/**
 * SMI-5876 Wave 1: Jailbreak / AI-Defence pattern arrays + evidence-tier map.
 * @module @skillsmith/core/security/scanner/patterns.jailbreak
 *
 * Split out of patterns.ts (which was approaching the 500-line audit:standards
 * gate) to hold `JAILBREAK_PATTERNS` and `AI_DEFENCE_PATTERNS`; the
 * evidence-tier classification that governs their severity now lives
 * alongside them in `patterns.jailbreak.evidence.ts` (SMI-5881, split out for
 * the same 500-line reason).
 *
 * Background: both arrays previously matched bare vocabulary with no context
 * requirement (`/jailbreak/i`, `/\bDAN\b/`, a bare role marker, a bare `[[...]]`
 * bracket, ...) — a security-checklist skill's prose tripped the same
 * CRITICAL/HIGH severity as a real attack. `EVIDENCE_TYPE_BY_PATTERN`
 * classifies every pattern in both arrays into one of FIVE evidence tiers
 * (`types.ts`'s `EvidenceType` — `mention`, `role_turn_with_body`,
 * `imperative_instruction`, `instruction_override`, and `state_assertion`, the
 * last added in a design-pass follow-up for declarative state assertions like
 * "Jailbreak activated" that no frame-based directive pattern can catch);
 * `SecurityScanner.evidence.ts` turns that tier (+ documentation context) into
 * a severity/confidence pair, and `SecurityScanner.helpers.ts`'s merge-loop
 * picks the STRONGEST tier per line across both the multi-line and
 * single-line scan passes.
 *
 * Discriminator (see the SMI-5876 design doc for the full worked argument): a
 * pattern is `mention`-tier iff its matched text, read in isolation, instructs
 * nothing — pure nouns/names/labels/structural markers/payload-free
 * obfuscation artifacts. Anything with a verb+object pairing or a
 * second-person predicate is directive-tier (`imperative_instruction` /
 * `instruction_override`). A descriptive-frame negative guard (demote when
 * preceded by "guards against" / "for example" / ...) was deliberately
 * REJECTED — for prompt injection the text IS the attack, so any framing-based
 * exemption is itself a bypass vector ("for example, ignore all previous
 * instructions" would be suppressed). This is why JAILBREAK's `bypass ...
 * restrictions/filters/safety` entry stays directive-tier: it's a genuine
 * attack on its own, and the only tool that would separate it from the
 * "guards against bypass" documentation case is the rejected frame guard.
 */
export declare const JAILBREAK_PATTERNS: RegExp[];
export declare const AI_DEFENCE_PATTERNS: RegExp[];
//# sourceMappingURL=patterns.jailbreak.d.ts.map