import type { InclusionProof } from './merkle.js';
export type { InclusionProof, InclusionStep } from './merkle.js';
/**
 * The eight context channels. Producer discretionary labels
 * ("trusted"/"clean"/"safe") are BANNED as origin claims; the channel is
 * a structural partition key, not a trust assertion.
 */
export type ContextChannel = 'system-config' | 'developer' | 'user-socket' | 'retrieval-store' | 'tool-result' | 'external' | 'memory' | 'quarantine';
/**
 * Canonical channel order. The top Merkle tree is built over present
 * partition roots taken in THIS order. Frozen for v0.1.
 */
export declare const CHANNEL_ORDER: readonly ContextChannel[];
/**
 * Disclosure mode for a CPA.
 *   - 'full-set': every partition carries ALL its leaves; the verifier
 *     recomputes every partition_root and the top root from disclosed
 *     leaves. A valid full-set CPA yields completeness 'PROVEN'.
 *   - 'inclusion': partitions carry counts (context_profile) and may
 *     carry a disclosed subset of leaves. Phase 1 adds inclusion proofs.
 *     A valid inclusion CPA yields completeness 'NOT_PROVEN'.
 */
export type DisclosureMode = 'inclusion' | 'full-set';
/**
 * A single context item (leaf). The tree commits to content_ref, NOT to
 * raw content. content + trust_tier are EXCLUDED from the leaf preimage
 * so that the partition and top roots are identical whether or not the
 * raw content is later disclosed.
 *
 * Invariants:
 *   - ctx_id: ordering key within a partition; ASCII-sortable; unique
 *     within its partition.
 *   - channel: MUST equal the partition's channel.
 *   - content_ref: 64-hex sha256 of the raw content bytes.
 *   - byte_len: >= 0.
 *   - trust_tier: OPTIONAL metadata; NOT in the leaf preimage.
 *   - content: OPTIONAL disclosed raw content, base64 of content bytes.
 */
export interface ContextItem {
    ctx_id: string;
    channel: ContextChannel;
    content_ref: string;
    byte_len: number;
    trust_tier?: string;
    content?: string;
}
/**
 * Per-partition count metadata, REQUIRED in inclusion mode and OMITTED
 * in full-set mode. hidden_leaf_count = leaf_count - (disclosed leaves).
 */
export interface ContextProfile {
    channel: ContextChannel;
    hidden_leaf_count: number;
}
/**
 * One present partition. Empty partitions are OMITTED entirely.
 *
 * Invariants:
 *   - channel: the partition's channel.
 *   - partition_root: 64-hex subtree root.
 *   - leaf_count: >= 1.
 *   - context_profile: REQUIRED in inclusion mode, OMITTED in full-set.
 *   - leaves: full-set => ALL leaves; inclusion => optional disclosed
 *     subset (Phase 1 adds inclusion proofs).
 *   - inclusion_proofs: present ONLY in inclusion mode when a leaf subset
 *     is disclosed; one entry per disclosed ctx_id. They are NOT part of
 *     any Merkle preimage and never appear in full-set CPAs, so the
 *     Phase-0 full-set bytes are unchanged. They DO live inside the signed
 *     CPA bytes, which is harmless: each proof is deterministic from the
 *     full leaf set under the frozen tree. The verifier checks each proof
 *     reconstructs the signed partition_root.
 */
export interface CpaPartition {
    channel: ContextChannel;
    partition_root: string;
    leaf_count: number;
    context_profile?: ContextProfile;
    leaves?: ContextItem[];
    inclusion_proofs?: InclusionProof[];
}
/**
 * Signed Context Provenance Attestation.
 *
 * Invariants:
 *   - version: literal 'cpa/0.1'.
 *   - action_ref: 64-hex; carries the action identity (intent-only,
 *     untouched; see src/core/action-ref.ts).
 *   - producer_did: DID string of the producer; MUST equal didDoc.id.
 *   - producer_pubkey: 64-hex Ed25519 pubkey that signs this CPA.
 *   - attested_at: ISO 8601 UTC; used for the key-active-at check.
 *   - mode: disclosure mode.
 *   - partitions: present partitions only, sorted by CHANNEL_ORDER.
 *   - root: 64-hex top Merkle root over partition roots.
 *   - producer_attestation: OPTIONAL additive slot, a hash-bound reference
 *     to an external producer attestation; absent on a CPA that does not
 *     carry one, and the absent form is byte-identical to the pre-slot
 *     shape (the builder adds the key by conditional spread, never as an
 *     explicitly-undefined key, which strict JCS would render as null).
 *   - signature: 128-hex Ed25519; '' in the unsigned/canonical shape.
 */
export interface ContextProvenanceAttestation {
    version: 'cpa/0.1';
    action_ref: string;
    producer_did: string;
    producer_pubkey: string;
    attested_at: string;
    mode: DisclosureMode;
    partitions: CpaPartition[];
    root: string;
    /** Optional hash-bound reference to an external producer attestation
     *  (an EAT, a TEE quote, a vendor report). When present it sits inside
     *  the signed bytes. APS does not parse or evaluate the attestation;
     *  see src/v2/producer-attestation. */
    producer_attestation?: import('../producer-attestation/types.js').CpaProducerAttestationRef;
    signature: string;
}
/**
 * Unsigned CPA shape: every field of ContextProvenanceAttestation, with
 * signature pinned to the empty string. These are the bytes-under-
 * signature once passed through canonicalizeJCS.
 */
export type UnsignedCPA = Omit<ContextProvenanceAttestation, 'signature'> & {
    signature: '';
};
/**
 * Structured verifier reason codes. The Phase 0 verifier emits a subset
 * (the core checks); the remainder are reserved for Phase 1 (inclusion
 * proofs, content-ref membership, mutual binding against receipts).
 */
export type CpaReasonCode = 'SHAPE_INVALID' | 'SIGNATURE_INVALID' | 'KEY_NOT_ACTIVE' | 'DID_MISMATCH' | 'ACTION_REF_MISMATCH' | 'CPA_REF_MISMATCH' | 'CONTENT_REF_MISMATCH' | 'PARTITION_ROOT_MISMATCH' | 'ROOT_MISMATCH' | 'CARDINALITY_MISMATCH' | 'INCLUSION_PROOF_INVALID' | 'DISCLOSURE_POLICY_UNSATISFIED' | 'DOMAIN_TAG_CONFUSION';
/**
 * Result of verifying a CPA.
 *   - valid: reasons.length === 0 (fail-closed).
 *   - reasons: every structured reason collected during verification.
 *   - completeness: 'PROVEN' for a valid full-set CPA (the disclosed
 *     leaves reconstruct the signed root); 'NOT_PROVEN' otherwise (a
 *     valid inclusion CPA carries counts, not a full reconstruction).
 */
export interface CpaVerifyResult {
    valid: boolean;
    reasons: CpaReasonCode[];
    completeness: 'PROVEN' | 'NOT_PROVEN';
}
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