import type { Delegation } from '../../types/passport.js';
import type { DelegationRef } from '../../core/reanchor.js';
import type { AttestedSignal } from '../../types/attestation.js';
/** The pinned ID-JAG draft identifier. A version bump is a separate, deliberate change. */
export declare const IDJAG_DRAFT = "draft-ietf-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant-04";
/** Domain-separation tag for the source-grant-ref commitment preimage. */
export declare const SOURCE_GRANT_REF_TAG = "aps.id_jag.source_grant_ref.v1";
/**
 * The decoded ID-JAG claims (draft-04 field names). This is the decoded grant,
 * NOT proof that it was verified. The public path takes VerifiedIdJagGrant.
 */
export interface IdJagClaims {
    /** IdP Authorization Server issuer identifier. */
    iss: string;
    /** Subject identifier (the authenticated End-User). */
    sub: string;
    /** Resource Authorization Server identifier. */
    aud: string;
    /** OAuth 2.0 client at the Resource Authorization Server. */
    client_id: string;
    /** Unique JWT identifier. */
    jti: string;
    /** Expiration time (JWT NumericDate, seconds since epoch). */
    exp: number;
    /** Issued-at time (JWT NumericDate, seconds since epoch). */
    iat: number;
    /** Subject identifier in an alternate namespace (optional). */
    sub_id?: string;
    /** Resource Server identifier (optional). */
    resource?: string;
    /** Space-separated scopes (optional). */
    scope?: string;
    /** RAR authorization objects (optional). */
    authorization_details?: IdJagAuthorizationDetail[];
    /** Actor claim (optional). Advisory only. */
    act?: Record<string, unknown>;
    /** Multi-tenant issuer tenant identifier (optional). Opaque context. */
    tenant?: string;
    /** End-User authentication time (optional). Opaque context. */
    auth_time?: number;
    /** Authentication Context Class Reference (optional). Opaque context. */
    acr?: string;
    /** Authentication methods (optional). Opaque context. */
    amr?: string[];
    /** Resource AS tenant identifier (optional). Opaque context. */
    aud_tenant?: string;
    /** Resource AS identifier for the End-User (optional). Opaque context, minimizable. */
    aud_sub?: string;
    /** End-User email (optional). Opaque context, minimizable. */
    email?: string;
}
/** A Rich Authorization Request object. RAR is open; only recognized fields are read. */
export interface IdJagAuthorizationDetail {
    type: string;
    [key: string]: unknown;
}
/** The caller's statement that it verified the grant. The grant signature itself is the caller's responsibility, never this module's. */
export interface IdJagVerification {
    /** Fixed: the caller asserts it verified the grant. */
    status: 'caller_verified';
    /** ISO 8601 time the caller performed verification. Required to form the signed attestation. */
    verifiedAt?: string;
    /** Optional identifier of the verifier (DID or URI). */
    verifier?: string;
    /** Optional kid the caller used to verify the grant. Recorded, never folded into a commitment as proof. */
    kid?: string;
}
declare const VERIFIED_BRAND: unique symbol;
/**
 * A grant the caller asserts it has verified, wrapped so an unverified grant is
 * unrepresentable on the public path. Construct only via verifiedIdJagGrant().
 */
export interface VerifiedIdJagGrant {
    readonly [VERIFIED_BRAND]: true;
    readonly grant: IdJagClaims;
    readonly verification: IdJagVerification;
}
/** The committed preimage for sourceGrantRef. Provenance and binding target ONLY. Never scope, spend, chain, or receipt content. */
export interface SourceGrantRefPreimage {
    tag: typeof SOURCE_GRANT_REF_TAG;
    draft: string;
    iss: string;
    sub: string;
    jti: string;
    client_id: string;
    aud: string;
    resource?: string;
    exp: number;
}
/** Marks the chain root as imported external trust, not an APS-native root. APS verification begins at the first APS-signed hop. */
export interface IdJagExternalRoot {
    type: 'external_identity_assertion';
    protocol: 'id-jag';
    verifiedBy: 'caller';
}
/** aud plus resource, carried but NOT enforced by the binding. The relying party MUST reject a mismatch. */
export interface IdJagCarriedAudience {
    enforcement: 'not_enforced_by_binding';
    recipients: string[];
}
/** Literal-only reconciliation of the ID-JAG act claim against the APS chain leaf. Advisory, never authoritative. */
export interface IdJagActReconciliation {
    status: 'absent' | 'same_literal_identifier' | 'different_literal_identifier_not_enforced' | 'not_comparable';
    advisoryAct: Record<string, unknown> | null;
}
/** The caller-signed verification attestation. Sound by accountability (a keyed party on the hook), not by construction. */
export interface IdJagCallerVerification {
    /** Existing-vocabulary signal record. provenance self_declared, verificationStatus declared (APS did not re-verify the grant). */
    signal: AttestedSignal;
    /** The exact signed message: "verified grant <sourceGrantRef> at <verifiedAt>". */
    message: string;
    /** The caller's signature over message, checkable under signerPublicKey. */
    signature: string;
    /** The caller's APS public key (the party on the hook). */
    signerPublicKey: string;
    /** ISO 8601 time the caller verified the grant. */
    verifiedAt: string;
    /** Optional kid the caller used. Recorded only. */
    kid?: string;
}
/** A non-fatal observation made during projection (for example a unitless RAR amount that was not stamped). */
export interface IdJagDiagnostic {
    code: 'UNITLESS_AMOUNT_NOT_STAMPED' | 'RAR_SCOPE_CONFLICT_NOT_APPLIED' | 'OPAQUE_RAR_CARRIED_IMMUTABLE';
    detail: string;
}
/** Claims carried by reference with no APS narrowing meaning. */
export interface IdJagOpaqueContext {
    tenant?: string;
    aud_tenant?: string;
    acr?: string;
    amr?: string[];
    auth_time?: number;
    aud_sub?: string;
    email?: string;
    sub_id?: string;
}
/** Options for binding. Privacy minimization defaults OFF (public SDK; the draft asks to minimize sub_id). */
export interface IdJagBindOptions {
    /** When true, email, sub_id, and aud_sub are omitted from carried context. Default false. */
    minimizeSensitive?: boolean;
}
/**
 * The binding descriptor. A pure projection of a verified ID-JAG grant onto the
 * APS envelope, plus the APS-signed chain built under it. Two anchors are kept
 * separate and never merged: delegationChainRoot is canonical chain content;
 * sourceGrantRef is grant provenance.
 */
export interface IdJagDescriptor {
    /** Pinned ID-JAG draft identifier. */
    draft: string;
    /** Grant provenance hash over the committed preimage. NOT chain content. */
    sourceGrantRef: string;
    /** The committed preimage, so a verifier can recompute sourceGrantRef. */
    sourceGrantRefPreimage: SourceGrantRefPreimage;
    /** Canonical chain content hash over the APS-signed hops. NOT grant identity. */
    delegationChainRoot: string;
    /** The APS-signed delegation hops built under the imported grant. */
    chain: Delegation[];
    /** Root authority by reference (the End-User sub). Keyless. */
    rootRef: DelegationRef;
    /** Label marking the root as imported external trust. */
    externalRoot: IdJagExternalRoot;
    /** First delegate: the requesting client at the Resource AS (a reference). */
    delegatedTo: string;
    /** Projected APS scope baseline (from the scope claim). Lossy; see rawAuthorizationDetails. */
    scope: string[];
    /** The raw RAR objects, always preserved verbatim. */
    rawAuthorizationDetails: IdJagAuthorizationDetail[];
    /** True: the scope projection is lossy relative to authorization_details. */
    projectionLossy: boolean;
    /** Non-fatal projection observations. */
    diagnostics: IdJagDiagnostic[];
    /** Spend cap, set ONLY when a recognized RAR amount carries a currency. Never invented. */
    spendLimit?: number;
    /** Spend unit, set ONLY alongside a recognized spendLimit. Never invented, never 'unspecified'. */
    spendLimitUnit?: 'currency' | 'invocations';
    /** createdAt (ISO 8601) from iat. No notBefore: draft-04 has no nbf claim. */
    createdAt: string;
    /** expiresAt (ISO 8601) from exp. */
    expiresAt: string;
    /** aud plus resource, carried, not enforced by the binding. */
    carriedAudience: IdJagCarriedAudience;
    /** External state the binding does not check. */
    externalState: {
        revocation: 'not_checked_by_binding';
    };
    /** Literal-only act reconciliation. Advisory. */
    actReconciliation: IdJagActReconciliation;
    /** The caller-signed verification attestation. */
    callerVerification: IdJagCallerVerification;
    /** Claims carried by reference with no APS narrowing meaning. */
    opaqueContext: IdJagOpaqueContext;
    /** Honestly marks confirmation/sender-constraint material that is not carried. */
    notCarried: {
        cnf: 'not_carried';
        dpop: 'not_carried';
    };
}
/** The result of the soundness verifier. */
export interface IdJagVerifyResult {
    /** Structural soundness: anchors recompute, attestation signature checks, no invented unit, draft pinned. */
    ok: boolean;
    /**
     * Never a bare safe-for-execution boolean. When ok and external constraints
     * (audience, revocation) are carried but unchecked, this reports
     * structurally_valid_with_unchecked_external_constraints.
     */
    status: 'structurally_valid_with_unchecked_external_constraints' | 'unsound';
    /** Per-check booleans. */
    checks: {
        draftPinned: boolean;
        sourceGrantRefRecomputes: boolean;
        sourceGrantRefPreimageScopeClean: boolean;
        delegationChainRootRecomputes: boolean;
        attestationSignatureValid: boolean;
        audienceMarkedUnenforced: boolean;
        noSilentSpendUnit: boolean;
    };
    /** Human-readable failures (empty when ok). */
    failures: string[];
}
/** Error raised when a verified ID-JAG grant cannot be bound (missing required claim, missing verifiedAt). */
export declare class IdJagBindingError extends Error {
    readonly code: string;
    constructor(code: string, message: string);
}
export {};
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