import type { BoberConfig } from "../config/schema.js";
import type { SecurityFinding } from "./security-audit-types.js";
import type { AuditDiff } from "./security-knowledge/diff-provider.js";
/**
 * Adversarial, fresh-context, contract-free finder->verifier stage
 * (spec-20260714 sprint 8, ADR-2/ADR-6 default-off).
 *
 * Runs sequentially AFTER the security auditor ("finder") inside
 * `runSecurityAudit`, fed ONLY the finder's `critical`+`important` findings
 * (never `minor`/`approvedAreas`, never the sprint contract — that strips
 * the sycophancy framing a favorably-worded contract creates). It is told
 * to DISPROVE each finding and may only downgrade (`critical`->`important`)
 * or drop a finding — never promote or manufacture a clean pass.
 *
 * Fail-closed, mirroring the finder's own `parsed:false => blocked`
 * inversion: any parse failure, provider error, refusal, or abort resolves
 * `ran:false`, and the caller (`runSecurityAudit`'s fold) KEEPS the finder's
 * findings unchanged.
 */
/** Downgrade-only, fail-closed verifier result. `ran:false` => finder criticals kept. */
export interface VerifierResult {
    /** Confirmed by the verifier — stays at the finder's original severity. */
    verified: SecurityFinding[];
    /** Real but not critical-severity — moves critical->important in the fold. */
    downgraded: SecurityFinding[];
    /** Disproved against the evidence — removed entirely in the fold. */
    dropped: SecurityFinding[];
    /** False on parse-failure / provider error / refusal / abort (fail-closed). */
    ran: boolean;
}
export interface VerifyParams {
    /** The finder's critical + important findings ONLY — never minor/approvedAreas. */
    findings: SecurityFinding[];
    /** The SAME AuditDiff the finder saw; hunks are the re-check evidence. Undefined in estimated-files mode. */
    diff: AuditDiff | undefined;
    projectRoot: string;
    config: BoberConfig;
    /** Time-box for this stage, owned by the caller (keyed to config.security.timeoutMs). */
    signal: AbortSignal;
}
/** Injectable seam so `runSecurityAudit` tests can stub the stage (mirrors `SecurityDiffProvider`). */
export interface SecurityVerifier {
    verify(params: VerifyParams): Promise<VerifierResult>;
}
export declare const runSecurityVerifier: SecurityVerifier;
/**
 * Parse the verifier's response into a `VerifierResult`.
 *
 * Reuses the same resilient extraction ladder as
 * `security-auditor-agent.ts:parseSecurityAuditResult` (direct parse ->
 * markdown-fence -> first-bracket-to-last-bracket slice), but INVERTS which
 * JSON shape it accepts: the auditor rejects arrays (it wants a
 * `ReviewResult` object); the verifier REQUIRES an array of per-finding
 * verdicts — any non-array, truncated, or garbage response is fail-closed
 * (`ran:false`).
 *
 * A finding present in `inputFindings` but never addressed by a matched,
 * recognized verdict entry defaults to `verified` — fail-closed means an
 * unaddressed finding is never silently dropped.
 */
export declare function parseVerifierResult(text: string, inputFindings: SecurityFinding[]): VerifierResult;
//# sourceMappingURL=security-verifier-agent.d.ts.map