# Cockpit Daily Linux Operator Gate The daily gate is the bounded, report-producing proof for Cockpit's supported Linux lane. It requires a real protected agentic-sandbox executor, a host runtime, and a container runtime. VM and Apple rows are always reported as preview and do not block the Linux result. This is an operator-controlled test. It provisions temporary runtimes, drives managed PTYs, interrupts connectivity, restarts the executor, and rehearses an upgrade and rollback. Obtain the approvals required by the host's operations policy before running it. Never overlap it with another E2E lane. ## One command Prepare the environment and then run: ```bash npm run uat:cockpit-daily ``` The command accepts no positional arguments, credentials, or inline hook commands. All credentials stay behind file references. Hooks are executable files invoked directly without a shell; their stdout and stderr are discarded so they cannot become report content. Required configuration: ```bash export AIWG_COCKPIT_EXECUTOR_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8122 export AIWG_COCKPIT_EXECUTOR_TOKEN_FILE=/protected/path/cockpit-executor.token export AIWG_COCKPIT_LIVE_PROVIDER=codex # Optional: allow a slow provider-backed discovery turn up to two minutes. export AIWG_COCKPIT_LIVE_WORKLOAD_TIMEOUT_MS=120000 export AIWG_COCKPIT_DAILY_PREVIOUS_AIWG_VERSION=2026.7.14 export AIWG_COCKPIT_DAILY_CANDIDATE_AIWG_VERSION=2026.7.15 export AIWG_COCKPIT_DAILY_PREVIOUS_EXECUTOR_VERSION=v2026.7.9 export AIWG_COCKPIT_DAILY_CANDIDATE_EXECUTOR_VERSION=v2026.7.10 export AIWG_COCKPIT_DAILY_UPGRADE_HOOK=/operator/hooks/cockpit-upgrade export AIWG_COCKPIT_DAILY_ROLLBACK_HOOK=/operator/hooks/cockpit-rollback export AIWG_COCKPIT_DAILY_TRANSIENT_HOOK=/operator/hooks/cockpit-transient export AIWG_COCKPIT_DAILY_EXECUTOR_RESTART_HOOK=/operator/hooks/cockpit-executor-restart export AIWG_COCKPIT_LIVE_EXPECT_CWD_HOST=/home/operator export AIWG_COCKPIT_LIVE_EXPECT_CWD_CONTAINER=/home/agent export AIWG_COCKPIT_LIVE_MUTATION_FILE=/operator/scratch/cockpit-daily-mutation export AIWG_COCKPIT_LIVE_PROVISION_IMAGE=agentic/codex@sha256: # Optional: gate-owned provider-login copy or other operator-approved input. export AIWG_COCKPIT_LIVE_PROVISION_CONTAINER_MOUNT=/operator/protected/codex:/home/agent/.codex # Optional: explicit Tier 0 network for a provider workload that needs egress. export AIWG_COCKPIT_LIVE_PROVISION_CONTAINER_NETWORK=bridge ``` The token file must be a regular file inaccessible to group and other users (mode `0600` on Unix). The mutation path must be a harmless, gate-owned scratch path with a dedicated non-root parent directory. For a provisioned container, the harness creates that parent with mode `0700` and bind-mounts only that directory at the same absolute path. The gate verifies exact content and removes the mutation file during scoped cleanup; operators remain responsible for removing the empty parent after retaining the reports. The container image must use an immutable tag or digest; `latest` fails preflight. If previous-stable targets are provisioned outside the gate, their container must already bind-mount the mutation file's parent directory at the same absolute path. Candidate targets provisioned by the gate receive that mount automatically. Before either phase, grant the declared non-root container uid write access to that dedicated directory without opening it to other users; a POSIX ACL for that uid preserves the host operator's ownership and private default mode. The provider workload timeout defaults to 120 seconds and may be set from 10 seconds through 15 minutes with `AIWG_COCKPIT_LIVE_WORKLOAD_TIMEOUT_MS`; keep it bounded to the slowest approved provider turn rather than using an unbounded wait. When the provider workload needs a pre-authenticated file-backed profile, point `AIWG_COCKPIT_LIVE_PROVISION_CONTAINER_MOUNT` at one gate-owned host directory and its absolute container destination. The value is a mount reference, never a credential value, and is not written to the reports. Do not point it at the operator's original profile: make a private, disposable copy, grant only the container runtime uid access, and remove that copy after the gate. Managed sandbox networks remain internal by default. If the selected live provider requires upstream egress, set `AIWG_COCKPIT_LIVE_PROVISION_CONTAINER_NETWORK` to an existing operator-approved Docker network such as `bridge`. The report records that network choice. It is an explicit Tier 0 compatibility posture, not a claim that the container retains the managed default-deny network boundary. Use exact CalVer package versions for AIWG and an immutable release version or commit for the executor. Mutable names such as `main` and `latest` fail preflight. The globally resolved `aiwg --version` must match the declared AIWG version before upgrade, after upgrade, and after rollback. A real executor identity endpoint must contain the declared executor version/commit in every smoke phase; the live UAT's operator hint is recorded for context but cannot satisfy this identity check by itself. ## Hook contract Hooks receive only a narrow environment: `PATH`, `HOME`, `TMPDIR`, the executor URL, the executor **token-file reference**, and the variables below. They never receive a credential value in argv. | Hook | `AIWG_COCKPIT_DAILY_ACTION` | Required behavior | |---|---|---| | upgrade | `upgrade` | Install the declared candidate AIWG/executor builds and return after readiness | | rollback | `rollback` | Restore both declared previous-stable builds and return after readiness | | transient | `disconnect`, then `restore` | Interrupt only the Bridge-to-executor path, then restore it without restarting the Bridge | | executor restart | `restart` | Restart the executor in place and return after its listener is ready | Upgrade and rollback hooks also receive `AIWG_COCKPIT_DAILY_FROM_VERSION` and `AIWG_COCKPIT_DAILY_TO_VERSION`, plus all four explicit product-specific previous/candidate version variables. The recovery hooks receive `AIWG_COCKPIT_EXECUTOR_URL` and `AIWG_COCKPIT_EXECUTOR_TOKEN_FILE`. Hooks must be bounded, idempotent where practical, and scoped to this gate's executor. They must not start a second E2E lane, print secrets, remove unrelated runtimes, or broaden host mutation. The wrapper attempts rollback after every attempted upgrade, including a failed or partially applied upgrade. A successful gate intentionally finishes on the declared previous-stable versions after the rollback smoke. The disconnect hook must also close existing keep-alive connections between the Bridge and executor. Stopping only a proxy listener is insufficient when its already-forked connection handlers remain alive; terminate those scoped child connections or apply an equivalently narrow network interruption before the hook returns. ## What must pass The candidate phase provisions one gate-owned host target and one gate-owned container target through the Bridge. For both it verifies protected inventory, lifecycle mutation, session create/list, observer and controller attach, a real provider-backed AIWG discovery workload, the exact managed-PTY working directory, and the scratch mutation. It then proves: - unauthenticated upstream inventory remains an explicit `401` or `403`; - the same Bridge recovers inventory, running/session projections, and SSE after the transient hook, without a Bridge or browser restart; - a Bridge restart re-adopts and reattaches every created managed session; - an executor restart re-adopts and reattaches those sessions; and - only gate-created sessions and instances are removed during cleanup. The wrapper runs a previous-stable smoke, the upgrade hook, the full candidate phase, the rollback hook, and a previous-stable rollback smoke. Missing evidence, an unreachable or mock executor, missing authentication, any required skip, cleanup failure, version mismatch, or secret-pattern finding makes the final result fail. Synthetic unit/integration tests validate orchestration and report semantics, but their reports use `mode: synthetic` and can never satisfy this live gate. ## Reports and preview rows Default artifacts are mode `0600`: - `test-results/cockpit-daily-gate.json` - `test-results/cockpit-daily-gate.md` - phase reports beside them with `.previous_stable_smoke`, `.candidate_smoke`, and `.rollback_smoke` suffixes Set `AIWG_COCKPIT_DAILY_REPORT` to change the report basename. The JSON schema is `aiwg.cockpit-daily-gate/v1`; check and runtime rows have stable ordering. Reports identify exact AIWG/executor versions, timings, required failures, and linked blockers, while recording only the boolean authentication posture. VM and Apple default to explicit `skip` preview rows. A separate preview run may feed sanitized status/evidence into: ```bash export AIWG_COCKPIT_DAILY_VM_STATUS=pass export AIWG_COCKPIT_DAILY_VM_EVIDENCE='preview run artifact vm-report.json' export AIWG_COCKPIT_DAILY_APPLE_STATUS=blocked export AIWG_COCKPIT_DAILY_APPLE_EVIDENCE='preview capacity blocker devops#53' export AIWG_COCKPIT_DAILY_BLOCKERS='aiwg#1732,devops#53' ``` Preview failures and blockers remain visible but do not turn a green Linux host/container result red. Apple preview evidence is developer-package evidence, not a production distribution attestation. For Apple Silicon coverage, record the agentic-sandbox developer package version, `darwin/arm64` host runtime discovery, Docker Desktop runtime posture, and the artifact or log that proves the run. Production signing and notarization remain tracked separately upstream and do not block the Cockpit Linux release gate or Apple preview row. ## Recovery after a failed run 1. Read the Markdown report first; it lists required failures without hook output or credentials. 2. Confirm the rollback phase and rollback smoke. If rollback failed, follow the operator-owned rollback procedure directly before another run. 3. Reconcile only gate-prefixed resources created by the failed run. Do not delete an instance merely because it appears in inventory. 4. Fix the named phase or linked upstream blocker, then rerun the same command. See [Recovery](./recovery.md) for runtime-specific session semantics and [Trust & Security](./trust-and-security.md) for credential custody and audit redaction. For protected sandboxes that advertise governed activity, the live gate must query an exact tenant/host/instance/agent scope, assert coverage is rendered before events, and record complete/incomplete status including loss, restart, staleness, unsupported-class, and clock-uncertainty fields. Export is tested as a separate authorized action, including the signing-key-unavailable case. For managed Docker, the Linux row must prove native UDS plus valid control UID range and workload UID 10001. Docker Desktop is expected to report bootstrap fallback, never the secure-default badge. A legacy/missing-evidence row must say recreation is required, and a credential-ref launch rejection must retain the credential-proxy-or-VM recovery guidance without exposing the rejected refs.