/**
 * @fileoverview Content-based skill install path (private registry).
 * @module @skillsmith/core/services/skill-installation.content
 * @see SMI-5905 Wave 1: installFromContent() + resolveFreshAccessToken() extraction
 * @see docs/internal/implementation/private-registry-skill-install.md
 *
 * `install()` (skill-installation.service.ts) only knows how to fetch a
 * skill from GitHub. This module adds a second entry point,
 * `installFromContent()`, for skills whose content has already been resolved
 * elsewhere (a private-registry `content` JSONB column, read via a
 * per-team-member Supabase session or the `private-registry-get` Edge
 * Function — Waves 2/3 wire those transports; this module only needs the
 * already-fetched `{skillId, version, content}` triple).
 *
 * SCOPE TRIM (Sol review #5 — read before extending this function):
 * `installFromContent()` deliberately reuses only two things from the
 * `install()` policy chain:
 *   1. `writeInstallFiles()`'s disk-write + rollback-on-partial-write handling
 *      (skill-installation.io.ts), plus this module's own manifest-driven
 *      already-installed/force gate (mirrors `install()`'s ALREADY_INSTALLED
 *      check).
 *   2. A security scan at the `community` trust tier, via the same
 *      `classifyBundledFile()`/`isRejectableScan()` policy `install()` uses
 *      for optional bundled files (skill-installation.policy.ts) — applied
 *      here to every content-map entry (including "SKILL.md" itself, which
 *      falls through to the conservative 'structured' default class since it
 *      has no BUNDLED_SCAN_FILES entry).
 *
 * It deliberately does NOT route through the rest of `install()`'s chain:
 *   - `skipScan` is NOT an accepted option here. Registry-content installs
 *     always scan — there is no opt-out, unlike `install()`'s tier-gated
 *     skipScan.
 *   - Dependency-intelligence extraction/persistence (extractDepIntel,
 *     persistDependencies, checkDepsAgainstQuarantine), risk-history
 *     recording, AI-defence feedback, and co-install-session recording are
 *     all OUT of v1 scope — a known, intentional gap, not a silent drop.
 *     Wave 3's MCP `install` action and Wave 4's CLI command do not get
 *     these signals for private-registry installs yet.
 *   - Frontmatter/manifest validation on `SKILL.md` itself DOES still run
 *     (`validateSkillMd()`), same as any other install.
 *
 * PATH VALIDATION (Sol review #2, critical, confirmed exploitable): every key
 * in `content` is attacker-controlled — any team member with publish access
 * chooses these filenames — and flows into `writeInstallFiles()`'s
 * `path.join(installPath, subSkill.filename)` (skill-installation.io.ts:167)
 * with NO containment check of its own. `path.join('/a/b', '../../etc/passwd')`
 * escapes `installPath` after normalization, so every key is validated here,
 * BEFORE any disk write — see `validateContentKeys()`.
 */
import type { Database } from '../db/database-interface.js';
import type { ClientId } from '../install/paths.js';
import type { ProgressCallback, InstallFromContentOptions, InstallResult } from './skill-installation.types.js';
import type { ManifestManager } from './skill-manifest.js';
/**
 * Validate every key in a content map before any disk write.
 *
 * Rejects (as a single combined error, first offense wins):
 *   - path-traversal (`..` segment), absolute paths (posix or win32/UNC),
 *     NUL bytes, backslashes, empty/bare-"."/".git"-adjacent keys;
 *   - any key that, after `path.resolve()` against `installPath`, resolves
 *     outside `installPath` (a lexical backstop behind the checks above,
 *     matching `writeInstallFiles()`'s own lexical escape check);
 *   - two keys that `path.normalize()` to the same on-disk path CASE
 *     -INSENSITIVELY (SMI-6529 M4/M9) — a collision on any filesystem, but
 *     specifically catches a case-insensitive alias (e.g. "SKILL.md" and
 *     "skill.md" — literally the same inode on default APFS) that a
 *     case-sensitive string comparison would miss, in addition to the
 *     exact-string collision it already caught (e.g. "SKILL.md" and
 *     "./SKILL.md").
 */
export declare function validateContentKeys(content: Record<string, string>, installPath: string): {
    valid: true;
} | {
    valid: false;
    error: string;
};
/** Internal params bag: the caller's InstallFromContentOptions plus the service state
 *  installFromContent() needs (mirrors performUninstall()'s flattened-params convention
 *  in skill-installation.helpers.ts). */
export interface InstallFromContentParams extends InstallFromContentOptions {
    db: Database;
    skillsDir: string;
    manifest: ManifestManager;
    client: ClientId;
    onProgress: ProgressCallback;
    /**
     * SMI-5982 code-review fix #1: base dir for resolving a relative companion-agent
     * target (Antigravity only) — see writeInstallFiles()'s own doc comment.
     * PR-review follow-up: optional (not required) — an omitted value must flow
     * through to `resolveCompanionAgentPath()`'s own required-`baseDir` guard as
     * `undefined`, not be silently defaulted anywhere in this chain.
     */
    companionBaseDir?: string;
}
/**
 * Install an already-resolved private-registry skill's content to disk.
 *
 * See this file's header doc comment for the full scope trim vs. `install()`.
 */
export declare function installFromContent(params: InstallFromContentParams): Promise<InstallResult>;
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