/**
 * SMI-5207: install-gate fixture suite for the sensitive_path action-context
 * gating fix.
 *
 * docs/internal/implementation/smi-5207-sensitive-path-action-context-gating.md
 * Wave 1 Step 3(f) / Step 4's "4c" row: `skill-installation.service.ts:233`'s
 * `if (!securityReport.passed)` branch is one of the FOUR consuming surfaces
 * with NO allowlist at all (`AllowlistMatcher` is threaded only through the
 * weekly-scan path, `skill-scanner/scanner.ts:105,109` -> `trust-scorer.ts`) —
 * so this is the surface where the plan's fix claims its primary practical,
 * user-facing benefit: a real local `skill_validate`/install user could not
 * have worked around a bare "secret/PII" mention with an allowlist entry;
 * only a detector fix helps them.
 *
 * Fixtures are shaped like the two LIVE false positives this plan closes
 * (data/skills-security-allowlist.json entries 12/13, SMI-6237/SMI-6425) —
 * their real GitHub repo descriptions, verified via
 * `curl -s https://api.github.com/repos/<owner>/<repo>` at test-authoring
 * time (2026-09-07), placed as plain SKILL.md body prose (not frontmatter,
 * not a code block, no action verb/shell operator nearby) so the fix's MF-3
 * gate (SecurityScanner.scanners.ts) is exercised for real, exactly as a
 * fetched GitHub SKILL.md would be scanned by `service.install()`.
 *
 * Lives in its own file rather than skill-installation.service.test.ts
 * (following the established per-topic split already used by
 * skill-installation.gap1.test.ts / .error-codes.test.ts / .multi-client.test.ts).
 */
export {};
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