import type { ApplicationService } from '@adonisjs/core/types';
import { type Disk } from 'flydrive';
export declare const PREVIEWABLE_MIME_TYPES: Record<string, string>;
/**
 * Wraps a temporarily-uploaded file living on this package's internal
 * upload Disk. Reconstructed on every hydrate from just the tmp filename
 * (which itself encodes the original client name) — no extra snapshot
 * state needed.
 * PHP parity: TemporaryUploadedFile
 */
export declare class TemporaryUploadedFile {
    private disk;
    private tmpFilename;
    constructor(disk: Disk, tmpFilename: string);
    /**
     * PHP parity: getClientOriginalName()
     */
    getClientOriginalName(): string;
    /**
     * PHP parity: getSize()
     */
    getSize(): Promise<number>;
    /**
     * PHP parity: getMimeType()
     */
    getMimeType(): Promise<string>;
    /**
     * PHP parity: isPreviewable()
     */
    isPreviewable(): boolean;
    /**
     * PHP parity: temporaryUrl()
     */
    temporaryUrl(): Promise<string>;
    /**
     * PHP parity: exists()
     */
    exists(): Promise<boolean>;
    /**
     * PHP parity: delete()
     */
    delete(): Promise<void>;
    /**
     * Moves the tmp file to permanent storage under app storage/<path>/, using
     * Node fs directly. If no app option is provided, uses AdonisJS core app service.
     * PHP parity: store()
     */
    store(path: string, options?: {
        name?: string;
        app?: ApplicationService;
    } | string): Promise<string>;
    /**
     * The tmp filename as stored on the upload disk — used by _removeUpload
     * and the cleanup command to target this exact file.
     */
    getTmpFilename(): string;
    /**
     * PHP parity: serializeForLivewireResponse()
     */
    serializeForLivewireResponse(): string;
    /**
     * PHP parity: canUnserialize()
     */
    static canUnserialize(value: unknown): boolean;
    /**
     * PHP parity: unserializeFromLivewireRequest()
     *
     * `value` ultimately traces back to client-controlled request data (a property
     * update payload can carry an arbitrary `livewire-file:...` string through
     * `/livewire/update`, independent of the actual upload flow), so the embedded tmp
     * filename is guarded here at the source — this is the only construction site
     * that isn't already covered by a caller-side `assertValidTmpFilename` check
     * (`_finishUpload`, `_removeUpload`, and the preview route all guard themselves).
     * Throwing here on a malformed/traversal-shaped value is intentional and
     * consistent with those other 3 sites: surfacing a clear error beats silently
     * constructing a wrapper that points at an invalid or dangerous path.
     */
    static unserializeFromLivewireRequest(disk: Disk, value: string): TemporaryUploadedFile;
}