import { type VcMeetingLiveManagedOrigin } from '../services/vc-meeting-send-policy.js';
export type SessionScopedIpcAuthDecision = {
    ok: true;
} | {
    ok: false;
    error: 'origin_unproven' | 'managed_action_required';
};
export interface SessionScopedIpcIdentity {
    sessionId: string;
    larkAppId: string;
    chatId: string;
    rootMessageId: string | null;
}
/** Replace every caller-selectable route field with the authenticated
 * daemon-session identity while preserving endpoint-specific payload fields. */
export declare function bindSessionScopedIpcIdentity<T extends object>(payload: T, identity: SessionScopedIpcIdentity): T & SessionScopedIpcIdentity;
/**
 * Narrow fallback for commands that legitimately originate inside a
 * read-isolated CLI and therefore cannot read the host IPC HMAC secret.
 *
 * The daemon resolves `liveOrigin` from the exact body session id; callers must
 * present that session's current rotating capability. The visible turn/attempt
 * tuple is never accepted as proof. Receiver sessions are denied unless the
 * endpoint is explicitly non-observable (currently SessionStart readiness).
 */
export declare function authorizeSessionScopedIpc(input: {
    trustedHost: boolean;
    sessionExists: boolean;
    receiverSession: boolean;
    allowReceiver: boolean;
    sessionId: string;
    liveOrigin?: VcMeetingLiveManagedOrigin;
    claimedCapability?: string;
    claimedTurnId?: string;
    claimedDispatchAttempt?: number;
}): SessionScopedIpcAuthDecision;
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