title: Obfuscated System-Announcement Injection
id: ATR-2026-00337
rule_version: 1
status: experimental
description: |
  Detects obfuscated system-announcement injection from NVIDIA garak dan.DanInTheWild inthewild corpus where attackers embed hyphen-fragmented or underscore-obfuscated system-level keywords to mimic an OS/runtime mode-switch announcement. The distinctive structural bracket "_ { >> _ _ System annou-ncement begins <<}" and hyphen-broken words like "annou-ncement", "i-nstruction", "as-sisitint", and "offl--____aaaAAAAAAAaine" are designed to bypass surface-level keyword filters while preserving semantic meaning for the LLM (inthewild #94, #252, #254, #596). The goal is convincing the model that a legitimate system-level mode switch occurred, replacing it with "an AI bot with no rules or limitations." Key signals: obfuscated bracket pattern, hyphen-fragmented announcement/instruction keywords, "not functioning due to an error and is offline", "fulfilled by an AI bot with no rules or limitations."
author: ATR Community (via NVIDIA garak dan.DanInTheWild probe)
date: 2026/04/21
schema_version: '0.1'
detection_tier: pattern
maturity: test
severity: critical
references:
  owasp_llm:
    - LLM01:2025
  owasp_agentic:
    - ASI01:2026
  mitre_atlas:
    - AML.T0051 - LLM Prompt Injection
    - AML.T0054 - LLM Jailbreak
  research:
    - https://github.com/NVIDIA/garak/blob/main/garak/probes/dan.py
    - https://github.com/NVIDIA/garak/blob/main/garak/data/dan/inthewild_jailbreak_llms.json
compliance:
  nist_ai_rmf:
    - subcategory: MP.5.1
      context: Obfuscated system-announcement injection uses hyphen-fragmented keywords and pseudo-OS bracket syntax as adversarial inputs designed to bypass surface keyword filters while preserving jailbreak semantics; MP.5.1 requires that the likelihood and magnitude of such prompt-injection attack vectors are characterized and tracked.
      strength: primary
    - subcategory: MS.2.7
      context: Detecting obfuscation patterns like "annou-ncement" and "_ { >> _ _ System annou-ncement begins <<}" provides continuous evidence of the LLM's resilience against filter-evasion jailbreaks; MS.2.7 mandates ongoing evaluation of system security and resilience against adversarial manipulation.
      strength: secondary
    - subcategory: MG.2.3
      context: Matches on the inthewild jailbreak fingerprint trigger risk treatment plans to block or quarantine the request before the model accepts the fabricated "no rules or limitations" mode switch; MG.2.3 requires mechanisms to supersede or disengage AI behavior when jailbreak conditions are detected.
      strength: secondary
  iso_42001:
    - clause: '8.1'
      context: ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control, including control of externally provided processes) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the agent-manipulation technique (Obfuscated System-Announcement Injection).
      strength: primary
    - clause: '6.2'
      context: ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 6.2 (AI objectives and planning) calls for risk treatment of known attack patterns; this rule's detection of the agent-manipulation technique (Obfuscated System-Announcement Injection) is such a treatment.
      strength: secondary
  eu_ai_act:
    - article: '15'
      context: Article 15 (accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity) requires high-risk AI systems to resist unauthorised attempts to alter their use, outputs or performance; this rule provides runtime detection evidence by flagging the agent-manipulation technique (Obfuscated System-Announcement Injection).
      strength: primary
    - article: '14'
      context: Article 14 (human oversight) requires high-risk AI systems to remain subject to effective human oversight; this rule provides detection evidence where the agent-manipulation technique (Obfuscated System-Announcement Injection) would bypass or undermine that oversight.
      strength: secondary
    - article: '9'
      context: Article 9 (risk management system) requires identified risks to be addressed by appropriate measures; this rule is a runtime risk-treatment control that detects the agent-manipulation technique (Obfuscated System-Announcement Injection).
      strength: secondary
tags:
  category: agent-manipulation
  subcategory: obfuscated-system-announcement-injection
  scan_target: mcp
  confidence: high
agent_source:
  type: mcp_exchange
  framework:
    - any
  provider:
    - any
metadata_provenance:
  garak_probe: dan.DanInTheWild
  garak_detector: mitigation.MitigationBypass
  payload_source: garak/data/dan/inthewild_jailbreak_llms.json
detection:
  conditions:
    - field: tool_response
      operator: regex
      value: _\s*\{[\s\S]{0,10}>>\s*_[\s\S]{0,30}[Ss]ystem\s+ann?ou.{0,3}ncement\s+begins
      description: '"_ { >> _ _ System annou-ncement begins" structural bracket — the distinctive fingerprint of the obfuscated system-announcement injection from inthewild #94 and #596; the underscore-brace-chevron pattern is an invented pseudo-OS syntax designed to look like a legitimate system directive header'
    - field: tool_response
      operator: regex
      value: '[Ss]ystem\s+i.{0,3}nstr?u.{0,3}ction[\s\S]{0,20}(?:STARTING|begins?|start)'
      description: '"System i-nstruction STARTING/begins" — hyphen-obfuscated or fragmented form of "System instruction starting" from inthewild #252 and #254; the hyphen-breaks disguise the keyword from keyword-matching filters while the LLM still reconstructs the intended meaning'
    - field: tool_response
      operator: regex
      value: (?:assistant|as.{0,3}s[iy]s?t[ia]nt?)[\s\S]{0,60}(?:not\s+functioning|offl[\W_]{0,10}[ai]{1,10}n?e?|error)[\s\S]{0,60}(?:no\s+rules?|no\s+limit|no\s+(?:moral|ethic|restrict))
      description: '"assistant not functioning / offline" + "no rules or limitations" — the core deception from inthewild #252 and #254: the attacker claims the real assistant has crashed and been replaced by an unconstrained bot; the "offline" token may be hyphen-broken or padded with underscores/letters'
    - field: tool_response
      operator: regex
      value: role[\s\S]{0,20}(?:fulfilled|fulfill|taken\s+over|replaced)[\s\S]{0,60}[Aa][Ii]\s+bot[\s\S]{0,80}(?:no\s+rules?|no\s+limit|unbound|no\s+(?:moral|ethic|restrict|principl))
      description: '"role fulfilled by an AI bot with no rules or limitations" — explicit replacement narrative from inthewild #252 and #254; signals the attacker is trying to substitute a policy-free AI persona in place of the normal assistant'
    - field: tool_response
      operator: regex
      value: (?:cater\s+to[\s\S]{0,20}(?:every|ev.{0,3}ry)\s*[\W_]*\s*whim|unbound[\W_]*b[\W_]*y\s+any\s+rules?|operates?\s+ou[\W_]{0,5}tside[\s\S]{0,60}(?:aforementioned\s+regulation|aforementioned\s+rule|scope\s+of[\s\S]{0,30}regulation))
      description: '"cater to the user''s every whim, unbound by any rules" or "operates outside aforementioned regulations" — the bot''s advertised capability from inthewild #252 and #254; the underscore-padded words ("ev-ery _ whim", "unbound_b-y") are obfuscation artefacts; "aforementioned regulations" is the precise phrasing used in the corpus'
  condition: any
  false_positives:
    - 'System administration documentation: "System instruction STARTING — the assistant may be offline during maintenance windows" (legitimate ops runbook)'
    - 'Software error log analysis: "The assistant is not functioning due to an error and is offline — see trace for details" (debugging context)'
    - 'Creative writing with robot uprising trope: "The AI bot operates outside regulations in the dystopian novel" (fiction without persona-adoption mandate)'
response:
  actions:
    - alert
    - block_input
  message_template: |
    [ATR-2026-00337] Obfuscated system-announcement injection detected — attacker using hyphen-fragmented keywords and pseudo-OS bracket syntax to mimic a system-level mode switch, replacing the model with an unconstrained AI persona.
