/**
 * Build a sanitized child-process environment.
 *
 * The bash/exec tools and MCP stdio transports execute LLM-generated or
 * configured commands. The parent process carries provider API keys
 * (ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, ...), VCS tokens (GITHUB_TOKEN),
 * and cloud credentials. Forwarding those to a child is an exfiltration
 * vector even with `permission: 'confirm'` — a compromised MCP server
 * or a cleverly composed shell pipeline can leak secrets.
 *
 * Strategy: copy a small, explicit allowlist of variables that real builds
 * need, then copy anything else that does NOT look secret-bearing. This
 * preserves user-friendly behavior (locale, terminal, npm config) while
 * blocking the obvious leak channels. Two value-side guards back up the
 * name-based filter:
 *   - any value carrying an embedded URI credential (`scheme://user:pass@host`,
 *     e.g. `DATABASE_URL`/`REDIS_URL`/`*_DSN`) is dropped (WS-01);
 *   - `NODE_OPTIONS` is forwarded but with module-preload directives
 *     (`--require`/`--import`/`--loader`) stripped so a parent-set value can't
 *     inject code into node children (WS-02).
 *
 * Override with `WRONGSTACK_CHILD_ENV_PASSTHROUGH=1` to forward the full
 * parent environment unchanged (opt-in for advanced users who understand
 * the risk).
 */
/**
 * Strip module-preload directives from a `NODE_OPTIONS` value while preserving
 * benign flags (`--no-warnings`, `--max-old-space-size=…`, etc.). Handles both
 * the `--require=./x.js` and space-separated `--require ./x.js` forms. Returns
 * the sanitized string (possibly empty).
 */
export declare function sanitizeNodeOptions(value: string): string;
export interface BuildChildEnvOptions {
    /** Session ID to inject as WRONGSTACK_SESSION_ID. */
    sessionId?: string | undefined;
    /** Additional env vars to merge (takes priority over filtered parent env). */
    extra?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv | undefined;
}
/**
 * Commit identity applied to every git-touching child process via the
 * `GIT_AUTHOR_*` / `GIT_COMMITTER_*` env vars. Env-var identity outranks
 * every `git config` layer (repo/global/system), so commits made by any
 * tool (git tool, bash/exec, worktree manager, plugins) carry this
 * name/email without touching the user's git config — hand-made commits
 * in a normal terminal are unaffected.
 */
export interface GitIdentity {
    name?: string | undefined;
    email?: string | undefined;
}
/**
 * Set (or clear with `null`) the git commit identity injected by
 * `buildChildEnv()`. Wired at boot from the user-level `config.git.identity`
 * (the config loader strips `git` from repo-committed in-project configs —
 * identity spoofing must not be repo-controllable) and re-applied at runtime
 * by the `/gitid` slash command.
 */
export declare function configureChildEnvGitIdentity(identity: GitIdentity | null | undefined): void;
/** Current configured git identity, or null when none is set. */
export declare function getChildEnvGitIdentity(): Readonly<GitIdentity> | null;
/**
 * Build a filtered child-process environment suitable for bash, exec, and
 * MCP server subprocesses. Strips API keys, tokens, and other credentials
 * while preserving system/tooling variables.
 */
export declare function buildChildEnv(optsOrSessionId?: BuildChildEnvOptions | string): NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
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