/**
 * Central input validation for the TUI.
 *
 * EVERY external data source that crosses a trust boundary passes through
 * this module. Uses an **allow-list** approach: define the exact allowed
 * shape, types, ranges, and formats for each input; reject everything else.
 *
 * ── Trust boundaries ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
 *
 *   Boundary          | Source              | Validator
 *   ------------------|---------------------|--------------------------
 *   stdin             | terminal emulator   | validateStdinFragment()
 *   paste             | bracketed-paste     | validatePasteContent()
 *   AppProps          | CLI host            | validateAppProps()
 *   Reducer Action    | handleKey dispatch  | validateAction()
 *   Host callbacks    | CLI/plugin return   | validateCallbackReturn()
 *   Mouse events      | SGR protocol        | validateMouseEvent()
 *   Fleet telemetry   | Director/FleetBus   | validateFleetEntry()
 *   Restore data      | session JSONL       | validateRestoreEntry()
 *
 * ── Rejection over coercion ──────────────────────────────────────────
 *
 * This module **rejects** invalid input rather than coercing it, for
 * three reasons:
 *
 * 1. **Coercion masks injection.** Trimming whitespace from a string
 *    that contains an ANSI escape sequence leaves the sequence intact.
 * 2. **Semantic gap.** Coercing a value (e.g. clamping a PID to a valid
 *    range) creates a gap between what was validated and what the
 *    application actually uses — a future code path may use the raw
 *    value, not the clamped one.
 * 3. **Predictable failure.** Silent data transformation makes security
 *    debugging harder — rejection produces a clear error at the point
 *    of violation; coercion produces subtly wrong behavior downstream.
 *
 * The single exception is **normalization before comparison**: trimming
 * whitespace from an enum label before comparing it to the allow-list
 * prevents trivial bypasses (e.g. `"  off  "` vs `"off"`). This is
 * NOT the same as coercing the input — the normalized comparison only
 * determines allow/deny; the caller receives the original value.
 *
 * ── Conventions ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 *
 * - Every `validate*` function returns `ValidationResult<T>`:
 *     `{ valid: true; value: T }` — the validated, ready-to-use value
 *     `{ valid: false; error: string }` — a specific, actionable message
 * - Every error message follows the pattern:
 *     `"{path}": {what went wrong} ({detail}).`
 * - Size limits are defined as module-level constants with doc comments.
 * - Enum/union allow-lists are defined as `const` arrays and kept in
 *   ONE place so the allowed set is auditable.
 */
import type { ValidationResult } from './input-validation/result.js';
export { ALLOWED_ACTION_TYPES, type AllowedActionType, } from './input-validation/action-types.js';
export { ALLOWED_AUTONOMY_MODES, ALLOWED_CAPABILITY_FIELDS, ALLOWED_COLLAB_VERDICTS, ALLOWED_ENTRY_KINDS, ALLOWED_FLEET_CHAT_MODES, ALLOWED_FLEET_STATUSES, ALLOWED_KEY_EVENT_FIELDS, ALLOWED_MOUSE_BUTTONS, ALLOWED_MOUSE_KINDS, ALLOWED_PICKER_KINDS, ALLOWED_SCROLL_DIRS, ALLOWED_SDD_OPS, ALLOWED_SEND_MODES, TEXT_BEARING_ENTRY_KINDS, } from './input-validation/allow-lists.js';
export { MAX_ACTION_DEPTH, MAX_ACTION_STRING_FIELD, MAX_BATCHED_ACTIONS, MAX_ENTRY_TEXT_CHARS, MAX_FLEET_ENTRIES, MAX_HISTORY_ENTRIES, MAX_HOST_STRING_FIELD, MAX_INPUT_BUFFER_CHARS, MAX_PASTE_CHARS, MAX_PASTE_FRAGMENT_CHARS, MAX_PICKER_MATCHES, MAX_RECENT_MESSAGES, MAX_RECENT_TOOLS, } from './input-validation/limits.js';
export type { ValidationError, ValidationOk, ValidationResult, } from './input-validation/result.js';
export { validateFleetEntry, validateRestoreEntry } from './input-validation/state-entries.js';
export { validateKeyEventFields, validateMouseEvent, validatePasteContent, validateStdinFragment, } from './input-validation/terminal.js';
export declare function validateAction(action: {
    type: string;
    [key: string]: unknown;
}): ValidationResult<Record<string, unknown>>;
/**
 * Validate that an action dispatch is safe for the reducer.
 * This is a convenience wrapper used at the dispatch boundary.
 * Returns the original action untouched if valid, or throws with the
 * specific error message if invalid.
 *
 * In production, the caller can log the error and drop the action
 * instead of crashing — but for security boundaries, throwing is the
 * safe default because it prevents any partially-valid state from
 * reaching the reducer.
 */
export declare function ensureValidAction(action: {
    type: string;
    [key: string]: unknown;
}): Record<string, unknown>;
/**
 * Safe dispatch wrapper: validates the action, then calls dispatch
 * only if validation passes. Returns true if dispatched, false if rejected
 * (with the error logged).
 */
export declare function safeDispatch(action: {
    type: string;
    [key: string]: unknown;
}, dispatch: (action: Record<string, unknown>) => void): boolean;
/**
 * Normalize a string by trimming whitespace.
 * This is the ONLY normalization we do — and it's only used for
 * allow-list comparison, never for the returned value.
 */
export declare function normalizedEquals(a: string, b: string): boolean;
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