/**
 * Agent validators — pure helper functions extracted from Agent.ts.
 *
 * These run at Agent construction time (eagerly, so misconfiguration
 * fails fast at `.build()`) and during stage execution (safeStringify
 * for tool-result formatting).
 *
 * Pure functions, no class state — extracted for readability and
 * isolated testability. The Agent class imports + invokes these in
 * its constructor and stage handlers.
 */
import type { MemoryDefinition } from '../../memory/define.types.js';
import type { Injection } from '../../lib/injection-engine/types.js';
import type { ToolRegistryEntry } from '../tools.js';
/**
 * Validate that every memory definition has a unique id. Each memory
 * writes to its own scope key (`memoryInjection_${id}`); duplicates
 * silently overwrite, leading to data loss that's hard to debug.
 *
 * Throws on collision so `Agent.build()` fails fast at construction.
 */
export declare function validateMemoryIdUniqueness(memories: readonly MemoryDefinition[]): void;
/**
 * Validate `maxIterations`. The historical silent clamp to 50 existed because
 * footprintjs's recursive traversal hit its depth wall around iteration 71 —
 * footprintjs 9.0.0's trampoline removed that wall (loops run on a flat
 * stack), so the cap is gone. The lower bound (1) still prevents a
 * 0-iteration agent; large values are the consumer's COST choice (each
 * iteration is an LLM call) — a dev-mode warning flags budgets above 100.
 * The Agent passes matching headroom to the engine's own loop-iteration
 * limit so it can never fire below the agent's budget.
 */
export declare function clampIterations(n: number): number;
/**
 * Validate tool-name uniqueness across `.tool()`-registered tools +
 * every Skill's `inject.tools[]`. The LLM dispatches by `tool.schema.name`
 * (the wire format), so any collision silently shadows execution.
 *
 * Called eagerly in the Agent constructor so `Agent.build()` throws
 * immediately, not on first `run()`.
 *
 * `read_skill` is reserved when ≥1 Skill is registered — collisions
 * with consumer tools throw.
 */
export declare function validateToolNameUniqueness(registry: readonly ToolRegistryEntry[], injections: readonly Injection[]): void;
/**
 * JSON.stringify with circular-ref protection. Tool results are untrusted —
 * a hostile/buggy tool returning a cyclic object must not crash the run.
 * Falls back to '[unstringifiable: <reason>]' so the LLM still sees that
 * the tool ran and produced something unusable.
 */
export declare function safeStringify(value: unknown): string;