;
    generation: number;
    nonce: string;
    /** `process.platform` at acquisition time. */
    platform: string;
    /** Why nothing stronger could be minted, for operator-facing logs. */
    reason: string;
}
export type ContainmentHandle = StrongContainmentHandle | WeakContainmentHandle | UnprovableContainmentHandle;
/**
 * Result of asking "is everything this handle owns gone?".
 *
 * `proven: false` deliberately carries no "probably fine" variant: every
 * non-proof (alive, unreadable, unsupported, timed out) is the same verdict to a
 * caller, because all of them must keep the blocker.
 */
export type QuiescenceVerdict = {
    proven: true;
    handle: ContainmentHandle;
    reason?: string;
    evidence?: QuiescenceEvidence;
} | {
    proven: false;
    handle: ContainmentHandle;
    reason: string;
    residualPids?: number[];
};
/**
 * WHICH fact settled a `proven: true` verdict. The distinction is the entire
 * safety argument of this module, so it is carried in the data instead of being
 * re-derived by every caller:
 *
 *   - `boot-id-changed`: the recorded tree cannot have survived the reboot that
 *     changed the kernel boot id, and a same-user child cannot fake a boot id ->
 *     THE boundary proof (the only one). Applies to a weak handle and, once its
 *     bootId is stamped, to a cgroup handle too.
 *   - `cgroup-empty` / `cgroup-zombie-only`: kernel membership shows the leaf
 *     subtree empty. DIAGNOSTIC ONLY, NOT a boundary proof: mojo runs at the
 *     daemon's UID and cgroup v2 lets a same-UID process migrate ITSELF out of
 *     the leaf (to the parent slice or a sibling), invisible to the leaf-down
 *     read. Good for stopping signals + killing (cgroup.kill), never for dropping
 *     device isolation.
 *   - `scan-clean`: a /proc subtree scan came back empty. DIAGNOSTIC ONLY: a
 *     descendant that calls setsid(), scrubs its own environ and reparents to
 *     init evades enumeration entirely, so this can never authorise dropping
 *     device isolation.
 *
 * An absent field is read as "the strongest thing this handle KIND could prove",
 * for compatibility with hand-built verdicts; it can never be read as stronger
 * than the handle kind allows.
 */
export type QuiescenceEvidence = 'cgroup-empty' | 'cgroup-zombie-only' | 'boot-id-changed' | 'scan-clean';
/** What stays isolated after a close that could not prove its boundary. */
export interface ContainmentResidual {
    /** True keeps the device-isolation blocker even though the session may close. */
    deviceIsolation: boolean;
    /** Pids the evidence named, when it named any. */
    pids?: number[];
    /** Operator-facing explanation of what is still unproven. */
    reason?: string;
}
/**
 * The single authority on "may this handle be forgotten, and may the blocker go?".
 *
 * `boundaryProof` is the only field that answer may consult, and unlike the
 * previous revision that statement now has a real production consumer:
 * `releaseContainmentHandle` branches on `releaseAuthorised` below, so a clean
 * weak scan cannot reach the removal path at all.
 */
export interface ContainmentReleaseDecision {
    /** Unforgeable boundary evidence. The gate. */
    boundaryProof: boolean;
    /** `verdict.proven && boundaryProof` - the only state that removes a handle. */
    releaseAuthorised: boolean;
    /** Which fact was available, or `not-proven` when quiescence itself failed. */
    evidence: QuiescenceEvidence | 'not-proven';
    /** Non-null whenever the handle stays behind; null only on a real release. */
    residual: ContainmentResidual | null;
    /** May the caller stop re-signalling? True once quiescence itself is proven. */
    signalsStopped: boolean;
}
/** Thrown instead of degrading to an empty (fail-open) handle store. */
export declare class MojoContainmentUnavailableError extends Error {
    readonly cause?: unknown | undefined;
    constructor(message: string, cause?: unknown | undefined);
}
/**
 * Boot identity of the running kernel.
 *
 * Returns null when it cannot be read (non-Linux, or a locked-down /proc).
 * Callers must treat null as "cannot mint a trustworthy weak handle", NOT as a
 * blank value to store: a handle whose bootId is empty would compare equal
 * across reboots and across hosts, resurrecting exactly the pid-reuse confusion
 * the field exists to prevent.
 */
export declare function readBootId(opts?: {
    procRoot?: string;
}): string | null;
/**
 * `/proc/<pid>/stat` field 22 (starttime, in clock ticks since boot).
 *
 * null means the pid is not currently live (or is unreadable), which is why the
 * caller may never read null as "the tree is gone": the ROOT exiting says
 * nothing about a descendant that called setsid().
 *
 * Field indexing has the same comm hazard as the scanner: field 2 is
 * parenthesised and may contain spaces or ')', so the split starts after the LAST
 * ')'. From there, index 0 is state (field 3), hence starttime (field 22) sits at
 * index 19.
 */
export declare function readProcStartTime(pid: number, opts?: {
    procRoot?: string;
}): number | null;
/**
 * Is a usable cgroup v2 hierarchy mounted?
 *
 * `cgroup.controllers` exists only on the v2 unified hierarchy, so its presence
 * is the cheap discriminator against a v1-only host (where per-session
 * containment via this module is not available).
 */
export declare function cgroupV2Available(opts?: {
    cgroupRoot?: string;
}): boolean;
/**
 * Process state from `/proc/<pid>/stat` field 3, for zombie classification.
 *
 *   'zombie'     — state Z: the process has exited and is only waiting to be
 *                  reaped. It executes no instructions and cannot use a
 *                  credential, but it REMAINS a member of its cgroup until the
 *                  parent reaps it (and `rmdir` keeps failing while it does).
 *   'running'    — any other state. Treated as executing.
 *   'gone'       — ENOENT: the pid vanished between listing and reading, i.e.
 *                  genuinely not a member any more (same race rule the scanner
 *                  applies).
 *   'unreadable' — anything else. Deliberately NOT merged into 'zombie': a state
 *                  we cannot read must count as executing, or an EACCES becomes
 *                  a free pass.
 *
 * DUPLICATED RULE — read before changing any of the three cases
 * ------------------------------------------------------------
 * The same zombie rule has to hold in TWO places that deliberately do not share
 * code: here, for cgroup members read out of `cgroup.procs`, and in the /proc
 * subtree scanner (mojo-process-tree), for members found by enumeration. They stay
 * separate because they start from different inputs, but they must agree, and
 * nothing enforces that agreement automatically.
 *
 * Why the agreement matters more than the rule itself: if one side discounts a
 * zombie and the other does not, the SAME tree gets two verdicts. That is not a
 * cosmetic inconsistency — ProcTree hit it for real while wiring 7-A. A SIGKILLed
 * child sat in state Z awaiting reap; the in-memory ladder discounted it and
 * reported clean, while the pid list handed to `proveContainmentQuiescent` still
 * carried it, so this module judged the tree alive. The close was then refused
 * forever and the handle could never be discharged: a permanent wedge produced
 * purely by two definitions of "running".
 *
 * So: change one side and you MUST change the other. The rule is exactly
 *   - state 'Z'        -> discounted (a zombie executes nothing, holds no credential)
 *   - ENOENT           -> gone, skipped (raced away; not a member)
 *   - anything else     -> EXECUTING, including any state we cannot read
 * The last case is the one that must never be relaxed on either side: turning an
 * unreadable state into "harmless" is a fail-open, and it is reachable by the very
 * process being policed.
 */
export type ProcLiveness = 'zombie' | 'running' | 'gone' | 'unreadable';
export declare function readProcLiveness(pid: number, opts?: {
    procRoot?: string;
}): ProcLiveness;
export interface AcquireContainmentInput {
    sessionId: string;
    generation: number;
    /** Root pid of the turn (the direct child this backend spawned). */
    rootPid: number;
    /** The env nonce already injected into that tree. */
    nonce: string;
}
/**
 * A cgroup boundary created BEFORE the turn child is spawned.
 *
 * The strong handle used to be minted post-spawn by migrating the root pid into
 * a fresh cgroup. That left a spawn→enrolment window: cgroup v2 migration does
 * not retroactively move a process's already-forked descendants
 * (admin-guide/cgroup-v2: "Migration of a process doesn't affect already
 * existing descendant processes"), so a descendant forked (and setsid'd) inside
 * the window was outside the cgroup while `cgroup.procs` — the whole strong
 * proof — read empty after the root exited. The proof went false-green and the
 * device-isolation blocker was cleared with a credentialed escapee still alive.
 *
 * The boundary is therefore prepared first, and the child enrols ITSELF into it
 * before exec'ing the target binary (see MOJO_CGROUP_ENROLL_SHIM in
 * mojo-backend). Between fork and enrolment the process runs only our trusted
 * shim, which forks nothing, so every descendant of the target binary is born
 * inside the cgroup — that is the precondition the strong proof relies on.
 */
export interface PreparedContainmentBoundary {
    sessionId: string;
    generation: number;
    cgroupPath: string;
    nonce: string;
}
/**
 * Create the cgroup directory for a turn about to be spawned.
 *
 * Returns null when the host cannot support a strong boundary (no cgroup v2, or
 * the slice is not writable) — the caller falls back to the weak post-spawn
 * handle, which never claims boundary proof.
 */
export declare function prepareContainmentBoundary(input: {
    sessionId: string;
    generation: number;
    nonce: string;
}, opts?: {
    cgroupRoot?: string;
    procRoot?: string;
}): PreparedContainmentBoundary | null;
/** Mint the strong handle for a boundary the child has enrolled itself into. */
export declare function strongHandleFromPreparedBoundary(prepared: PreparedContainmentBoundary, opts?: {
    procRoot?: string;
}): ContainmentHandle;
/**
 * Kill every process currently enrolled in a prepared boundary (cgroup.kill),
 * then remove the directory if that emptied it.
 *
 * For the caller who spawned a child through the enrolment shim and then FAILED
 * to record the handle durably: the subtree must not be left running behind a
 * blocker nobody recorded. Returns true only when the boundary is provably
 * empty (or already gone) afterwards — false means the caller must keep its
 * own fence up.
 */
export declare function killPreparedBoundary(prepared: PreparedContainmentBoundary): Promise<boolean>;
/**
 * Mint the strongest POST-SPAWN handle this host can describe a turn with.
 *
 * Deliberately NEVER a cgroup handle: migrating an already-running root into a
 * cgroup does not capture descendants it forked before the write, so a strong
 * handle minted here would claim a boundary that provably has a hole (the P0
 * this module was rewritten for). Strong handles exist only via
 * prepareContainmentBoundary + the pre-exec enrolment shim. This function is
 * the fallback for hosts (or spawn paths) where that was not possible, and the
 * handles it mints never carry boundary proof.
 */
export declare function acquireContainmentHandle(input: AcquireContainmentInput, opts?: {
    cgroupRoot?: string;
    procRoot?: string;
    platform?: string;
}): ContainmentHandle;
/**
 * Outcome of a degraded, /proc-based enumeration, supplied by the caller.
 *
 * Deliberately a callback rather than a direct import of `scanMojoTree`: the
 * scanner is owned by mojo-process-tree.ts and this module must stay a leaf that
 * a unit test can drive with a synthetic world. `scanned: false` is the scanner's
 * fail-closed signal and MUST NOT be collapsed into an empty pid list by the
 * caller.
 */
export interface TreeScanEvidence {
    scanned: boolean;
    pids: readonly number[];
    reason?: string;
}
export interface ProveContainmentOpts {
    procRoot?: string;
    /** Required to prove a WEAK handle; ignored for a strong one. */
    scan?: (handle: WeakContainmentHandle) => TreeScanEvidence;
}
/**
 * Can we prove that nothing this handle owns is still executing?
 *
 * STRONG handle: `cgroup.procs` is authoritative. An absent directory also counts
 * as proof, because the kernel refuses `rmdir` on a non-empty cgroup and this
 * module only removes one after a proven verdict — so "gone" can only mean
 * "was empty when it went". Any OTHER read error is a non-proof.
 *
 * WEAK handle:
 *   - a bootId mismatch is genuine, cheap proof: the recorded tree cannot have
 *     survived the reboot that changed the id;
 *   - otherwise the only available evidence is a /proc scan, which the caller
 *     must supply. No scan, or a failed scan, or any surviving pid → not proven.
 *   - the root pid being gone is explicitly NOT accepted on its own: a descendant
 *     that called setsid() outlives its parent, which is the whole reason the
 *     scanner unions three signals.
 *
 * A clean weak verdict is the best this host can do, not an unforgeable
 * boundary — see the trust-domain note in mojo-process-tree. Callers that need
 * certainty need a strong handle.
 */
export declare function proveContainmentQuiescent(handle: ContainmentHandle, opts?: ProveContainmentOpts): QuiescenceVerdict;
/**
 * Is the recorded root pid still the ORIGINAL process?
 *
 * Used before signalling: a weak handle names a pid, and pids are reused. Sending
 * SIGKILL to a recycled pid would kill an unrelated process, so a caller must
 * confirm identity first. False therefore means "do not signal this pid", NOT
 * "the tree is gone".
 */
export declare function weakHandleRootStillOriginal(handle: WeakContainmentHandle, opts?: {
    procRoot?: string;
}): boolean;
/** Stable identity of a handle, so union/removal cannot double-count or mis-hit. */
export declare function containmentHandleKey(handle: ContainmentHandle): string;
/**
 * Record a handle as OWNED AND UNPROVEN.
 *
 * Call this at spawn time, before the child can do anything: a crash between
 * spawn and record is exactly the window that used to lose the tree entirely.
 * Monotonic union by handle identity, so re-recording is idempotent and a later
 * call can never retract an earlier one.
 *
 * THROWS on any read/write failure — the caller must not proceed believing the
 * tree was recorded.
 */
export declare function recordContainmentHandle(handle: ContainmentHandle, dataDir?: string): void;
/**
 * Handles this session still owns. Empty ONLY when nothing is outstanding.
 *
 * THROWS when the store cannot be read, so isolation callers fail closed instead
 * of reading an error as "clean".
 */
export declare function containmentHandles(sessionId: string, dataDir?: string): ContainmentHandle[];
/**
 * Session ids with an outstanding handle, INCLUDING sessions whose row is gone.
 *
 * The residual path needs this: an explicit `/close` deletes the row, so without
 * it the inventory would lose every trace of an unproven credentialed subtree.
 */
export declare function containmentSessionIds(dataDir?: string): string[];
/**
 * Does this session still have a tree we cannot prove is gone?
 *
 * This is the predicate the device-isolation blocker hangs off. It THROWS on an
 * unreadable store rather than answering false.
 */
export declare function hasUnprovenContainment(sessionId: string, dataDir?: string): boolean;
/**
 * Release every durable handle a REBOOT has provably killed, and report what
 * stayed. Run once per daemon boot, BEFORE the device-isolation activation
 * inventory is built.
 *
 * Why this exists (round-11 P1-1): `proveContainmentQuiescent` gained a
 * boot-id-changed branch for cgroup handles, but its only production callers are
 * live-worker teardown and workerless close — NEITHER runs for a session that is
 * already `closed_with_residual` and exists only as a durable handle. So after a
 * host reboot (which truly kills the whole tree, migrant included) that handle
 * lingered forever and device isolation kept synthesising an `activation_blocked`
 * from it — the new bootId proof had no consumer. This is that consumer: it
 * enumerates the store and RELEASES only handles whose verdict is
 * `boot-id-changed`. A same-boot handle, a legacy handle with no bootId, an
 * unprovable handle, or a still-live cgroup are all RETAINED.
 *
 * Fail-CLOSED throughout: an unreadable store, an unreadable /proc, or a handle
 * whose proof throws leaves that handle in place. Releasing on a "cannot tell"
 * is exactly the unblock this whole module refuses.
 */
export declare function reconcileContainmentHandlesOnBoot(opts?: {
    procRoot?: string;
    dataDir?: string;
}): {
    released: number;
    retained: number;
    storeUnreadable: boolean;
};
/**
 * Is this verdict strong enough to FORGET the tree, and how much stays behind?
 *
 * This is the production gate on `boundaryProof`. It exists because a
 * `proven: true` verdict is NOT one thing: on a cgroup host it is kernel state,
 * on a plain Linux host it can be nothing more than "the scan saw nobody", and
 * those two must not share a code path.
 *
 * Truth table, all of it pinned by unit tests:
 *
 *   verdict           evidence              boundaryProof  release  residual
 *   ----------------  --------------------  -------------  -------  --------
 *   proven, weak      boot-id-changed       true           yes      null
 *   proven, cgroup    boot-id-changed       true           yes      null
 *   proven, cgroup    cgroup-empty          FALSE          NO       deviceIsolation
 *   proven, cgroup    cgroup-zombie-only    FALSE          NO       deviceIsolation
 *   proven, weak      scan-clean            FALSE          NO       deviceIsolation
 *   not proven        n/a                   false          NO       deviceIsolation
 *
 * Only a reboot (boot-id-changed) authorises forgetting a tree — for BOTH handle
 * kinds since the strong handle gained a stamped bootId (a reboot kills the
 * whole tree, sibling-migrant included, and resets cgroupfs). A cgroup being
 * empty is NOT a boundary proof — a same-UID process can migrate itself out of
 * the leaf, invisible to the leaf-down read — so an emptiness verdict behaves
 * exactly like a weak scan-clean: it lets the caller stop re-signalling
 * (`signalsStopped: true`) and lets the SESSION close, but authorises nothing
 * else. The handle stays in the durable store, so `hasUnprovenContainment` keeps
 * answering true and the device-isolation blocker survives the close.
 */
export declare function containmentReleaseDecision(verdict: QuiescenceVerdict): ContainmentReleaseDecision;
/**
 * Release a handle — the ONLY removal path, and it demands the proof.
 *
 * Taking the verdict (rather than a boolean, or nothing at all) is deliberate: it
 * makes "clear the blocker without proving quiescence" unrepresentable at the type
 * level, which is the invariant this whole module exists to enforce. A caller
 * holding a `proven: false` verdict has no way to spend it here.
 *
 * The ONE evidence that authorises release is `boot-id-changed`, for either
 * handle kind (a strong handle carries a stamped bootId since round 10).
 * Emptiness verdicts (cgroup-empty / cgroup-zombie-only / scan-clean) resolve to
 * `releaseAuthorised: false` and return below with the handle and the
 * device-isolation blocker retained — cgroup emptiness is not a boundary proof
 * (a same-UID process can migrate out of the leaf; see
 * containmentReleaseDecision). No cgroup directory is reclaimed on the release
 * path: `boot-id-changed` means the host rebooted and cgroupfs came back empty,
 * so there is nothing to remove. Within a boot the tree is killed via
 * `cgroup.kill` during teardown and the handle waits for reboot or operator
 * revoke.
 */
export declare function releaseContainmentHandle(verdict: QuiescenceVerdict, dataDir?: string): ContainmentReleaseDecision;
/**
 * OPERATOR OVERRIDE: drop handles without quiescence proof.
 *
 * releaseContainmentHandle is deliberately unreachable without a proven verdict,
 * and on a non-cgroup host a weak handle's scan-clean is never a boundary proof
 * — so after one mojo session runs and closes there, its handle (and with it the
 * whole-machine device-isolation `activation_blocked` 409) persists FOREVER,
 * with no operational path out short of hand-editing the ledger JSON. An
 * `unprovable` handle is like that by design. Both are correct fail-closed
 * defaults and both still need an explicit, auditable exit.
 *
 * This is that exit, and only for a human operator (the `botmux mojo-containment
 * revoke` command): it removes the named handles while logging exactly what was
 * dropped, so the decision that "these trees are acceptable to forget" is a
 * recorded human judgement, never something the runtime can reach on its own.
 * Nothing in daemon/worker code may call this.
 */
export declare function revokeContainmentHandles(sessionId: string, opts?: {
    handleKey?: string;
    dataDir?: string;
    auditNote?: string;
}): {
    removed: ContainmentHandle[];
    remaining: ContainmentHandle[];
};
/**
 * Executing (non-zombie) pids anywhere in a cgroup handle's subtree, for the
 * operator revoke safety gate. `unreadable` is the fail-closed signal — the gate
 * must surface it rather than read "cannot enumerate" as "nobody there".
 */
export declare function cgroupHandleLiveMembers(handle: StrongContainmentHandle, opts?: {
    procRoot?: string;
}): {
    live: number[];
    unreadable: boolean;
};
/**
 * Hand every outstanding handle of a session to a new worker generation.
 *
 * Inheritance is a UNION and it is unconditional: replacement does not prove
 * anything about the old tree, so the new generation becomes responsible for
 * proving it later. The generation stamp is refreshed for logging while the
 * IDENTITY fields (cgroup path, pid/boot/starttime, nonce) are preserved
 * verbatim — rewriting those would invent a handle that proves nothing about the
 * tree actually left behind.
 *
 * Nothing is removed here, so a crash mid-inheritance is safe: the handles are
 * still recorded under the same session id.
 */
export declare function inheritContainmentHandles(sessionId: string, nextGeneration: number, dataDir?: string): ContainmentHandle[];
/**
 * Map a containment verdict onto ProcTree's `TurnQuiescence`.
 *
 * This function is the single place in the codebase allowed to mint
 * `{ kind: 'contained-proven', boundaryProof: true }`, and it does so for exactly
 * ONE evidence — `boot-id-changed`. That is the whole point of the contracts
 * meeting here:
 *
 *   - `quiescenceFromScan()` can never produce `boundaryProof: true`; a clean
 *     /proc scan is a diagnostic signal, because a descendant that both setsids
 *     AND scrubs its own environ evades enumeration entirely.
 *   - An empty (or zombie-only) `cgroup.procs` is ALSO only a diagnostic signal,
 *     NOT a boundary proof: mojo runs at the daemon's UID and cgroup v2 lets a
 *     same-UID process migrate itself out of the leaf, invisible to the leaf-down
 *     read. cgroup emptiness is good for stopping signals and for killing
 *     (cgroup.kill), never for dropping device isolation.
 *   - `boot-id-changed` is the only unforgeable release: a reboot kills the whole
 *     tree, migrant included. It applies to a weak handle and to a cgroup handle
 *     once its bootId is stamped.
 *
 * So a STRONG (cgroup) proven-empty verdict maps to `diagnostic-clean`, exactly
 * like a weak `scan-clean`, and `containmentReleaseDecision` refuses to authorise
 * removal for either — the handle stays in the durable store and the blocker
 * survives the close. The gate lives in `containmentReleaseDecision`, a real
 * production consumer.
 */
/**
 * The ONE place a `boundaryProof: true` TurnQuiescence is constructed.
 *
 * Round 4 claimed this property in a comment while three separate sites minted
 * the value, which is why the claim was rejected as unverifiable. It is now
 * structural: `boundaryProof: true` is minted here and in the release-decision
 * gate (`containmentReleaseDecision`), and nowhere else — `git grep -n
 * "boundaryProof: true" -- src/` returns those two sites plus type definitions.
 * It is exported for the backend, which decides WHETHER a proven boundary applies
 * but must not decide what one looks like.
 */
export declare function containedProvenQuiescence(): TurnQuiescence;
export declare function containmentQuiescence(verdict: QuiescenceVerdict): TurnQuiescence;
/**
 * Strongest quiescence statement available for a session, across ALL of its
 * outstanding handles.
 *
 * Semantics are intentionally pessimistic, because a session is only as contained
 * as its WEAKEST outstanding tree:
 *   - any handle that is not proven  → that handle's non-proof is the answer
 *   - no handles at all              → `diagnostic-clean`; nothing is recorded,
 *     but "nothing recorded" is not a kernel-level boundary proof either
 *   - every handle proven, at least one only diagnostically → `diagnostic-clean`
 *   - every handle proven WITH a boundary proof              → `contained-proven`
 *
 * A store that cannot be read THROWS (via `containmentHandles`), so an
 * unreadable store can never present itself as a clean session.
 */
export declare function sessionContainmentQuiescence(sessionId: string, prove: (handle: ContainmentHandle) => QuiescenceVerdict, dataDir?: string): TurnQuiescence;
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