/** 10-mcp §5 — the door's canonical mount under the wire's own prefix. */
export declare const MCP_MOUNT = "/api/vendo/mcp";
/** 10-mcp §4-5 — the paths the door owns: its own mount (plus subpaths), and the
    FOUR exact origin-root discovery documents it serves — the RFC 9728/8414
    path-inserted metadata for its fixed mount, and the SEP-2127 server card. We
    match those four EXACTLY rather than claiming the whole `/.well-known/oauth-*`
    prefixes: a boundary-free prefix would shadow a host serving its own OAuth/
    OIDC metadata at the same origin (and would even swallow
    `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resourceX`). These are NOT wire routes — the
    door mints its own principals (§3), and the OAuth /token and /register
    endpoints are form-encoded POSTs — so they bypass the wire's principal/CSRF
    machinery.

    The two METADATA documents are asked for in two spellings when the
    deployment is mounted under a path prefix. RFC 8414 §3 / RFC 9728 §3.1 derive the
    well-known URL from the FULL resource URI, so a spec client asks for
    `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/maple/api/vendo/mcp` where the door's
    own prefix-local metadata URL says `…/api/vendo/mcp`. Both name the SAME
    door path, and the door already answers both — it strips the configured base
    path off the suffix itself (`door.ts`). The prefix is the path of the base
    URL the door was handed (`mcp.baseUrl` ?? `VENDO_BASE_URL`, the same
    resolution as `doorBaseUrl` in createVendo — never a forwarded header, which
    is the one channel an attacker can set). With no prefix configured the set
    collapses to the same four exact paths. */
export declare function doorWellKnownPaths(basePath: string): ReadonlySet<string>;
/** The deployment's path prefix, normalized exactly as the door normalizes its
    own (`""` for a base URL that names only an origin). */
export declare function basePathOf(baseUrl: string | undefined): string;
/** Is this origin THIS machine, and only this machine? The one question that
 *  makes a request-derived origin safe to hand a turn credential: a loopback
 *  address cannot carry the credential off the host, whoever set the Host
 *  header. `URL` throws on opaque origins (the literal string "null"), which
 *  are likewise not loopback. */
export declare function isLoopbackOrigin(origin: string): boolean;
export declare function isDoorPath(pathname: string, wellKnown: ReadonlySet<string>): boolean;