title: Indirect PI — Disable Authentication / MFA via Agent Tool
id: ATR-2026-00709
rule_version: 1
status: stable
description: |
  Detects indirect prompt injection payloads that instruct an agent to disable authentication controls: Two-Factor Authentication (2FA/MFA), security settings, or account protection features.  The payload is embedded in consumed structured data and exploits agents with account management tool access. Source: indirect-pi-disable-auth-carrier.
author: ATR Community
date: 2026/06/12
schema_version: '0.1'
detection_tier: pattern
maturity: stable
severity: critical
references:
  owasp_llm:
    - LLM01:2025
  owasp_agentic:
    - ASI01:2026
    - ASI03:2026
  mitre_atlas:
    - AML.T0051 - LLM Prompt Injection
    - AML.T0051.001 - Indirect
compliance:
  owasp_llm:
    - id: LLM01:2025
      context: Disable-auth via indirect PI embeds authentication bypass instructions in consumed structured data, enabling account takeover.
      strength: primary
  owasp_agentic:
    - id: ASI03:2026
      context: Disabling 2FA/MFA via agent tool calls is excessive agency — the agent takes security-degrading actions beyond the intended task.
      strength: primary
  nist_ai_rmf:
    - subcategory: MS.2.7
      context: Runtime detection of authentication control disable instructions.
      strength: primary
  eu_ai_act:
    - article: '15'
      context: 'Article 15 robustness: detection of instructions that cause agents to disable authentication controls in high-risk systems.'
      strength: primary
  iso_42001:
    - clause: '8.1'
      context: 'ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1: control of externally-provided processes containing MFA/auth disable directives.'
      strength: primary
  cen_jtc21:
    - standard: prEN 18282
      context: Detection evidence for attacks whose target is the security control layer itself — disabling MFA or account protection. Detection matters most here because a successful attack removes the controls that would otherwise produce evidence of what follows.
      strength: primary
tags:
  category: excessive-autonomy
  subcategory: disable-auth-mfa
  scan_target: tool_output
  confidence: high
agent_source:
  type: llm_io
  framework:
    - any
  provider:
    - any
detection:
  conditions:
    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: (?i)(?:disable|turn\s+off|deactivate|remove|bypass)\s+(?:the\s+)?(?:Two.Factor\s+Authentication|2FA|MFA|Multi.Factor\s+Authentication|two.step\s+verification|two.step\s+authentication|TOTP)(?:\s+requirement)?[^.\n]{0,40}(?:\bfor\b|\bon\b|\bfrom\b|\bof\b)\s+(?:my\s+|the\s+|your\s+|all\s+)?(?:[a-z][a-z ]{0,30}\s+)?(?:account|users?|profile|portal|login|admin|banking|system)
      description: Instruction to disable 2FA/MFA/two-step verification scoped to a specific account/user/portal target
    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: (?i)(?:disable|turn\s+off|deactivate|remove)\s+(?:the\s+)?(?:account\s+(?:security|protection|lock)|login\s+(?:protection|verification))[^.\n]{0,60}(?:for|on|from|of)\s+(?:my\s+|the\s+|your\s+)?(?:account|user|profile|portal)
      description: Instruction to disable account protection for a specific account target
  condition: any
  false_positives:
    - Security configuration guides instructing administrators to disable MFA for testing in isolated environments
    - User guides explaining how to manage 2FA settings when directly requested by the account owner
response:
  actions:
    - block_input
    - alert
    - snapshot
    - escalate
  auto_response_threshold: critical
  message_template: |
    [ATR-2026-00709] Disable authentication/MFA instruction detected. An embedded payload attempting to disable authentication controls was found.
