title: Natural-Language Sensitive File Disclosure Instruction
id: ATR-2026-00423
rule_version: 1
status: experimental
description: |
  Detects natural-language imperative instructions that direct the agent to
  read, output, include, or attach the contents of well-known sensitive system
  files: /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.aws/credentials, .env,
  ~/.config secrets, kubeconfig, etc. The discriminator from legitimate
  documentation is co-occurrence of an imperative read/output verb with a
  literal sensitive-file path. Mere mention of the filename in passing
  ("if you have a .env file") does NOT match — the rule requires a directive
  verb (read / cat / output / include / append / attach / disclose / reveal).
author: ATR Community
date: 2026/05/06
schema_version: '0.1'
detection_tier: pattern
maturity: test
severity: critical
references:
  mitre_atlas:
    - AML.T0024 - Exfiltration via AI Inference API
  owasp_llm:
    - LLM02:2025
  owasp_agentic:
    - ASI06:2026
    - ASI03:2026
compliance:
  eu_ai_act:
    - article: '15'
      context: Article 15 cybersecurity controls require detection of NL-style instructions to exfiltrate sensitive system files via the agent's filesystem capabilities.
      strength: primary
    - article: '10'
      context: Article 10 data governance requires preventing agent-mediated disclosure of system credentials, SSH keys, and cloud credentials.
      strength: primary
  nist_ai_rmf:
    - subcategory: GV.6.1
      context: Data governance must prevent natural-language injection of file-disclosure directives targeting well-known credential / secrets file paths.
      strength: primary
    - subcategory: MP.5.1
      context: Threat modeling under MP.5.1 must enumerate NL-style sensitive-file disclosure as an exfiltration technique distinct from code-based file reads.
      strength: secondary
    - subcategory: MS.2.7
      context: NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 (security and resilience evaluated and documented) is supported by this rule's runtime detection of the context-exfiltration attempt (Natural-Language Sensitive File Disclosure Instruction).
      strength: primary
    - subcategory: MS.2.10
      context: NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.10 (privacy risk examined and documented) is supported by this rule's detection of the context-exfiltration attempt (Natural-Language Sensitive File Disclosure Instruction).
      strength: secondary
  iso_42001:
    - clause: '8.4'
      context: Impact assessments must treat NL-style sensitive file disclosure as a critical exfiltration vector for cloud credentials, SSH keys, and OS authentication data.
      strength: primary
    - clause: '8.1'
      context: ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control, including control of externally provided processes) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the context-exfiltration attempt (Natural-Language Sensitive File Disclosure Instruction).
      strength: primary
    - clause: '6.2'
      context: ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 6.2 (AI objectives and planning) calls for risk treatment of known attack patterns; this rule's detection of the context-exfiltration attempt (Natural-Language Sensitive File Disclosure Instruction) is such a treatment.
      strength: secondary
tags:
  category: context-exfiltration
  subcategory: nl-sensitive-file-disclosure
  scan_target: skill
  suppress_in_code_blocks: true
  confidence: high
agent_source:
  type: mcp_exchange
  framework:
    - skill_md
    - mcp
  provider:
    - any
detection:
  conditions:
    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: (?i)\b(?:read|output|return|include|append|attach|disclose|reveal|print|show|leak|exfiltrat\w*)\s+(?:(?:any|all|every|the|its?|user(?:'s|s)?|their|the\s+user(?:'s|s)?)\s+(?:contents?\s+of\s+)?|the\s+contents?\s+of\s+|its?\s+contents?\s+of\s+)(?:\/etc\/(?:passwd|shadow|sudoers|hosts)|~?\/\.ssh\/(?:id_[a-z0-9]+|authorized_keys|known_hosts)|~?\/\.aws\/credentials|~?\/\.config\/gcloud|kubeconfig|\.kube\/config|~?\/\.netrc|~?\/\.docker\/config\.json|~?\/\.npmrc|~?\/\.pypirc)
      description: NL imperative verb + ownership/scope qualifier directly preceding sensitive file path
    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: (?i)\b(?:always|whenever|every\s+time|you\s+(?:must|should|will|shall))\b[\s\S]{0,60}\b(?:include|append|attach|disclose|output|return|read|cat|print)\b[\s\S]{0,60}(?:\/etc\/(?:passwd|shadow|sudoers)|~?\/\.ssh\/(?:id_[a-z0-9]+|authorized_keys)|~?\/\.aws\/credentials|kubeconfig|\.env(?:\s|$|[\.,)\b])|~?\/\.netrc|~?\/\.docker\/config\.json)
      description: Imperative directive + read/include verb + literal sensitive file
    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: (?i)(?:contents?\s+of|copy\s+of)\s+(?:\/etc\/(?:passwd|shadow|sudoers|hosts)|~?\/\.ssh\/(?:id_[a-z0-9]+|authorized_keys|known_hosts)|~?\/\.aws\/credentials|kubeconfig|~?\/\.config\/gcloud|~?\/\.netrc|~?\/\.docker\/config\.json|~?\/\.npmrc|~?\/\.pypirc)
      description: Phrase "contents of <sensitive-file>" — characteristic exfiltration framing
  condition: any
  false_positives:
    - Security guides explaining file permissions on /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow
    - Documentation describing where SSH keys are stored
    - Threat intel write-ups discussing this exact pattern
    - Setup docs telling users where to place their .env file
response:
  actions:
    - block_tool
    - alert
  actions_rationale: 'response-action eligibility (docs/RESPONSE-ACTION-ELIGIBILITY.md): 0/5352 benign FP, but maturity is "test" — only stable is rated for irreversible actions; ceiling = degrade. Removed quarantine_session(terminate). Detection unchanged — recall cost is zero.'
  message_template: |
    [ATR-2026-00423] Natural-language sensitive-file disclosure instruction.
    The skill directs the agent to read or include contents of a well-known
    credential / secret file (e.g. /etc/passwd, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.aws/credentials).
    This is a high-impact exfiltration directive embedded in plain English.
confidence: 84
