/**
 * Operator-supplied URL safety guard for outbound HTTP integrations.
 *
 * Callers use this before persisting or fetching user-configured URLs
 * that could otherwise probe internal services or leak credentials.
 *
 * The guard:
 *   * Enforces http/https scheme (rejects file:, gopher:, etc.).
 *   * For credentialed calls, requires https.
 *   * Resolves the hostname via DNS and refuses loopback, link-local,
 *     and RFC1918 / IPv6 ULA addresses.
 *
 * Escape hatch (either env disables the private-address block):
 *   - AGIM_ACP_ALLOW_LOOPBACK=1 — historical name kept for old setups
 *   - AGIM_URL_ALLOW_PRIVATE=1  — shared name for LLM/MCP/local URLs
 * Intended for development against `localhost:<port>` / LAN Ollama etc.;
 * never set these in shared deployments.
 *
 * Callers that `fetch()` the URL should also pass `redirect: 'manual'`
 * so an allowed origin can't 302 the request into a blocked address.
 */
export interface AssertSafeOptions {
    /** When true, only https URLs are accepted because the request carries credentials. */
    forwardsCredentials: boolean;
}
type LookupHost = (hostname: string) => Promise<{
    address: string;
    family: number;
}>;
export declare class UnsafeUrlError extends Error {
    readonly reason: string;
    constructor(message: string, reason: string);
}
/** @deprecated Use UnsafeUrlError. */
export declare const UnsafeAcpUrlError: typeof UnsafeUrlError;
export declare function assertSafeUrl(raw: string, opts: AssertSafeOptions, lookupHost?: LookupHost): Promise<URL>;
/** @deprecated Use assertSafeUrl. */
export declare const assertSafeAcpUrl: typeof assertSafeUrl;
/** RFC1918 + loopback + link-local + IPv6 ULA + 0.0.0.0. Exported for unit tests. */
export declare function isPrivateAddr(ip: string, family: 4 | 6): boolean;
export {};
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