import type { AgentConstraints } from '../types/agent.types.js';
export interface EffectivePermissions {
    delegationDepth: number;
    forbidden_paths: string[];
    requires_approval_for: string[];
}
export declare class PermissionPropagationService {
    /**
     * Derive the effective permissions for a child agent given its parent's constraints.
     *
     * Intersection rule: a child can never gain scope the parent forbids.
     * Forbidden paths are UNIONED (child can never write what parent can't write).
     * Approval requirements are UNIONED (child inherits all parent approval gates).
     */
    derive(parent: AgentConstraints, child: AgentConstraints, parentDelegationDepth?: number): EffectivePermissions;
    /**
     * Returns true if the given file path falls under any forbidden path prefix.
     *
     * Both sides are resolved to their real (symlink-free, `..`-collapsed) form
     * before comparing — a lexical-only comparison can be defeated by an
     * unnormalized ".." segment, or by a mismatch between a caller's
     * already-symlink-resolved path and a `forbidden_paths` entry configured
     * using an unresolved symlink pointing at the same real location.
     *
     * A relative `forbidden_paths` entry (the form real agent personas actually
     * use, e.g. `.valora/`, `data/`) is resolved against `baseDir` — pass the
     * caller's actual working directory (which can legitimately differ from
     * `process.cwd()`, e.g. in exploration contexts) rather than relying on the
     * default.
     */
    isForbidden(filePath: string, forbiddenPaths: string[], baseDir?: string): boolean;
    /**
     * Returns true if the given file path matches any approval-required pattern.
     * Supports simple glob wildcards (*) in patterns.
     */
    requiresApproval(filePath: string, patterns: string[]): boolean;
}
export declare function getPermissionPropagationService(): PermissionPropagationService;
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