/**
 * @license
 * Copyright 2026 Steven Roussey <sroussey@gmail.com>
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 */
/**
 * Single source of truth for default numeric limits used across the
 * `libs` packages (task-graph, job-queue, storage, ai, tasks). Every one
 * of these defaults remains overridable at its call site (constructor or
 * function option); this module only centralizes the fallback value so it
 * is not duplicated and drifted across packages.
 *
 * See {@link SECURITY_LIMITS} for hard ceilings that are NOT caller
 * overridable because they exist to defend against resource-exhaustion /
 * injection attacks (ReDoS, decompression bombs, SSRF).
 */
export declare const DEFAULT_LIMITS: {
    /** Max nesting depth for subgraph task-event re-emission before bridging becomes a no-op. */
    readonly bridgeMaxDepth: 16;
    /** Default max attempts before a job is considered permanently failed. */
    readonly jobMaxAttempts: 10;
    /** Default interval (ms) between JobQueueWorker poll iterations. */
    readonly jobQueuePollIntervalMs: 100;
    /** Floor (ms) applied when deriving a worker's lease duration from its poll interval. */
    readonly jobQueueLeaseFloorMs: 30000;
    /** Upper bound (ms) on how long JobQueueWorker will sleep before re-checking a rate limiter. */
    readonly jobQueueLimiterMaxWakeMs: 30000;
    /** Size of the rolling window of recent job-processing-time samples JobQueueWorker retains. */
    readonly jobQueueMaxProcessingTimeSamples: 1000;
    /** Max rows the in-memory/IndexedDB fingerprint-dedup fallback will scan before giving up. */
    readonly jobQueueMaxFingerprintScan: 10000;
    /** Max characters kept when formatting a job error's `.cause` chain for diagnostics. */
    readonly jobErrorMaxDiagnosticsChars: 48000;
    /** Max levels of `.cause` walked when formatting error diagnostics. */
    readonly jobErrorMaxCauseChainDepth: 8;
    /** Max buffered cross-tab change-notification messages before older ones are dropped. */
    readonly storageMaxPendingMessages: 1000;
    /** Max redirect hops followed by the loopback-only AI provider fetch helper. */
    readonly aiLocalFetchMaxRedirects: 5;
    /** Max tool-calling turns for AiChatTask / AiChatWithKbTask. */
    readonly aiChatMaxIterations: 100;
    /** Max validation-error retries for StructuredGenerationTask. */
    readonly structuredGenMaxRetries: 2;
    /** Default absolute TTL (ms) for OtpPassphraseCache. */
    readonly otpCacheHardTtlMs: number;
};
/**
 * Hard ceilings that defend against resource-exhaustion or injection
 * attacks (ReDoS, decompression/pixel bombs, SSRF via redirects, cursor
 * tampering). Unlike {@link DEFAULT_LIMITS}, these are NOT exposed as
 * caller-overridable options — a caller weakening one of these would
 * reopen the vulnerability the constant defends against.
 */
export declare const SECURITY_LIMITS: {
    /** Max '[' characters allowed in a RegexTask pattern before rejecting (ReDoS guard). */
    readonly regexMaxBracketCount: 100;
    /** Max decoded pixels (width * height) accepted by the image raster codec. */
    readonly imageMaxDecodedPixels: 100000000;
    /** Max raw (base64-decoded) byte size of an incoming data URI on the Node image codec. */
    readonly imageMaxInputBytesNode: number;
    /** Max raw byte size of an incoming data URI on the browser image codec. */
    readonly imageMaxInputBytesBrowser: number;
    /** Max redirect hops followed by the SSRF-aware `safeFetch` wrapper. */
    readonly safeFetchMaxRedirectHops: 20;
    /** Max accepted length (characters) of an encoded tabular storage pagination cursor. */
    readonly tabularMaxCursorLength: number;
};
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